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Abstract  
 
Informal urban settlements are increasingly recognised as vulnerable to climate-
related risks. Their political-legal status is known to influence their vulnerability, but 
the linkages between state governance and vulnerability in this setting remain under-
researched. In particular, as more urban governments develop climate risk 
assessments, questions arise about how risks are defined, the politics behind the 
processes of risk definition, and the impact this has on local-scale vulnerabilities.   
 
The thesis proposes a new conceptual direction for urban vulnerability research. 
First, it draws on livelihoods debates to highlight the embeddedness of the 
livelihoods pathways that shape vulnerability in social and political relations. 
Second, the thesis shows how the idea of co-production, developed in the context of 
Science and Technology Studies (STS) and public policy, can be used to investigate 
the state politics of risk assessment in informal, urban areas. This theoretical frame 
generates insights at the interface between development studies and STS, providing a 
new perspective on questions of how urban communities adapt in informal areas, 
who adapts and what they are adapting to.  
 
The conceptual propositions of the thesis are applied to a landslide risk management 
programme in three informal settlements in Bogota, Colombia. The thesis presents 
empirical findings that illustrate (i) how risk assessments are shaped by state 
cultures, values and practices particular to informal sites in ways that drive new 
forms of inclusion and exclusion; (ii) how inhabitants respond to risk in the context 
of socially-embedded meanings and identities and their relationships with the state; 
and (iii) how people’s agency to transform risks depends on fragile social and 
political relationships and the exercise of political agency. The thesis argues for a re-
politicisation of approaches to understanding urban risk and adaptation, and for 
transformations in policy to reflect this approach. 
  
4 
 
Acknowledgements 
 
To my beautiful sons Rafi, born 2010, and Jo, born 2013. 
 
To Keith, my partner, without whom this project would not have been possible at 
this time. To my parents and parents-in-law for their support. In particular my dad, 
who will be relieved and proud to see this finished.  
 
To Tim Forsyth, my supervisor, for the original inspiration to ‘go urban’, his 
constant interest and encouragement, and for incisive comments and ideas returned, 
without fail, within days of receiving new drafts. 
 
To everyone in Bogota who gave time to be interviewed in 2009 and 2010. In 
particular to the people in Ciudad Bolivar who shared their stories, and their homes, 
often in the hope that it would change their lives. 
 
To Johana Gutiérrez Melo and Duvan Hernan Lopez (and his moto) for their 
invaluable research assistance in Bogota. 
 
To all those who so kindly hosted and supported me in Bogota: Edward Davey, 
Natalia Perez, Claudia Coca, Jenny Enarsson, Andrea Lampis, Carolina Figueroa and 
Tatiana Ome.  
 
To my wise friends Emily Jones, Lara Coleman, Sally Stares and Joana Setzer who 
have accompanied me the whole way.  
 
To the LSE PhD Scholarship Scheme and the University of London Central 
Research Fund for the financial support for this research. I am also grateful for the 
work opportunities at IIED, the World Bank, UN Habitat and KCL that have helped 
sustain this work and provided insights along the way, although the views expressed 
in this thesis, and any errors in it, remain my responsibility.    
 
In the final bout of revisions, I am indebted to Sue Redgrave for proofing and to 
Claire Watrinel for taking such good care of the children.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
5 
 
Contents 
Chapter 1 Introduction: The Challenge of Urban Climate Risk .............................................. 8 
1.1 Understanding climate risk in an urban world ......................................................... 8 
1.2 The politics of urban climate risk .......................................................................... 11 
1.3  The politics of vulnerability in the informal settlements of Bogota, Colombia ..... 13 
1.4 Rethinking urban risk and adaptation: research questions and thesis overview .... 16 
Chapter 2 Approaches to Urban Risk and Vulnerability and New Ways Forward ................ 21 
2.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 21 
2.2 Existing approaches to urban climate risk and vulnerability ................................. 22 
2.3 Livelihoods approaches to urban social vulnerability ............................................ 28 
2.4 Developing livelihoods-based approaches to social vulnerability analysis in the 
context of urban informality and risk ................................................................................. 31 
2.5 Conclusion: ways forward for urban social vulnerability research in informal 
urban settlements ............................................................................................................... 42 
Chapter 3 The State and the Politics of Urban Climate Risk ................................................. 44 
3.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 44 
3.2 The co-production of knowledge and state power ................................................. 47 
3.3 Rethinking the state and the co-production of urban risk ...................................... 53 
3.4 The societal politics of risk in informal urban settlements .................................... 63 
3.5 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 69 
Chapter 4 Research Methodology and Context: Exploring New Directions for Vulnerability 
Research in an Urban Context ............................................................................................... 71 
4.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 71 
4.2 Research design and case selection ........................................................................ 71 
4.3 Information elicitation and analysis ....................................................................... 73 
4.4 Research challenges and ethics .............................................................................. 79 
4.5 Research context: the ladera programme, Bogota, Colombia ............................... 82 
4.6 Study sites: the landslide risk zones of Ciudad Bolivar, Bogota ........................... 84 
4.7 Conclusion ............................................................................................................. 90 
Chapter 5 States of Risk: The Co-production of Landslide Risk Assessment in the Informal 
Settlements of Bogota, Colombia .......................................................................................... 91 
5.1 Introduction ............................................................................................................ 91 
5.2 The production of knowledge about risk in Bogota’s ladera programme ............. 92 
5.3 Unpacking the practices of urban risk governance: flexibility, un-mapping and the 
politics of inclusion and exclusion ................................................................................... 116 
5.4 State practice in broader institutional context ...................................................... 120 
5.5 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 123 
Chapter 6 ‘But we are not illegal’: Responses to Landslide Risk in Three Informal 
Settlements of Bogota, Colombia ........................................................................................ 124 
6.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 124 
6.2 Convergence and contrasts in state and local responses to landslide risk ............ 125 
6 
 
6.3 Finding a home in the city: Risk and the meaning of livelihood ......................... 126 
6.4 Risk in the context of meanings of informality and illegality .............................. 136 
6.5 State practice and the social experience of risk ................................................... 138 
6.6 Risk through relationships with expertise: contests over causes and responsibility 
in informal, urban settings ............................................................................................... 141 
6.7 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 143 
Chapter 7 Re-defining Risk from Below: Agency, Access and Vulnerability to Climate Risk 
in the Informal Settlements of Bogota, Colombia ............................................................... 145 
7.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 145 
7.2 Urban adaptation as politics: negotiating risk in the political domain ................. 146 
7.3 Responses to risk in the context of informal, urban livelihoods .......................... 151 
7.4 Conclusion ........................................................................................................... 163 
Chapter 8 Conclusion: Rethinking Urban Risk and Adaptation .......................................... 166 
8.1 Introduction .......................................................................................................... 166 
8.2  Do approaches to risk need re-thinking in informal, urban settlements and, if so, 
how?  ............................................................................................................................. 166 
8.3 How do states control for risk and vulnerability in informal, urban settlements? 171 
8.4 Policy implications ............................................................................................... 173 
8.5 Suggestions for future research ............................................................................ 174 
Annex 1: List of government interviewees .......................................................................... 177 
Annex 2: Semi-structured household survey ....................................................................... 179 
Bibliography ........................................................................................................................ 185 
 
  
7 
 
Table of Figures 
 
Figure 1: Landslide risk map for the city of Bogota .............................................................. 83 
Figure 2: Map showing location of Ciudad Bolivar district, Bogota ..................................... 85 
Figure 3: Photograph of the Brisas de Volador risk area ....................................................... 87 
Figure 4: Risk map of Altos de Estancia................................................................................ 89 
Figure 5: Landslide risk map for the risk zone of Caracoli, Ciudad Bolivar ......................... 96 
Figure 6: Photo of a risk communication sign, Altos de Estancia ......................................... 99 
Figure 7: Former community of Cerros de Diamante, Altos de Estancia ............................ 114 
Figure 8: Home owner’s house in the San Rafael barrio, Altos de Estancia ....................... 135 
Figure 9: Home owner’s house in the former barrio of Santo Domingo, Altos de Estancia 135 
Figure 10: Temporary shelter erected by newly displaced settlers in a cleared zone, Altos de 
Estancia ................................................................................................................................ 136 
 
 
List of Tables 
 
Table 1: Reasons cited for exclusion or delay in accessing the government resettlement 
programme from high risk zones ......................................................................................... 115 
Table 2: Characterisation of state and local responses to landslide risk .............................. 126 
 
  
8 
 
Chapter 1 Introduction: 
The Challenge of Urban Climate Risk 
 
1.1 Understanding climate risk in an urban world 
"Our struggle for global sustainability will be won or lost in cities." 
 – Ban Ki-Moon, UN Secretary-General, April 20121 
In a world now characterised by urban growth and settlement, understanding and 
adjusting to urban environmental risk is a pressing concern. More than half the 
world’s population now lives in urban areas (World Bank 2010). Debates about how 
to adapt to future climate risks have become increasingly politically prominent in 
cities over the past decade and reinvigorated discussion about how best to tackle 
existing disaster risks in urban areas (Carmin, Nadkarni, and Rhie 2012). Urban 
areas in low and middle income countries, where financial and institutional resources 
are often the scarcest, are most vulnerable to the impacts of weather and climate-
related events (Bicknell, Dodman, and Satterthwaite 2009). In turn, poor urban 
populations are often the hardest hit as both large disaster events, but also smaller, 
recurrent events cause losses to lives and livelihoods (ibid.). A large proportion of 
this vulnerable group live in informal urban settlements (World Bank 2011)2.      
Research into urban climate change risk, in particular in cities of the global south, 
has grown, but still remains relatively limited in its empirical breadth and conceptual 
scope (Romero Lankao and Qin 2011). The oldest, and arguably predominant, 
paradigm in urban risk studies focusses on defining the hazard in question and 
mapping its subsequent social impacts (ibid.). This paradigm gives rise to technical 
interventions reliant on predicting physical events and putting in place the physical 
and social infrastructure to protect against them (Moench, Tyler, and Lage 2011). 
There is a long history of critique from the field of disaster risk in response to this 
form of approach that also applies to urban studies (Varley 1994; Blaikie et al. 1994; 
Pelling 2003). Accordingly, a further paradigm in work on urban climate risk has 
drawn on this tradition to ask not just what physical events occur and what these 
                                                          
1
 Remarks to the High Level Delegation of Mayors and Regional Authorities, in New York, 23 April 
2012. 
2
 In the only guide to date as to the global scale of informal settlement, UN-Habitat estimates that one 
billion people already live in slums, or areas where households lack one or more conditions relating to 
housing quality, water and sanitation access and tenure security, and this is projected to double by 
2030 (UN-Habitat 2011). It is commonly the case that between one-third and one-half of the 
population of cities in low and middle income countries lives in informal settlements (International 
Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2010). 
9 
 
events do, but how urban livelihoods and institutions mediate who is vulnerable to 
risk and why (see, for example, Moser et al. 2010; Pelling 2003; Jabeen, Johnson, 
and Allen 2010; Chatterjee 2010). 
Two questions arise which warrant further research. First, what conceptualisations of 
livelihoods and institutions underpin approaches to urban risk as social 
vulnerability? Second, do such approaches adequately reflect the nature of 
livelihoods and institutions in urban settings, and, in particular, informal, urban 
contexts? Whilst ‘urban’ livelihoods and institutions should not be homogenised, or 
treated as divorced from rural contexts, studies on urban poverty and vulnerability 
highlight certain distinct features. The urban poor rely less on ‘natural’ resources and 
more on their labour power than in rural areas, more on housing as a key productive 
asset and on social connections to make their way in the city (Moser 1998). 
Characteristics of the urban context that shape the nature of urban poverty and 
vulnerability include density, the presence of state institutions, the marketization of 
goods and services, pressure on land and housing (International Federation of Red 
Cross and Red Crescent Societies 2010); heterogeneity, mobility, segregation and 
possible violence and criminal activity and precarious, under- and unemployment, 
over-crowding, poor quality shelter and infrastructure and urban environmental risks 
such as waste disposal (Fay 2005; Baker 2012; Moser 1998; Hardoy and Pandiella 
2009).  
In informal urban settlements, or those constructed outside formal regulation3, 
gaining access to infrastructure and services is critical to protecting against climate-
related risks (World Bank 2011; Revi et al. 2014). As Moser and Satterthwaite 
stress, this lack of infrastructure is not only due to a lack of resources but is also 
strongly related to the nature of politics and governance:   
The lack of protective infrastructure is partly linked to the constrained 
investment capacity of city and municipal governments. But in some 
cities, it is associated more with the problematic relationships between 
                                                          
3
 Amidst on-going debates about definitions of informality, Porter provides a helpful common 
definition, “Informality is associated with modes of human settlement and trade or exchange that 
occur outside of formal legal structures and processes” (p.115) (Porter 2011). As Duminy clarifies, 
this is often associated with illegal practices, but may also refer to those relatively unregulated or 
controlled by formal institutions (Duminy 2011). Whilst these may be strongly inter-related with 
formal practices, as Porter explains, “it is useful to hold these two modes of urbanisation distinct from 
each other to explore the nature of their relations more clearly” (p.116) (Porter 2011).  
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local governments and urban poor groups living in high-risk informal 
settlements. (p.9) (Moser and Satterthwaite 2008) 
In addition, insecure forms of tenure – and the associated lack of rights – are 
highlighted in several studies as affecting the provision of infrastructure and 
services, leading authors to define a ‘political-legal’ domain of vulnerability (Moser 
et al. 2010; Roy, Hulme, and Jahan 2013)4.  
As well as the need to extend this empirical work and apply it to different informal 
urban contexts (which vary from peri-urban to inner city settings), little, if any, 
scholarship has re-appraised the implications of these findings for our underlying 
theoretical approaches to understanding urban risk and vulnerability. Analysts and 
advocates of social vulnerability approaches stress their potential to account for the 
social, economic, political and cultural processes that drive risk (Ribot 2009) and to 
provide an actor-centred perspective that emphasises the role of institutions and 
power relations in risk formation (Miller et al. 2010). However, the ways in which 
urban climate risk is currently understood as a social phenomenon is restrictive in its 
attention to the important questions of politics, power and governance and in its 
exploration of the meanings, identities and perceptions that frame agency. This 
includes examining people’s adaptations to environmental risk in the context of real 
and perceived changes to their livelihoods, and not just in response to physical 
hazard events alone (Forsyth and Evans 2013). As Chapter 2 develops, these gaps in 
existing approaches reflect the limitations of the particular conceptual frameworks to 
which work on urban climate risk is indebted (Scoones 2009, Forsyth 2007). A wider 
reading of debates about livelihoods, access and entitlements potentially provides 
new insights and methods for existing approaches and better elucidates how social 
relations and institutions drive vulnerabilities to risk in informal, urban settlements.  
Indeed, the theoretical concepts and frameworks offered by the risk literature, 
drawing mostly on livelihoods and political ecology perspectives, provide little 
purchase on two further themes of importance: understanding the practices through 
which urban states govern, and the knowledge and expertise of government that 
supports this. Although vulnerability analysts have stressed that it is the lack of state 
institutions that drives vulnerability in informal areas, it is also the case that state 
                                                          
4
 Insecurity can take multiple forms, from the fear of eviction to the vagaries of renting, and 
landlords’ lack of commitment to housing improvement (Roy, Hulme, and Jahan 2013). 
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institutions are deeply implicated in their formation and development. Urban 
scholars in particular have noted that the traditional characterisation of urban 
informality as ‘beyond’ the state realm in fact masks the state’s role in defining land 
use and rights to services, and neglects analysis of the formalisation processes that 
are a feature of many cities (Roy 2005; Varley 2013; Porter 2011). Increasingly, 
state and non-state organizations are generating knowledge to address environmental 
risks arising from climate change or related hazards in cities. But the wider politics 
of how risk is identified, and connects to the political driving forces of vulnerability, 
is largely unexamined. How might these processes influence the emergence and 
nature of climate risk and vulnerability in informal, urban settlements?  
1.2 The politics of urban climate risk  
Questions of governance and expertise shift us onto post-structural terrain, in their 
concern with knowledge-power relations, meaning and identity, and the intent to 
offer nuanced and historically contingent accounts of these phenomena (Birkenholtz 
2008). Here, a growing amount of scholarship has emerged in the field of disaster 
risk to stress that urban disaster risk assessments and associated management 
practices are also tools for the exercise of state power and that purportedly 
‘technical’ knowledge about risk both enables and sustains particular forms of rule 
(Mustafa 2005; Rebotier 2012). The point is developed by Zeiderman, arising from a 
more explicit engagement with theories of governmentality, or the reasoning and 
practices that shape the conduct of groups and individuals. In counterpoint to 
existing vulnerability scholarship, he asks: “Rather than investigating how the poor 
came to inhabit landscapes of risk…How did “zones of high risk” come to inhabit 
the territories of the poor?” (p.6) (Zeiderman 2012). This scholarship shows how 
new techniques of risk governance function to define risk in heterogeneous and 
contingent ways, and redefine the ways in which poor groups engage with the state 
(Zeiderman 2012; Zeiderman 2013). 
Whilst this work raises important questions about how risk is politically embedded 
in cities, and with what effects, other scholarly traditions invite us to inspect more 
closely the constitution of technical or expert knowledge in the political realm. In 
some approaches to Science and Technology Studies (STS), it has long been noted 
that risk assessments embody particular social assumptions about agency, causality 
and responsibility, and arrive in context not as neutral exercises, but, to use Wynne’s 
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memorable phrase, ‘dripping with meaning’ (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Wynne 
1996). Further work in STS has proposed the idiom of co-production to understand 
how “how the making of knowledge is incorporated into the making of states but 
also how practices of governance influence the making of knowledge” (p.3) 
(Jasanoff 2004). Co-production thereby opens out from STS’s traditional concern 
with social influences on scientific knowledge to account for the workings of the 
social world and their influence on claims about the ‘natural’ order. In the context of 
urban risk, these theoretical standpoints enable us to move beyond existing 
scholarship to view the inner workings of risk assessment, and better trace its effects.  
The idiom of co-production, however, does not specify how we ought to understand 
the social component in question: the ‘black box’ of urban government. Existing 
scholarship on urban risk tells us little about how urban governments work in 
informal terrain, and how new categories and boundaries of formality, legality and 
illegality are constructed, although this has been of increasing concern in urban 
studies (Varley and Fernandes 1998; Varley 2013; Roy 2005). We should not 
assume either that states rule as one body, with state theorists advancing existing 
governmentality studies to analyse how the multiple bureaus, agencies and levels of 
state function together to produce poverty (Gupta 2012). Taken together under the 
framing idea of co-production, these theoretical ideas suggest a new avenue for 
investigating how urban states control for risk and vulnerability in informal urban 
settlements.  
This frame for understanding the co-production of urban risk and urban government 
also suggests that in order to understand citizen’s responses to risk governance, it is 
necessary to understand how people respond to the meanings, values and practices 
lodged within it. Earlier work in STS suggests that risks are experienced in this 
context as risks to people’s own identity, and mediated by relationships of 
dependence on state institutions and of trust in expertise (Wynne 1996). Placed in the 
context of urban risk scholarship, this perspective adds depth and nuance to accounts 
of agency in existing post-structural scholarship which stress how communities resist 
dominant knowledge (Rebotier 2012; Mustafa 2005) and how new risk subjects 
navigate the new architectures and frames of risk governance (Zeiderman 2013). 
Such readings of societal responses to risk also extend the treatment of agency in the 
urban vulnerability and livelihoods literature discussed in Section 1. The concern of 
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vulnerability theorists with the material conditions of vulnerable groups, however, 
gives rise to important questions that are not addressed in the STS or post-structural 
analysis of urban risk about the livelihoods constraints to and opportunities for 
agency, and the opportunities and constraints for particular social groups (although 
other post-structural scholars have certainly raised questions about variations in 
subjectivity; see Agrawal 2005).  
Bringing these perspectives to bear on vulnerability debates is important to 
understanding the limits to state power. It is also important in redressing the lack of 
research illustrating how city-wide policies impact on vulnerable groups themselves 
(Bulkeley 2010). Post-structural analysis has so far not grounded the study of the 
political and institutional dynamics of urban climate risk governance in concrete 
analysis of the outcomes for risk and vulnerability. This thesis aims to do so. It also 
operationalises at the urban scale new thinking in disaster risk studies about the role 
of the disaster management cycle itself in driving risk and vulnerability (DKKV 
2012; IPCC 2012). The point is important to disasters analysis, as it affects the 
conceptualisation of disaster events, as not only discrete events in time but as 
continuous, complex and unfolding phenomena (DKKV 2012).  
Finally, the frame I suggest here for understanding the urban politics of climate risk 
connects debates about environmental risk with those about urban governance. The 
separation of these two fields has been noted by a growing number of authors (Allen, 
Boano, and Johnson 2010). As Harriet Bulkeley notes:  
…the fundamental disconnect between scholars whose primary focus is 
on understanding the dynamics of urban governance, who have 
traditionally neglected the environmental sphere, and those whose first 
concern has been with understanding responses to climate change in the 
city, predominantly from an environmental or political science 
background. (p.240)(Bulkeley 2010).  
Analysing the practices of the urban state alongside the practices of climate-related 
risk assessment, I argue, generates new insights about the vulnerability of informal, 
urban settlements.  
1.3  The politics of vulnerability in the informal settlements of Bogota, 
Colombia 
The city of Bogota, Colombia, is typical of many cities of the global south in 
containing a high proportion of informal settlement, but, more uniquely, has been the 
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site of long-standing government interventions which allow further questions about 
urban risk governance and expertise in informal settlements to be explored. In 
Bogota, as in many Latin American cities, informal settlements ring the central city, 
spilling out onto the enclosing hillsides. Here, poor construction on old quarry sites 
and unstable soils, violent conflict, poverty, a lack of infrastructure and services and 
bi-annual rains all contribute to the occurrence of landslides and their ongoing 
impact on human lives and livelihoods. Whilst exact numbers are imprecise and 
contested, thousands of people live in landslide-affected areas. However, unlike 
many other cities, in Bogota a sophisticated and globally renowned system of risk 
management penetrates these areas, and has done so since the 1990s. A dedicated 
cadre of engineers produce some of the most detailed records of risk and 
vulnerability in the world, on the basis of which the city government has 
implemented a host of resettlement programmes, structural mitigation works and 
education campaigns (Dickson et al. 2010). These measures have formed - and still 
form - part of a broader government intervention to reweave Bogota’s urban fabric, 
recognising and formalising informally-settled sites. Bogota, and in particular the 
ladera or hill-slopes programme with its attention to these informally-settled sites, 
therefore stands out as an appropriate site in which to investigate the politics and 
governance of risk and expertise in informal urban settlements.  
As I visited the city’s landslide ‘risk zones’, I was struck by ongoing habitation in 
the ‘high risk’ areas, despite their demarcation for clearance through resettlement, 
and the reoccurrence of landslide events. Analysis of vulnerability to disaster and 
climate change risk in Bogota to date highlights how the risk management paradigm 
reflects an ‘impacts-based’ approach, aiming primarily to protect against the 
‘natural’, but has little engaged with the social vulnerability of affected communities 
(Lampis and Rubiano 2012). Untangling the complex stories of inhabitants and their 
families, existing social vulnerability frameworks explained the social forces that 
propelled the habitation of the zones and how people were able or unable to prepare 
for or recover from landslide impacts – but only to a certain extent. Important 
questions remained which included why some households were eligible for 
resettlement and others not, why some households remained and others left, and how 
to make sense of the petitions and court judgements pressed into my hands by 
desperate residents, revealing of a politics of claim and counter-claim by state 
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authorities hidden by official narratives of the hill-slopes programme. Further, risk 
zones became places of ‘para-legality’ for people (Chatterjee 2006), in and between 
formality and illegality, in which people complained that they were now more rather 
than less vulnerable to the impacts of landslides. What answers lay in the urban 
politics of the ‘predict-and-prevent’ paradigm? 
In a different theoretical vein, Bogota has also been the subject of recent scholarship 
interrogating urban risk governance. This work has historicised the phenomena of 
the ‘high risk zone’ and illustrated how the new forms of governance it engenders 
create new entitlements for ‘at risk’ populations, who negotiate for these entitlements 
within certain discursive frames (Zeiderman 2013; Zeiderman 2012). Further, the 
work highlights how the boundaries of ‘risk zones’ are not just set in the hard 
science of probabilistic calculation but fixed in highly contingent, personal 
encounters (Zeiderman 2013). However, this leaves unexplained the multiple forms 
of exclusion and inclusion I witnessed. Personal accounts indicated that one’s risk 
status was defined not only in the process of risk assessment, but in an, at times, 
bewildering bureaucratic classification system. I found striking parallels in literature 
on medical risks which traces the exclusion of HIV/AIDS patients and the inclusion 
of new social categories in health classification systems back into the co-production 
of risk and forms of institutional categorisation (Biehl 2005; Epstein 2009). Stood in 
the half-empty barrio of Brisas de Volador, overshadowed by a huge placard 
advertising the presence of a high risk zone, I asked: What vision of risk was really 
being projected from above? 
Further, in lengthy interviews in people’s houses, or perched on the cleared plots of 
their neighbours, the view ‘from below’ was marked not just by a concern or lack of 
concern with landslide risk but concern for shelter and decent housing, for 
recognition as citizens, a sense of mistrust in the seemingly arbitrary imposition of 
boundaries and classification systems by state authorities and the ‘mamagallo’ or 
‘tramitologia’, different words for the bureaucratic procedures that weighed down 
state projects and programmes. Different elements of these discourses were more or 
less prominent among different social groups, but the elements were inseparable. 
Alongside petitions and protests to state bodies, some people were moving out whilst 
others shored up their houses as best they could. Others wearily answered ‘we must 
wait and see’. What were people responding to, if not the probabilistic calculations 
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of state engineers? What explained who could navigate the new state architecture of 
risk management, or find a new home to rent elsewhere, and who could not? On their 
own, neither existing livelihoods-based nor post-structural accounts of agency could 
make full sense of these questions.  
The case study of the ladera programme in Bogota therefore provided the 
opportunity to investigate, first, the co-production of urban climate risk and the 
urban governance of informal areas, second, household and community responses to 
climate-related risks, including their presentation in formal risk assessments and, 
third, the impacts of this politics of risk on the form and occurrence of vulnerability. 
In doing so, the analysis built on existing theories of urban vulnerability and 
governmentality scholarship concerned with urban risk, interrogating the questions 
between them but also developing a new direction founded on debates in livelihoods 
research, urban studies and STS. This theoretical vantage point also raised new 
questions about urban risk management and adaptation policies and their relationship 
to urban policies of formalisation and resettlement, policies at the heart of the ladera 
programme.    
1.4 Rethinking urban risk and adaptation: research questions and thesis 
overview 
The predominantly informal nature of urban vulnerability to climate risks in cities of 
the global south, and the political nature of the drivers of vulnerability in these areas, 
raises new questions about the politics of climate risk and vulnerability that this 
thesis aims to investigate. Whilst increased concern to understand the potential 
impacts of climate change in cities has raised the profile of debates about urban risk, 
analysis of the politics of urban policy-making, the practices through which it is 
enacted and how it is received or contested by those it affects has been neglected 
(Bulkeley 2010). This is reflected in practice, as well as in theory (Birkmann et al. 
2010). Further, the politics underlying how urban risks are identified by state and 
non-state actors remains largely unexamined, with a dearth of analysis on how such a 
politics of risk connects to debates about the drivers of vulnerability.  
In light of these gaps, two over-arching questions guided the research for this thesis: 
1. Do approaches to climate risk need re-thinking in informal urban settlements 
and, if so, how? 
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With regard to this first question, as the first section outlined, studies of urban 
climate risk in informal settlements suggest the need for greater attention to the 
political and governance dimensions underlying vulnerability to risk. Yet these 
dimensions are currently inadequately theorised in existing analytic approaches to 
understanding risk, which understand risk either as physical hazard or as social 
vulnerability. In conjunction, through the wider reading of the livelihoods and 
entitlements literature advocated in Section 1, I suggest fresh perspectives might 
arise that reshape the approaches to analysing and acting on social vulnerability to 
urban risk. Reappraised, such approaches potentially shed new light on the drivers 
and processes underpinning the vulnerability of informal settlements. 
The research question therefore encapsulates a number of sub-questions: 
• How might predominant approaches to urban climate risk be re-thought to 
better account for the nature of risk and vulnerability in informal, urban 
settlements? 
• How might existing conceptualisations of urban risk and vulnerability be 
extended to account for the politics of climate risk governance? 
• What are the consequences of applying such an extended approach for the 
analysis of risk and vulnerability in informal, urban settlements? 
 
2. How do states control for risk and vulnerability in informal urban settlements? 
With regard to the second question, a focus on the politics of urban climate risk and 
the rise of climate risk governance in cities of the global south demands, I suggest, 
attention to the practices of states in informal, urban settlements. This includes 
understanding the politics of risk assessments in these areas. The impact of the state 
goes beyond planned risk management interventions, however, with the question 
intended to draw attention to the intended and unintended effects of broader state 
actions as they impinge upon risk and vulnerability. In addition, the question of how 
states control for risk and vulnerability allows for both positive and negative effects 
to be explored.  
The second research question can be broken into sub-questions as follows: 
• How can we best understand the politics and practices of state interventions 
to manage risk and vulnerability in informal, urban settlements? 
• In particular, how do state risk assessments of climate-related risks become 
sites of political inclusion and exclusion?  
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• How do state risk assessments co-produce risk with particular forms of urban 
‘subject’ and how does this impact on people’s ability to adapt to risk?  
• How do we explain the responses of societal actors to the state management 
of risk in informal areas, and how does this influence vulnerability and 
adaptation to risk?   
 
Thesis overview 
The thesis proceeds as follows: Chapter 2 ‘Approaches to urban risk and 
vulnerability and new ways forward’ is the first of two chapters that sets out the 
conceptual basis of the thesis. It critically examines current approaches to 
understanding climate-related risk in the social sciences and their application in 
urban contexts. The chapter justifies the use of a vulnerability-based approach in the 
thesis, but argues that a wider reading of the livelihoods and entitlements literature 
provides important insights for social vulnerability analyses of urban risk, and for 
vulnerability analysis in informal, urban settlements.  
Chapter 3 ‘The state and the politics of urban climate risk’ takes up the challenge to 
existing vulnerability approaches outlined in Chapter 2, the need to better account 
for the state politics of urban climate risk. The chapter introduces new theoretical 
perspectives from Science and Technology Studies (STS), political science and 
urban studies to do so. It suggests that more explicit engagement with co-
productionist ideas about the ways in which knowledge about risk influences and is 
influenced by the practices of government is necessary if we are to understand better 
how risk becomes politically embedded in cities. However, co-production itself does 
not specify how to understand those practices in an urban governance context; the 
chapter then sets out how ideas from urban studies and state theory might address 
this. The final part of the chapter discusses the question of understanding societal 
agency in response to state risk assessment, critically assessing contributions from 
the fields of disaster studies, governmentality theories and STS.     
Chapter 4 ‘Research methodology and context: Exploring new directions for 
vulnerability research in an urban context’ justifies the use of a case study approach 
to the research questions and sets out the methods used to answer them. It discusses 
the use of open, flexible methods such as oral histories to explore the research 
questions, and reflects on the challenges and ethics of research in low-income urban 
19 
 
communities. The chapter then provides a background to the case study and in 
particular the study sites for the research. 
Chapter 5 ‘States of Risk: The Co-production of Landslide Risk Assessment in the 
Informal Settlements of Bogota, Colombia’ draws on the theoretical frame set out in 
Chapter 3 to show how knowledge about risk used in the hill slopes programme 
influences and is influenced by the politics and practices of government in ways that 
reconfigure the occurrence of vulnerability and disaster. The chapter illustrates how 
risk assessments are shaped by the political context of informality, in particular the 
culture and values that have accompanied Bogota’s urban transformation. It 
examines how the practices of urban governance in informal settlements shape who 
is defined as ‘at risk’, and how exposure and sensitivity to risk is influenced by the 
operations of multiple state agencies and related actors. 
Chapters 6 and 7 then detail how people respond to climate-related risk in informal 
urban settlements. Chapter 6 ‘But we are not illegal’: responses to landslide risk in 
three informal settlements of Bogota, Colombia’ asks what risks people are 
responding and adapting to, and how these responses reflect the influence of 
environmental change on people’s livelihoods. The chapter extends livelihoods-
based vulnerability analysis by accounting for the role of socially-embedded 
meanings and identities in people’s responses to risk, and in their response to the 
state co-production of risk assessments. It also analyses how people’s responses to 
risk are shaped by the institutional relationship between state and citizen, and 
relationships of trust and inter-dependence with institutions. Finally, the chapter 
deepens the accounts of societal responses to risk assessment discussed in Chapter 3, 
highlighting how such responses vary across social groupings and how agency is 
shaped by convergence with, and resistance and ambivalence to state risk 
management, and the influence of state framings and local idioms of identity and 
meaning. 
Chapter 7 ‘Redefining risk from below: agency, access and vulnerability to landslide 
risk in the informal settlements of Bogota, Colombia’ examines how inhabitants of 
risk zones use their agency to re-define the risks they face, and what facilitates or 
constrains possibilities to re-shape risk ‘from below’. The chapter shows how forms 
of socio-political agency are exercised by the urban poor as an ‘adaptive strategy’ in 
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the face of risk. It examines how different strategies for managing risk, including 
such socio-political agency, are enabled and constrained, first, by the relationships 
and networks which shape people’s livelihoods options and, second, by the politics 
of institutional processes at different scales, from democratic reform in the city to the 
local politics of community organisation. The chapter therefore brings new insights 
to bear on questions of how people adapt and who is able to adapt in informal, urban 
settlements that extend both existing vulnerability theories and post-structural 
scholarship on urban risk.  
Finally, Chapter 8 ‘Rethinking Urban Risk and Adaptation’ concludes. The chapter 
reviews the main findings and original contributions of the thesis, arguing for a re-
politicisation of our approaches to urban risk. It discusses the implications for policy 
and for future research.  
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Chapter 2 
Approaches to Urban Risk and Vulnerability and New Ways Forward 
 
2.1 Introduction 
As Chapter 1 highlighted, poor urban settlements are not only highly vulnerable to 
the impacts of climate-related events, but the drivers, characteristics and 
consequences of their vulnerabilities have been much less systematically 
investigated than for other geographic sites. Informality – as a mode of settlement 
not just with a particular ‘way of life’ but as a way of life constructed by and within 
the processes of urban development more broadly – emerges as a key feature of 
many of these sites. The critical question that arises from this observation, however, 
is whether the analytic approaches we have for investigating climate-related risk and 
vulnerability adequately explain the dimensions of climate risk and vulnerability in 
this – pressing – context.  
Chapter 2 now examines current conceptual and applied approaches to urban risk 
and vulnerability, arguing that new analytic approaches may be necessary to fully 
understand risk and vulnerability in informal, urban settlements. First, Section 2.2 
sets out existing approaches to understanding urban climate risk and vulnerability. 
While impacts-based approaches, which trace the impact of physical events on 
particular social phenomena, dominate the landscape of urban risk analysis, the 
section makes the case for the ongoing relevance and importance of vulnerability 
analysis. It argues that vulnerability analysis allows us to connect up with the social, 
political, cultural and economic processes driving risk, as well as allowing for a 
strong conceptualisation of actors, institutions, power relations and poverty 
distributions.  
The crux of the argument, that current approaches to urban social vulnerability 
analysis in themselves need to be extended, then follows (Sections 2.3-2.5). The 
chapter traces the genesis of current approaches in livelihoods-based and political 
ecology thinking, but argues that the treatment of these fields in the urban climate 
change debate is overly restrictive. By engaging with historic and contemporary 
debates about the nature of livelihoods, in particular, new insights can be brought to 
bear on questions of risk and vulnerability. The chapter draws on four related debates 
to make this case: first, concerning the use of livelihoods frameworks to specify 
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environmental risks; second, debates within livelihoods scholarship about the social 
embeddedness of livelihoods activities; third, theories of access and entitlements 
relations; and fourth, debates within livelihoods scholarship but also development 
studies about the importance of understanding the political as well as social realm in 
shaping responses to risk. Based on insights from these debates, I argue for an 
approach to urban risk that provides a stronger account of agency (and the meanings 
and identities that shape it) and the political and institutional dynamics of urban 
informality in which agency is exercised.  
Further, Chapter 1 posed the additional research question of how states control for 
risk and vulnerability in informal urban settlements. This chapter provides a 
conceptual avenue for this question in highlighting how approaches to risk 
themselves may become instrumental to forms of governance in ways that may be 
contested ‘on the ground’. However, I conclude that existing theoretical approaches 
to urban risk fall short on addressing questions about how we understand states 
themselves and the role of expertise and the construction of knowledge in the context 
of state interventions. The following chapter takes up conceptual approaches to these 
questions, and asks what this implies for urban risk. 
2.2 Existing approaches to urban climate risk and vulnerability 
This section provides a critical introduction to the main approaches to understanding 
urban climate risk and vulnerability, situating urban debates in the context of broader 
debates about climate risk. It argues for the ongoing importance of a social 
vulnerability approach to understanding urban risk, and justifies the use of this 
approach in this study.   
i. Impacts-based and vulnerability approaches 
The (small but increasing) sub-set of studies on urban climate change have so far 
tended to replicate a broad distinction between impacts and vulnerability approaches 
to risk evident in wider studies of climate vulnerability (Romero Lankao and Qin 
2011), reflecting also a longer trend in disaster risk studies to adopt a hazards-based 
or vulnerability perspective (Varley 1994; Pelling 2003)5. The operationalization of 
                                                          
5
 The core difference between the disaster risk and climate change fields, however, is the focus in 
climate change adaptation studies on vulnerability to climate change-related shocks or stresses, i.e. the 
future impacts of anthropogenic climatic change, and how adaptation (or a process of adjustment in 
behaviour or characteristics) might occur in response to this specific sub-set of climate-related risk 
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disaster management and adaptation policies in cities has so far leant towards 
impacts-based approaches, which begin ‘up in the air’ with predictions of the 
physical phenomena in question (IPCC 2012; Baker 2012; Chatterjee 2010; 
Birkmann et al. 2010). The resulting ‘predict and prevent paradigm’ is so called as it 
tends to result in technical, technology-based interventions that rely on knowing 
future climate conditions in order to provide the appropriate infrastructure, be it 
‘hard’ infrastructure such as sea walls or dams, or ‘soft’ infrastructure such as early 
warning systems or new urban zoning regulations (Moench, Tyler, and Lage 2011). 
In this context, the concept of vulnerability itself tends to acquire different meanings. 
As a common general meaning, vulnerability to climate-related risks may usefully be 
defined as the susceptibility of a population, system or place to harm from a 
particular hazard (Cutter et al. 2009; Brooks 2003). However, as Brooks clarifies, 
risk may be more or less associated with the notion of biophysical vulnerability or 
the notion of social vulnerability (Brooks 2003). The former is more strongly 
associated with an impacts-based approach to risk and refers to the physical 
component associated with a hazard and its primary impacts (with Brook’s definition 
of hazard in itself meaning climate events as purely physically defined, so the 
manifestation of climate change or variability in the ‘natural’ system). Its primary 
emphasis, as described, is on identifying, defining and preventing the impacts of a 
physical phenomenon. The latter refers to the social properties of the system affected 
that make it susceptible to that hazard (Brooks 2003) and may be better referred to as 
the ‘social’ or ‘inherent’ vulnerability approach – with a primary emphasis on 
altering social arrangements in an affected place or system (discussed in more depth 
below) (Brooks 2003; Romero Lankao and Qin 2011).  
                                                                                                                                                                    
(Brooks 2003)5. This difference between fields leads to different forms of hazard assessment: in 
disaster planning, assessments tend to be based on probabilistic analysis, or the likelihood of a 
particular hazard or consequence from a particular hazard (with consequence encompassing various 
dimensions )(IPCC 2012; Brooks 2003), while climate change-oriented assessments engage more 
heavily with climate science modelling to provide long-term predictions of climatic trends (Dickson 
et al. 2010). However, in practice, given the uncertainties of climate science and the difficulty of 
projecting vulnerabilities into the future, institutional and social approaches to adaptation work have 
increasingly been rooted in present responses to climate variability. In planning terms, existing 
disaster response institutions and policies have therefore provided a major ‘entry point’ for city 
governments broaching adaptation issues, and climate change-related initiatives tend to focus, in the 
main, on current-day hazards which directly impact on poor populations, such as flooding and 
landslides, in contrast to the indirect effects of impacts to infrastructure or ecosystems. 
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Impacts-based approaches, therefore, map causation from physical events onto 
particular social phenomena and systems, such as a particular social outcome (e.g. 
mortality) or the outcomes for a particular geographic area, for which hazards data 
may be coupled with forms of socio-economic data to determine differential spatial 
impacts (Romero Lankao and Qin 2011). Where there is a sense of social 
vulnerability potentially embedded in these latter frameworks, in that risk areas are 
also determined by social variables such as income or housing quality, these are 
nevertheless ‘taxonomic’ or ‘linear’ modes of capturing socio-economic ‘snapshots’, 
or ‘adding up’ socio-economic information (Ford 2002; Cannon 2000).  
However, the use of ‘taxonomic’ indicators pre-defines what are actually complex 
relationships. Vulnerability does not always correlate neatly with poverty, and highly 
aggregate indicators may mask high differentiation in low-income areas (Adger and 
Kelly 1999). Relatedly, impacts-based approaches have been critiqued for being 
generally weak on dynamism and in addressing the processes that drive vulnerability 
as well as providing causal explanations (Adger 2006; Blaikie et al. 1994). Further, 
they neglect how institutions and individuals may act to mitigate disaster risks or, in 
response to climate change, adapt to risks, in accordance with their capacities but 
also their knowledge and values (Romero Lankao and Qin 2011; Ford 2002)6. 
Finally, although a major claim for impacts-based assessments is their ability to 
highlight how hazard parameters will change into the future, critics within the 
climate change adaptation field have pointed out that the nature of risk modelled into 
the future is subject to major uncertainty (Moench, Tyler, and Lage 2011; Boyd et al. 
2009). These uncertainties are compounded at the city-scale because of the 
difficulties in downscaling Global Circulation Models to provide localised data 
relevant to urban centres and communities (Moench, Tyler, and Lage 2011)7. 
ii. Down on the ground: Social vulnerability approaches   
                                                          
6
 One caveat to this might be more complex forms of this type of analysis – such as that 
operationalized in the recent World Bank Urban Risk Assessment Framework – which add an 
ingredient of institutional analysis as a measure of how well prepared a city is to respond to risks 
(Dickson et al. 2010). However, the institutional analysis tends again to be static, and often limited to 
the capacities of risk management institutions, neglecting the broader development context and 
processes (Adger 2006).  
7
 In addition, Ford argues that exposure-based approaches overemphasise extreme events and neglect 
day-to-day processes (Ford 2002). 
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The concept of social vulnerability, as mentioned, provides a different entry point 
into these issues. It has roots, first, in a more radical tradition of disasters research 
indebted to scholarship in political ecology that sought to show that although 
physical events might be ‘natural’ processes, disasters were inherently man-made. 
Second, in poverty research that stressed that events such as famines were not 
environmentally but socially and politically-determined. Vulnerability theorists in 
this vein therefore see climate-related disasters as the product not only of physical 
phenomena but also social, economic and political processes that leave particular 
populations physically exposed and economically and socially sensitive to such 
events (Blaikie et al. 1994; Brooks 2003; Adger 2006; Pelling 2003). These 
structural processes or ‘root causes’ are embedded in a system independent of hazard 
events. The critical aspect of vulnerability analysis for Ribot is that it accounts for 
causality, as knowing what vulnerability is a function of does not tell us why it 
occurs (Ribot 1995). In this way, “Vulnerability analysis turns impact analysis on its 
head by examining the multiple causes of critical outcomes rather than the multiple 
outcomes of a single event.” (p.119) (ibid.).  
Whilst the diverse traditions of this approach to risk have overlapped, different 
strands have emerged which will be critically discussed throughout the rest of the 
chapter. These ‘group’ in urban studies around: first, household-based livelihoods 
studies (such as Moser’s assets-based approach but also Pelling’s socio-political 
asset analysis); second, structural-entitlements approaches (which seek to understand 
the distribution of entitlements through the economic, political and social structures 
operating at higher scales, codified into a general ‘Pressure and Release Model’ of 
disasters by Blaikie et al. and applied in cities by Pelling); and, third, related studies 
concerned with the role of urban governance discourses in influencing entitlements 
and vulnerabilities (drawing on a post-structuralist concern with discourse and 
knowledge). These schools of approach move from a concern with the material 
aspects of what people have and do and how particular social groups might be more 
or less vulnerable, to one that is distinctly more relational, in which, as Bankoff et al. 
argue for vulnerability analysis more generally8:“Vulnerability is not a property [or 
                                                          
8
 This form of conceptual shift is also advocated in some contemporary thinking on adaptation to 
climate risk (although again without explicit expression in urban debates): “While existing asset-
based approaches are helpful in identifying the resources that are available to a system - be it at the 
individual, community or national levels - in coping with and adapting to a changing external 
26 
 
the stock] of social groups or individuals [and one might add households], but is 
embedded in complex social relations and processes [the flow].” (p.5)(Bankoff and 
Hilhorst 2006) 
This point is developed in the remainder of the chapter.  
An over-arching tension within these strands of study concerns their potential to be 
integrative of the biophysical and social dimensions of risk9. For authors such as 
Romero Lankao and Qin, examining the operational uses of different approaches, 
social vulnerability specifies the ‘who and why’ of risk, whereas hazards-based 
research forms the basis for the ‘what, when and where’ (Romero Lankao and Qin 
2011). The natural conclusion from this is therefore that the two broad approaches 
need to be integrated. However, other authors conclude that existing vulnerability 
frameworks can account for both aspects, although they disagree about how. Adger, 
for example, argues that Blaikie et al.’s Pressure and Release Model (in the 
political/human ecology tradition of disaster studies scholarship) brings together the 
biophysical and the social elements in ways that livelihood studies (derived from 
entitlements theory in poverty and development research) do not (Adger 2006). 
However, Forsyth argues that the Pressure and Release model presents a linear 
model for understanding the relationship (in which social forces act upon a ‘natural’ 
event), whereas the ‘Access model’, in the livelihoods tradition, provides a much 
better account of the ways in which natural and social processes are mutually, and 
iteratively, constructed (Forsyth 2003)10. 
In addition, I develop the argument in the sections below that livelihoods-based 
research has more to offer over-arching debates about risk and vulnerability than 
some authors have acknowledged. Whereas Romero and Qin exclude vulnerability 
research from the potential to engage with the ‘what, when and where’ of risk, 
Section 2.4.i takes forward debates about how livelihoods approaches may be used to 
specify locally-based experiences of risk (Romero Lankao and Qin 2011). In the 
same vein, Adger argues that a major challenge to existing vulnerability research is 
                                                                                                                                                                    
environment, they do not give sufficient recognition to the processes and functions that are so 
imperative to supporting adaptive capacity at the local level.” (p.3) (Jones 2011) 
9
 As Brooks notes, the nature of the hazard affects vulnerability: housing quality is an important 
determinant of vulnerability to flooding or windstorms, for instance, but less likely to be a 
determinant of vulnerability to drought (Brooks 2003). 
10
 Although the model is avowedly economistic, focussing on material resources at the household 
scale. 
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to incorporate such perceptual elements, and also institutional and governance issues 
(Adger 2006). Again, his analysis rests on a particular view of the conceptual 
underpinnings of livelihoods approaches (as centred on the analysis of capital assets) 
which, I argue below, when re-thought may provide more scope for engaging with 
these important issues.    
Before further developing an analysis of how to further these approaches in the 
context of urban informality, I briefly review vulnerability approaches in the context 
of resilience approaches, which have become a key tool for assessing, analysing and 
catalysing climate change adaptation in particular. 
iii. A systems approach: urban resilience and vulnerability 
Resilience-based theory (beyond simply the notion of resilience to mean the 
antonym of vulnerability, or capacity to cope and recover from climate-related 
shocks) offers a way forward in thinking about ‘coupled human-ecological’ or 
‘socio-ecological systems’ to explain the complex interdependence of the physical 
and social elements (Miller et al. 2010). Although theories in this tradition have little 
application so far in urban contexts, in part due to the complexity of urban systems, 
some attempts are being made to use resilience theory to capture the wide sets of 
risks and opportunities for response in urban areas (Romero Lankao and Qin 2011; 
Moench, Tyler, and Lage 2011). Adger stresses how there are common elements of 
vulnerability and resilience research, in their emphasis on the shocks and stress 
experienced by a system, the response and the capacity for adaptive action (Adger 
2006).  
The context of this research, however, did not lend itself well to the adoption of a 
resilience-based lens. Firstly, the specific focus on informal urban settlements does 
not lead to easy definition as a socio-ecological system, focussing as it does on part 
of the city whole and given that it is defined by its particular socio-political 
dimensions. In addition, resilience theory – in current formulations – lacks an 
explicit consideration of poverty-related issues and reduction which is, on the other 
hand, a key concern for social vulnerability analysts (Béné et al. 2012). Secondly, in 
asking about how states control for risk and vulnerability in informal areas, the 
project demanded a focus on actors, agency, the role of meaning in driving agency 
and related power issues and power structures, issues not well integrated into notions 
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of resilience (Romero Lankao and Qin 2011; Béné et al. 2012; Miller et al. 2010; 
Pelling 2011). Finally, resilience theory uses fixed conceptions of physical risk, 
whereas particular vulnerability approaches allow us to open up the multiple ways in 
which actors experience risk, and use risk definitions in social and political processes 
(Rebotier 2012).  
The next three sections now develop the argument for extending existing social 
vulnerability approaches to urban risk. The following section, 2.3, examines the 
genesis and application of such approaches in livelihoods research.  
2.3 Livelihoods approaches to urban social vulnerability  
Livelihoods approaches have been put forward as both a conceptual vehicle and 
operationalisable framework for understanding social vulnerability in both the 
contexts of urban disasters and climate change. Drawing on Sen’s development of 
the concepts of entitlements and capabilities as ways of thinking about poverty and 
food security (discussed further below), these approaches reflect a historical shift in 
poverty debates. First, away from income as the sole measure of poverty to a multi-
dimensional approach that captures the different ways in which people hold wealth; 
second, towards an approach that values people’s own experience and perceptions; 
and third, as an approach acknowledges their capabilities, or capacities to manage 
their own assets (Sen 1984; Moser 1998; Pelling 2003; Scoones 2009; Batterbury 
2011). 
However, livelihoods research is an inter-disciplinary endeavour and a broad camp. 
This section (and the following, section 2.4) discuss how existing approaches to 
urban risk sit within different traditions of the livelihoods approach, and argue for 
the need to bring new perspectives from debates about livelihoods into the analysis 
of climate risk. Scoones outlines how livelihoods perspectives informed the 
particular development of the Sustainable Livelihoods approach and then a policy 
framework. This approach and framework provided the most often used definition of 
sustainable livelihood as “the capabilities, assets…and activities for a means of 
living. A livelihood is sustainable when it can cope with and recover from stresses 
and shocks, maintain or enhance its capabilities and assets, while not undermining 
the natural resource base” (Chambers and Conway 1992, in Scoones 2009 p.175). At 
the heart of the framework lay an operational model in which the resource base of 
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households – their ‘capitals’ or assets – was linked to their strategies, influencing 
poverty outcomes. Assets were treated as equivalent and as substitutable for each 
other. However, as Scoones notes: 
Other work on sustainable livelihoods had emphasised other features. For 
example, the IDS studies [relating to environmental entitlements, 
discussed further below] stressed in particular the idea of institutions and 
organisations as mediating livelihood strategies and pathways. These 
were socio-cultural and political processes which explained how and why 
diverse asset inputs linked to strategies and outcomes. They were subject 
to power and politics and were where questions of rights, access and 
governance were centred. Thus a different explanatory angle, with a 
different disciplinary emphasis, was being offered within the same 
framework, one that emphasised complex processes requiring in-depth 
qualitative understandings of power, politics and institutions… (p.178, 
Scoones 2009).  
Work on urban climate risk has built on urban applications of the sustainable 
livelihoods framework, and its central idea of understanding the assets base or 
‘capitals’ available to households (Moser 1998). While the original approach and 
framework derived from rural contexts, work in poor urban settings stresses that the 
model of livelihoods ‘system’ that governs the salience of particular assets reflects a 
highly monetised economy where households depend more starkly than rural 
households on their labour, their housing (as an asset for rental or enterprise) and 
(related) financial ‘capital’, social capital and less directly on natural resources 
(although land for housing may also be considered a critical ‘natural’ capital, see 
(Moser 1998; Moser and Satterthwaite 2008; Pelling 2003). ‘Assets livelihoods’ 
approaches to urban risk are strongly rooted in this framework and its application to 
vulnerability to shocks (see Moser’s Assets-Vulnerability Framework of 1998). 
More recently, they have given rise to new frameworks for understanding risks to 
climate change in the form of Moser’s assets-based adaptation framework (which 
seeks to support the protection and accumulation of household assets by different 
actors at different phases of a disaster cycle, both pre and post) (Moser and 
Satterthwaite 2008) and the related participatory climate change adaptation appraisal 
(through which communities diagnose the impacts of climate-related events on 
household assets and strategies) (Moser et al. 2010; Moser 2011). The central focus 
of this work is on mapping household (and community) assets, their inter-
changeability and their measurement.  
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A key component of the assets livelihood framework is a focus not only on the initial 
assets that people ‘hold’ but also, as mentioned, the ways in which people are 
managers of their own assets, their strategies and their capacity to build on and 
protect what they have (Moser 1998). This processual element of assets livelihoods 
approaches distinguishes between coping, as a short-term response to a shock or 
hazard, and adaptation as a longer-term process of adjustment (Pelling 2003; Moser 
1998). In the context of growing debates about climate risk in low-income urban 
areas, numerous studies have concentrated on describing this coping or adaptation 
aspect, which Roy et al. helpfully separate out into practises related to the built 
environment (with many studies highlighting the centrality of housing construction 
and modifying housing structures and features (as a critical asset) to household 
responses to climate-related hazards), socio-economic practices (livelihoods 
diversification, storage, building financial capital through savings, loans or relief 
funds, and the use of local social networks (to provide financial support or temporary 
shelter where houses are inundated or damaged11) and mobilisation and political 
action (Moser et al. 2010; Wamsler 2007; Jabeen, Johnson, and Allen 2010; Douglas 
et al. 2008; Braun and Abheuer 2011; Roy, Hulme, and Jahan 2013). The treatment 
of these latter social and political dimensions is discussed further below.   
In addition, although livelihoods approaches do not define vulnerability solely by 
social grouping, as is sometimes the case for forms of ‘taxonomic’ approach to 
vulnerability discussed in the section above, such studies do often link particular 
types of coping behaviour to particular social groups highlighting how women, 
children and elderly groups for instance may be more vulnerable as a result (Moser 
and Satterthwaite 2008). In addition, the socio-economic status of households, tenure 
status and length of time in residence also emerge as important characteristics 
determining asset-related behaviour: with studies suggesting that the time and 
financial costs of coping are too great for some households, that renters or those with 
less tenure security are less likely to undertake building modifications than owners, 
                                                          
11
 Although one study in Bangladesh reports that the ability to diversify is actually severely 
constrained (Roy, Hulme, and Jahan 2013). 
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and that older communities may develop stronger social networks12 (Pelling 1997; 
Pelling 2003; Moser and Satterthwaite 2008; Baker 2012; Chatterjee 2010). 
The following sections, however, seek to develop our thinking about urban social 
vulnerability to climate risk beyond the more descriptive analysis of assets 
frameworks, with their focus on what households have and what they do as a key 
predictor of vulnerability. Whilst acknowledging the importance of these facets of 
urban life to social vulnerability, I outline how analytic approaches focussed more 
heavily on contested interpretations of risk, and, in line with the broader approach to 
sustainable livelihoods set out by Scoones, the non-material and structural 
dimensions of livelihoods might be brought to bear on social vulnerability analysis 
in conditions of urban informality.  
2.4 Developing livelihoods-based approaches to social vulnerability analysis 
in the context of urban informality and risk 
This section examines four dimensions to debates about livelihoods, arguing that 
insights from these debates can shape a new approach to understanding the 
vulnerability of informal, urban settlements. These are: using livelihoods approaches 
to environmental risk, debates about the social embeddedness of livelihoods, 
conceptualising access and entitlements, and the role of political institutions and 
agency. 
i. Using livelihoods approaches to define local experiences of risk  
As Scoones outlines, the development of the sustainable livelihoods framework 
narrowed the focus of livelihoods perspectives (Scoones 2009). This narrower focus, 
Forsyth argues, is reflected in policy and analytic work on environmental risk using a 
livelihoods approach. Here there is a tendency to ‘add’ a discussion of livelihoods 
“on top of pre-existing notions of environmental risk, rather than being a way to 
specify this risk using the perspectives of vulnerable people” (p.95) (Forsyth 2007). 
Forsyth shows how some applications of livelihoods approaches have been used to 
suggest new forms of livelihood activity (such as resettlement or diversification) in 
                                                          
12
 Researchers have also noted how tenure insecurity may lead to greater mobility, which impedes 
community-based responses (see Roy, Hulme, and Jahan 2013). However, home owners in the same 
study also reported limitations on their investments in their built environment due to the fear of 
eviction and informal development controls. 
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response to a presumed ‘known’ risk, rather than examining how risks and 
livelihoods strategies are linked by people themselves.   
Instead, Forsyth argues that a more flexible use of livelihoods frameworks, that 
allows people to specify how they experience climate-related risks, and their 
understandings of the causes of these risks, may be more socially meaningful and 
lead to more appropriate solutions (Forsyth 2007; Hinshelwood 2003). In more 
conceptual terms this implies avoiding pre-specifying relationships between 
livelihoods assets, outcomes and strategies and the policy and institutional context in 
which such livelihoods activities take place. In application, this implies allowing 
poor groups to fully specify how they view environmental problems, as well as how 
they themselves use resources to reduce vulnerability. This can be revealing about 
the causes of environmental risk, the potential for and variations in adaptive 
responses, and the ways in which proposed interventions may actually work against 
livelihoods (Forsyth 2007). In the context of adaptation to climate change, Forsyth 
and Evans stress the need to ask ‘what’ is being adapted to (i.e. the experience of 
risk), ‘who’ adapts (what are the socio-economic barriers to adaptation) and ‘how’ 
do these actions reduce vulnerability (Forsyth and Evans 2013). The ways in which 
the poorest adapt, they argue, “is not always to environmental or climate change risk 
alone, but to what these changes mean for livelihoods” (p.3, Forsyth and Evans 
2013).  
In the context of urban climate risk, it could be argued that the tendency to ‘fix’ 
external views of risk is evident in livelihoods studies which, although rooted in 
local social contexts, use external (climate or hazard) models as the only way of 
specifying what the risks might be, and/or measure people’s experience of risk solely 
against their recognition of risks as derived from those models13. Moser et al.’s 
participatory study, for example, is indeed inductive in many senses, but it remains 
focussed on climate change (or at least present climate variability) as the sole shock 
or stressor affecting households, with little discussion of wider sets of risks. In 
addition, in highlighting what actions people do take to cope with risk, the analysis 
                                                          
13
 Indeed, the dominance of this approach more generally in urban climate change adaptation debates 
(especially given the prominence of impacts-based approaches) led UN Habitat’s recent global review 
report of climate change issues in cities to conclude: “Many discussions of climate change adaptation 
start with a discussion of the risks that climate change is bringing or may bring and then consider 
what needs to be done to address this – without considering how the climate change-related risks fit 
within other risks.” (p.149)(UN Habitat 2011) 
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runs the risk of obscuring a discussion around individuals or households who neither 
act on climate-related events nor perceive climate risk to be a problem in the same 
way (in fact these people are said to bias the data, when they may actually be an 
important part of the data) (Moser 2011; Moser et al. 2010). 
The second part of this section looks to related issues of how livelihoods approaches 
might be better conceptualised to account for the non-material and contextual 
dimensions of urban livelihoods, and how these approaches might be applied in the 
context of debates about urban risk.  
ii. Towards a socially-embedded approach to livelihoods and vulnerability  
Echoing the broader sense of sustainable livelihoods set out by Scoones, recent 
scholarship debating the conceptualisation and analysis of livelihoods moves away 
from a more instrumental ‘assets livelihoods’ approach and emphasises the networks 
of meaning and power within which livelihoods decisions are embedded, and the 
social and institutional contexts that frame this (van Dijk 2011; Haan and Zoomers 
2005; Arce 2003; Scoones 2009). Such a view re-emphasises the structural factors 
that influence livelihoods practices and outcomes, away from fully agent-centred 
applications of assets approaches (which assume that households have total control 
over the allocation and exchange of assets). While Moser and Satterthwaite, writing 
directly about urban vulnerability to climate risks, acknowledge the need to move 
beyond analysis that focusses on well-established categories of capital assets, they do 
not explore how we might do this (Moser and Satterthwaite 2008). According to 
authors critical of an assets-based focus, not only are such aspects of livelihoods not 
readily captured in existing sets of capital assets, but they cannot by nature be 
reduced to a ‘fixed asset’ component (and thereby simply reinserted as ‘political 
capital’ or other forms of less tangible ‘capitals’)14. Instead, authors such as Kaag et 
al. suggest that livelihoods studies should be underpinned by: 
a processual perspective that puts people and their actions at the centre of 
the analysis but that at the same time considers these actions as the result 
and the constituent of broader and longer-term processes….from this 
perspective livelihood practices are seen as embedded actions and 
livelihoods is considered more a process than a system. (p.5) (Kaag, M. 
et al. 2003)      
                                                          
14
 Indeed, some authors object to the use of ‘capitals’ on ideological grounds, as reflecting a neo-
liberal project (Arce 2003). Van Dijk differentiates ‘capitals’ as something of value that is ownable, 
from assets, which are also claimable, and resources, which do not require ownership but which one 
can have knowledge of and access to (the broadest term of the three) (van Dijk 2011). 
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As Scoones argues further, this processual perspective is underpinned by the 
simultaneous analysis of structure and agency, or the “recursive links” that occur 
across scales between structural conditions and human activities (p.186, Scoones 
2009).  
In the urban context, this more ‘relational’ approach is advocated by a number of 
scholars of urban poverty and vulnerability who highlight how urban livelihoods are 
constructed through relationships of access to broader sets of institutions, relying on 
the provision of collective infrastructure and services which are also critical to the 
occurrence and magnitude of hazards and vulnerability (Hendriks 2011; Moser et al. 
2010). Pelling and High identify access and social capital – both relational in nature 
– as the most critical dimensions of urban vulnerability (Pelling and High 2005). The 
conceptualisation of access relations is discussed in the next section. In analysing 
social relations, Pelling’s study of the formation of social organisation across three 
low-income urban contexts moves forward from the ‘Assets-Vulnerability’ 
framework in the specific context of urban vulnerability to disaster risk (Pelling 
2003). Although indebted to this framework – and concerned to measure the strength 
of social ‘assets’ – he highlights, in contrast to the universal rational-actor model of 
the assets-based approach, that the formation of social capital is deeply historically 
and contextually contingent. Social resources may be drawn upon in different ways, 
with ‘latent’ social norms and trust realised informally or formally under particular 
circumstances. Critically, Pelling opens up the concept of social capital to consider 
how the politics of different states can build or erode patterns of social association in 
ways that affect vulnerability. For example, social organisations may be co-opted or 
maintained in dependent and clientilistic relationships by political regimes in ways 
that limit the engagement and the flow of opportunities for the most vulnerable 
households in particular communities (ibid.).  
Pelling’s work echoes long-standing debates about social capital that have focussed 
on whether a measurable, instrumental application of the term fails to address the 
social and institutional context – and attendant power relations – within which social 
norms and networks are forged and transformed (Cleaver 2005; Fine 2010). Social 
capital is shaped by the political trajectory, not simply the other way round, as 
implied in Putnam’s original work on social capital (the inspiration for more 
apolitical and instrumental approaches) which associated increased levels of social 
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capital with better governance and development. Implicitly, the argument of this 
work reflects the broader critiques of instrumental approaches to social capital 
levelled by authors such as Fine, namely that their focus on strengthening horizontal 
social ties obscures the importance of securing powerful ‘vertical’ ties, and the ways 
in which forging such ties depends on pre-existing power relations and differentials 
(Fine 2010).  
In addition, although insights as to the hermeneutic dimensions of urban livelihoods 
are found in anthropological studies of urban life (Holston 1991; Zeiderman 2013), 
this has received little attention in scholarship that takes a livelihoods perspective on 
urban risk. Yet analysis of the hermeneutic dimensions of people’s activities has a 
relatively long pedigree in livelihoods-oriented research. Authors such as 
Bebbington have sought to show how livelihoods are shaped by the non-material as 
well as material aspects of livelihoods-related behaviour (Bebbington 1999). For 
example, these entail particular cultural practices which are related to the forms of 
livelihood in a particular place (so, in rural areas in the Andes practices such as 
coming together for fiestas are both enabled and constrained by the patterns of 
presence and absence of people due to their livelihoods and out-migration) but 
constitute a distinct dimension of livelihoods (ibid.). They may foster or inhibit the 
development of social norms and networks but they are not in themselves the same 
thing (ibid.). Hinshelwood, whilst retaining the Sustainable Livelihoods framework 
as a heuristic device for analysis, stresses not the material role of livelihoods assets 
in explaining public reactions to the uptake of new technologies, but the role of 
perceptions of livelihoods threats or opportunities (Hinshelwood 2003). Arce shows 
how contestations over livelihoods diversification projects in Bolivia could only be 
explained by understanding the value of coca production to different groups, a 
hermeneutic dimension to livelihoods not captured by existing Sustainable 
Livelihoods approaches (Arce 2003).   
A critical underlying implication of the work of van Dijk and de Haan and Zoomers 
in particular is that, to fully understand livelihoods-related processes, analysts need 
to engage, firstly, with how households make decisions (beyond describing what 
they do), which entails, secondly, ‘breaking open’ possible a priori assumptions 
about how households and social groups function. De Haan and Zoomers discuss 
how to allow for the fact that households engage in ‘non-strategic’ as well as 
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‘strategic’ behaviour, which assumes that households react rationally in response to 
given opportunities or constraints according to certain pre-set motivations or 
objectives (Haan and Zoomers 2005). Doing so involves recognising the role of 
relationships, including power relationships, between household members, but also 
that household activities may be highly diversified and conducted across multiple 
locations (ibid.). This raises questions about what is actually strategic, and for 
whom. In addition, de Haan and Zoomers note how – by starting with the open 
question of how decisions are made and for whom – we might avoid automatic 
labelling of the interests of pre-defined social groups (on the basis, for example, of 
age or gender), presumably coming instead to a more contextually-defined idea of 
how these categories might be relevant to livelihoods-related processes.   
The following sections build on this section, examining over-lapping debates about 
access and entitlements and politics and governance, and the potential to bring new 
perspectives on these themes into existing approaches to urban risk and vulnerability.  
iii. The institutional dimensions of livelihoods: conceptualising access and 
entitlements 
This section analyses over-lapping debates about access and entitlement relations 
and their role in shaping social vulnerability to risk in urban areas. Three key issues 
arise for discussion: first, how to conceptualise access in the context of debates about 
more holistic livelihoods approaches; second, how we view access in the context of 
different approaches to institutional entitlements and, finally, access in the context of 
debates about political society and agency as well as social empowerment. The first 
two are discussed in this section, and the final issue as a subsequent section.  
With asset-centred accounts of livelihoods coming to dominate livelihoods studies, 
de Haan and Zoomers demand that livelihoods analysts give greater weight to the 
issue of institutional access as the ‘sina qua non’ of understanding how household 
resources are leveraged, maintained and transformed (Haan and Zoomers 2005). This 
echoes earlier livelihoods work that advocates the treatment of access on a par with 
or prior to assets as a ‘resource’ in itself (Bebbington 1999). In the disaster risk field, 
the ‘access’ model was developed in parallel to livelihoods work to explain the 
social causes of vulnerability (Blaikie et al. 1994). Certainly, an important strand of 
the urban climate risk literature addresses the issue of access to networks and 
institutions in relation to vulnerability, but primarily as a function of assets. In line 
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with Sen and Bebbington, who point to the role that human capital and other assets 
play in the ability to change the rules that structure distributions of assets, Moser 
links the asset portfolios of households to their ability to make demands on local 
government, and thereby reduce vulnerability (Bebbington 1999; Ribot 2009; Moser 
and Satterthwaite 2008). Pelling’s analysis, as discussed, highlights how social 
resources determine how people join together to prepare for and cope with climate-
related events (through community drainage clearance, for example) and also shape 
how people are able (or unable) to press claims on the state in ways that affect their 
vulnerability (for disaster relief, for example)(Pelling 2003). Both Pelling and Moser 
stress that the ability to take these forms of collective action is unevenly distributed 
across households, with urban households with very low overall asset levels often 
unable to spare the time or resources to participate or reciprocate (Pelling 2003; 
Moser and Satterthwaite 2008). 
While asset levels may certainly influence people’s ability to access key resources 
through institutions, a more holistic livelihoods-based approach stresses how access 
is not simply a ‘condition’ but a ‘relation’ so, for example, a woman’s ability to 
access particular markets depends on the social structures that govern her access (van 
Dijk 2011; Haan and Zoomers 2005). Therefore,:“Access is shaped by institutions; at 
the same time, these institutions are repeatedly confirmed and reshaped by 
livelihoods” (p.35)(Haan and Zoomers 2005). 
Relationships governing access are deeply embedded in relationships of power 
between different actors (Haan and Zoomers 2005; Ribot and Peluso 2003). Access 
analysis is therefore, according to Ribot and Peluso, about mapping the 
‘constellation’ of means, relations and processes and underlying power relations that 
enable various actors to derive benefits from resources (Ribot and Peluso 2003). 
Access relationships are also underpinned by the rules and conditions of sets of 
institutional entitlements. This move to seeing livelihoods as a function of an 
absence of entitlements, rather than simply a ‘condition’ of poverty, is key, for 
authors such as van Dijk, to reconceptualising livelihoods in ways that are more 
comprehensive and socially grounded (van Dijk 2011). Based on Sen’s original 
theory of entitlements, which marked a move away from ‘environmental 
determinism’ in explaining famines to a conception that emphasised that the 
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processes that governed one’s ability to command food were more important drivers 
than food or resource availability in itself (Pelling 2003; Dreze and Sen 1989; Sen 
1984), entitlements theory situates “a disaggregated (or ‘micro’) analysis of the 
distinctive positions and vulnerabilities of particular [social actors] in relation to the 
‘macro’ structural conditions of the prevalent political economy” (Jenkins, 1997, p. 2 
in Leach et al. 1997). In doing so, entitlements-based thinking draws out the causal 
factors that structure household vulnerabilities at multiple scales (Watts 2005; Ribot 
2009).  
In work parallel to that on sustainable livelihoods, Leach et al. (1997) propose a 
revised entitlements framework to counter the perceived narrowness of Sen’s 
original theory (with the revised theory used by Adger and Kelly in relation to 
vulnerability analysis (Adger and Kelly 1999)). This environmental entitlements 
framework recognises the importance of informal institutional processes such as 
social and cultural norms as well as formally-sanctioned ones in governing 
entitlements. The approach seeks dynamic explanations, which further recognise the 
role of power and debates about social meaning as well as material resources in 
negotiations over entitlements. Certain sets of claims may be contested by counter-
claims made by other actors, for example when hunters are banned from hunting in a 
nature reserve by state law but continue on the basis of customary rights they view as 
legitimate (ibid.)15. This suggests the need to understand the degree to which 
different people can influence decisions about endowments and entitlements (Leach, 
Mearns, and Scoones 1999). It also stresses the importance of sets of entitlements, 
rather than a single relationship, in governing outcomes (Leach, Mearns, and 
Scoones 1997). Ultimately, Leach et al.’s framework rests on a disciplinary 
understanding of institutions and institutional change that allows us to view 
institutional processes that transform (or map) entitlements as socially constructed, 
not just individually allocated. It provides a much more politicised account of 
entitlements processes than that contained in Sen’s original theory, which has also 
been critiqued within contemporary scholarship on famine occurrence for neglecting 
considerations of how different actors wield power and the role of political 
                                                          
15
 Although Bebbington helpfully reminds us that co-operation as well as conflict is important to 
entitlements distributions (Bebbington 1999). Other authors add that the way in which people 
negotiate these relationships may not in fact be so clear-cut, entailing, for example, trade-offs between 
powerful patronage and one’s own freedom (van Dijk 2011). 
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marginalisation, including the absence of formal rights, for certain groups (Devereux 
2001; Keen 2008).  
Accounts of urban vulnerability to disaster and climate risk to date draw on a number 
of developments in entitlements theory and its application in the hazards literature. 
Pelling operationalizes the idea developed in Blaikie et al.’s ‘Pressure and Release’ 
Model of the chains of causality that structure vulnerabilities to hazards in cities, 
through changes in political economy and in political regime (Pelling 1999; Pelling 
2003). He therefore shows how the forces shaping vulnerabilities in low income 
urban settlements relate to historical patterns of power distribution which may enable 
or limit the empowerment of poor households to take collective action to reduce their 
vulnerability to disaster risk (ibid.).  
Other authors stress not only the institutional structures and rules that lead to 
vulnerability, but the role of discourses and social labelling (key aspects, according 
to van Dijk, of socially-embedded ways of conceptualising institutions and 
livelihoods (van Dijk 2011). These studies highlight how predominant framings of 
disaster present it as a natural event to be managed through technical solutions, the 
consequence of which is that the socio-political and structural processes 
underpinning the construction of vulnerabilities are hidden and notacted upon 
(Pelling 1999; Aragon-Durand 2007; Rebotier 2012; Mustafa 2005). Underpinning 
these discourses concerning causes are related discursive constructions around 
whose responsibility it is to act on what (Aragon-Durand 2007; Rebotier 2012). This 
may be accompanied by social labelling through which inhabitants are seen as 
irresponsible or ‘bad’ in contributing to the proximate causes of disaster, for 
example, by dumping rubbish which clogs up drainage systems or settling in 
‘unsuitable’ sites (Pelling 1999; Moser and Satterthwaite 2008). These types of 
discourses are not only rhetorical in nature but are performative, in that they ‘do’ 
things in the world (Rebotier 2012), and can serve to limit the entitlements urban 
households can claim for the effective management of their vulnerability. In turn, 
this theoretical ‘turn’ in disaster risk research allows us to see how dominant 
constructions may also be contested and resisted on the basis of different meanings. 
This point is taken up in the following section and in greater depth in the next 
chapter on societal responses to risk assessment.  
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Two points for discussion follow to close this section. The first is to note that 
although urban vulnerability theorists have been increasingly concerned with the role 
of forms of knowledge and meaning in the construction of risk and vulnerability (and 
therefore conceptualising risk not just as an outcome of social and biophysical 
processes, but also as a driver of these processes (Rebotier 2012), they have little 
touched on intrinsic questions about the role and nature of expertise in these 
processes, the process of constructing knowledge, and how it is harnessed to and 
influenced by state policy and practice. How these questions are addressed by 
scholars of risk and what conceptual tools to use to do so are questions explored in 
their own right in the next chapter.      
The second point concerns how we understand the influence of the ways in which 
urban livelihoods are constructed on the processes that govern vulnerability, as well 
as vice versa, or the ways in which the socio-economic basis and practices of 
people’s livelihoods relate to issues of access and institutional entitlement. Pelling’s 
analysis adopts this perspective for the critical dimension of social capital, but he 
himself notes the need to examine in the urban context “the ways in which 
livelihoods [referring to a broader set of household assets] are linked with the social 
and political aspects of adaptive potential and vulnerability / resilience” 
(p.181)(Pelling 2003)16 – to which, in line with the analysis above, we might add in 
their non-material as well as material dimensions. The following section turns to 
analyse the political aspects that frame, and are framed by, livelihoods practices.   
iv. From social to political vulnerability  
A central critique of livelihoods studies to date has been their ‘de-politicisation’, or 
that livelihoods analysts had failed to address issues of politics and governance 
(Haan and Zoomers 2005; Hendriks 2011; Moser and Norton 2001).    
Examining the political as a distinct domain, it is argued, furthers debates around 
social capital by according an explicit role to political empowerment, the links with 
the politics of democratisation and allows for consideration of a wider range of 
actors and strategies (Hickey 2009). The argument has acquired particular salience in 
informal urban contexts with the work of Partha Chatterjee, who points out a 
                                                          
16
 This echoes a point made by Slater about the tendencies of urban governance research, which are to 
focus solely on the socio-political dimension without understanding how wider sets of livelihoods 
dynamics – relating to employment, housing, etc. – play out in the political arena (Slater & Twyman 
2003).   
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distinction between civil society – as the formal domain of engagement by citizens 
with the state – and political society, or the world of informal negotiation between 
those without full rights in the eyes of the state and their political contacts (what 
Corbridge et al. refer to as the “loose community of recognised political parties and 
their operatives, local political brokers and councillors and perhaps even lower-level 
public servants who depend upon the grace and favour of politicians” 
(p.189)(Corbridge et al. 2005). This engenders specific forms of political agency and 
relies on particular institutional framings of such population groups (Chatterjee 
2010; van Dijk 2011). Related dynamics (clientelism, factional politics) are noted in 
the context of urban vulnerability to disaster risk by Pelling (Pelling 1999; Pelling 
2003), but are not rooted necessarily in Chatterjee’s distinction between the politics 
of formality and informality, and are not taken up in Pelling’s formal analysis, which 
focusses on the role and formation of disaster reduction-focussed civil society 
organisations.  
Nevertheless, debates about these political dynamics mirror those discussed above, 
turning on whether voluntaristic rational actor approaches (such as the insertion of 
political ‘capital’ into livelihoods frameworks (Baumann 2000)) are adequate to 
capture the relational dimensions of such dynamics, and their embeddedness in 
particular fields of power relations. In the context of these debates, both Hickey, in 
the broader context of development, and van Dijk, in relation to livelihoods 
approaches more specifically, reach for the framework of political ‘space’ in order to 
articulate how the institutional and discursive dimensions of policy and the socio-
political practices of poor groups come together to influence poverty and inequality, 
overturning the tendencies of voluntaristic approaches to imply that the achievement 
of particular goals can be ‘read off’ the strategic activities that people are able to 
engage in (Hickey 2009; van Dijk 2011)17. 
This specific focus on the ‘political’ has also invited criticism from scholars who 
have argued that the concept overstates the distinction between social and political 
‘capital’ and civil and political society (Corbridge et al. 2005), and assigns to urban 
informal life a set of dynamics that are present across multiple areas and social strata 
                                                          
17
 Although Hickey notes, resonating a theme of this and the following chapter, that such an approach 
neglects a focus on the institutional practices of the state and consideration of the links between 
agency and identity (Hickey 2009). 
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of societies worldwide (Roy 2011; Corbridge et al. 2005). Corbridge et al. instead 
argue that such practices “can more reasonably be thought of as a set of interlocking 
political practices that are arranged along a continuum” (p.214)(Corbridge et al. 
2005). The formal practices of ‘civil society’ are, in essence, intertwined with the 
dynamics of the ‘political’ (ibid.). In this context, the term ‘socio-political’ assets, 
referred to by Pelling, may be more apt to describe the forms of resources poor 
groups draw on to reshape their vulnerability (Pelling 2003). 
2.5 Conclusion: ways forward for urban social vulnerability research in 
informal urban settlements 
This chapter has argued for a number of ways in which research on urban climate 
risk, and especially that exploring the nature and impacts of risk in informal urban 
settlements, might be advanced. First, it argued for the ongoing importance of social 
vulnerability approaches to urban risk, highlighting the weaknesses of the dominant 
impacts-based paradigm. Taking social vulnerability analysis as the starting point 
through which we might further understand the processes driving urban risk, I have 
nevertheless suggested that approaches in this tradition should be extended. In 
particular, I have argued that insights from broader livelihoods-related debates can 
usefully be brought to bear on the analysis of urban climate risk.  
The chapter concludes that the assets-based operational frameworks proposed by 
Moser and others for understanding vulnerability need to be re-framed to better 
account for local perspectives on risk (the ‘what’ of risk) and the nature of household 
agency, including the possible role of meaning, identity and cultural practice in 
relation to that agency. In addition, the chapter has advocated a move to a more 
relational approach that demonstrates how livelihoods are embedded in dynamic, 
social relationships influenced by underlying power relations. It also argued for a 
stronger emphasis on the institutional context shaping social relationships at 
different scales and the role of access to institutional resources to protect against 
risks. Pelling provides one account of urban vulnerability to risk from a 
livelihoods/entitlements perspective that relates the formation of social assets to the 
institutional context, highlighting how contingent, socially and politically embedded 
and historically determined such processes are. Extending from this contribution, 
however, I suggest the need for research that takes a broader view of livelihoods 
practices, their material and non-material dimensions, and situates them more 
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specifically in the political and institutional dynamics of urban informality 
(including engagements with debates about the role of ‘political society’).  
The chapter also notes that while urban vulnerability analysis has moved to 
accommodate the discursive as well as the structural forces shaping entitlements, it 
has lacked a specific focus on access and entitlement relations at the scale of urban 
governance. There has been little theoretical engagement with the question of how 
urban states govern in informal settlements, the policies and practices by which they 
do and the knowledge and expertise that underpins risk governance. It is to 
understanding these issues that the next theoretical chapter turns. Chapter 4 then 
outlines how new methods are needed for new approaches to urban vulnerability, 
and Chapters 5-7 present the findings of the empirical work.   
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Chapter 3 
The State and the Politics of Urban Climate Risk 
3.1 Introduction 
In Chapter 1 I introduced two central research questions to advance the study of the 
impacts of climate-related risk in conditions of urban poverty and informality. To 
summarise: Firstly, do existing approaches to climate-related risk and vulnerability 
need rethinking in such contexts and, if so, how? Secondly, how do states control for 
such risk and vulnerability in informal urban settlements? 
To this end, the previous chapter (Chapter 2) critically examined existing models of 
risk and vulnerability and their application in urban areas. It explored how theorists 
of risk as social vulnerability have sought to overturn, or at least provide a 
counterpoint to, predominant physically-based explanations of risk. Drawing on new 
currents in livelihoods and entitlements research (as underpinning social 
vulnerability theories), and debates about the political and socio-economic processes 
underlying urban informality and poverty, the chapter then outlined how new 
analytic and methodological approaches might be brought to bear on the challenge of 
understanding social vulnerability to climate-related risk in conditions of urban 
informality. The chapter concluded, however by acknowledging that two important 
concerns remained largely unaddressed: a critical lens on the construction of 
knowledge about risk and (relatedly) a more substantive conceptual treatment of the 
workings and practices of the state and societal responses to it. 
This chapter takes up these issues through a different conceptual frame. Again, 
against existing impacts-based approaches to risk, it takes as its starting point the 
idea that risk is socially and politically embedded. However, this chapter anchors this 
assertion in thought arising from Science and Technology Studies (STS), owing to 
its concern with the constitution of knowledge in risk assessment. Science studies 
and science policy analysts18 have long noted that the spheres of science and politics, 
expertise and government, are not easily separated (Forsyth 2003), and that there are 
real world ramifications from treating them as such. The adoption of science 
insensitive to the social and political conditions in which it is embedded may 
                                                          
18
 Science studies uses the philosophy and sociology of science to look at the context in which 
environmental science is produced whilst Science policy examines the co-evolution of scientific and 
political norms within policy. 
 
45 
 
undermine the ability to address the biophysical causes of (in this case) 
environmental risk, as well as result in policies that end up undermining the 
livelihoods of users of a particular environment and potentially end up increasing 
local vulnerabilities to risk (Hess 1997). The idea of risk as fixed and neutral, 
standing outside social and political relations, is not only a misnomer, but potentially 
damaging19. In turn, sociologists of scientific knowledge highlight that the manner in 
which risk is experienced by people does not simply reflect the fact of the ‘physical’ 
risk alone, but is a response to the ways in which official definitions of risk carry 
particular social and political assumptions and engender particular relationships with 
expertise (discussed further below). Indeed, Wynne, a classic proponent of this 
argument, suggests that responses to risk should therefore be understood in relation 
to this ‘identity risk’ rather than simply to risks ‘out there’ (see Wynne 1996 and Part 
2 of this chapter for further discussion of this view). The main point here is that these 
theoretical perspectives imply that we view approaches to risk and vulnerability not 
just as analytical paradigms but as forms of knowledge constructed and applied by 
particular actors in ways that are constitutive of the nature of risk (both as a 
biophysical process and in terms of the distribution and form of social vulnerability), 
and frame how states can and do control for risk and vulnerability.  
In the context of this thesis, this scholarship begs the question: how do we 
understand the inter-linkages between knowledge about risk and the social and 
political conditions of urban informality, in particular in the context of responses by 
states (here taken to mean local or urban governments) to risk and vulnerability? In 
order to develop the conceptual tools to answer this question I turn to scholarship in 
STS concerned with knowledge construction, in political science and political 
anthropology concerned with the nature of state rule and its effects, and, relatedly, in 
urban studies concerned with urban state governance and informality. Through a 
critical reading of these literatures, I argue we need to rethink the state, its politics 
and its relationship to knowledge about risk in situations of urban informality if we 
are to generate a full explanation of how (urban) states act upon climate risk and 
with what consequences. Unlike the last chapter, which examined structural theories 
of entitlements, these fields of scholarship are largely situated on post-structural 
terrain, in their concern with knowledge-power relations and questions of meaning 
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 However, this should not be read as a relativistic account of science.  
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and identity, and the intent to offer nuanced and historically contingent accounts of 
these phenomena (Birkenholtz 2008).  
The chapter is structured in three parts. The first begins by setting out debates about 
the relationship between state power and knowledge, examining the idea of co-
production as developed in STS and its potential to contribute to our understanding 
of urban risk governance. Although, I argue, existing studies concerned with the 
politics of urban risk management implicitly capture a number of aspects of co-
production, I suggest that more explicit engagement with co-productionist ideas 
about the ways in which knowledge about risk is influenced by the practices of 
government is necessary if we are to better understand how risk becomes politically 
embedded in cities. The second part of the chapter examines questions that arise 
when we seek to embed the idea of co-production in theories of urban state 
governance and how, in this context, to rectify a central challenge to existing co-
productionist accounts of state governance, namely the tendency to ‘black box’ the 
state. I examine three relevant debates: the first, how co-production might relate to 
ideas about the governance of urban informality emerging from the urban studies 
literature; the second, debates about how theories of governmentality and urban risk, 
whilst providing a new account of state practice, account for the political 
construction of expertise; the third, the implications for both of these debates of 
understanding the state as both a disaggregated and ‘hybridised’ entity (with 
‘hybridised’ describing the state’s relationship to non-state actors in the context of 
informal urban areas). Finally, the third part examines the urban state and the 
societal politics of risk. It asks how we might understand the meanings that ground 
the responses of societal actors both to hazard risks and to state efforts to control 
these risks, and the potential for agency to reshape the experience of risk and 
vulnerability. Again, I argue that STS opens up routes for understanding local, 
context-specific meanings of risk in ways so far unconsidered in the literature on 
urban risk and vulnerability, but that critical engagement with theorisations of 
agency in response to state power and in response to the specific conditions of urban 
informality are necessary to frame questions about the modes of, and possibilities 
for, particular societal responses to risk and vulnerability.    
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3.2 The co-production of knowledge and state power 
How, concretely, do we understand this intertwined relationship between risk 
knowledge and the state governance of informal urban settlements? This section 
embarks on this question by introducing the idea of co-production and its application 
to questions of knowledge and state power.  
The idiom of co-production 
Arising from inter-disciplinary work in Science and Technology Studies (STS) 
concerned with linking the practice of science to the practice of politics in a variety 
of contexts (beyond STS’s traditional concern with the practice and discipline of 
science within the scientific community), Jasanoff proposes the frame, or what she 
calls ‘idiom’, of co-production. This aims to interpret and account for the 
intertwining of knowledge about the natural and social orders (Jasanoff 2004). Co-
production, according to Jasanoff, is a way of thinking that allows us to see that the 
“ways in which we know and represent the world are inseparable from the ways we 
live in it” (p.2)(Jasanoff 2004). “Scientific knowledge”, therefore, “…is not a 
transcendent mirror of reality. It both embeds and is embedded in social practices, 
identities, norms, discourses, instruments and institutions” (p.3, ibid.).  
The idea of co-production arises from work in STS that seeks to define an important 
line between seeing science as pure ‘objective’ representation of a natural ‘truth’ or 
simply a (constructivist) reflection of social and political interests. Risk is both 
materially and socially produced. In the context of STS debates, this ‘fully’ 
symmetrical formulation (as Jasanoff calls it), marks a departure from previous 
approaches to science as ‘realism’ (the assumption that scientific statements 
accurately represent the ‘real’ world) or ‘constructivism’ (the assumption that 
scientific statements are shaped to some or other extent by social forces) in two key 
ways. Firstly, co-production seeks to avoid giving a primacy to either realm (hence 
Jasanoff’s reference to ‘full’ symmetry, in contrast to the work of earlier 
‘symmetrists’ who actually propounded a strongly constructivist view (Brown 2009). 
Secondly, co-production rejects the very idea of a distinction between realism and 
constructivism, or a separation of “the domains of nature, facts, objectivity, reason 
and policy from those of culture, values, subjectivity, emotion and politics” (p.3) 
(Jasanoff 2004).  
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The significance of co-production in the context of STS debates is that it retains the 
focus on the making of material things and exploration of the social influences on 
scientific knowledge whilst rejecting a deterministic account of both the social and 
the scientific. Not only does Jasanoff seek to reject any connotation that it is purely 
social phenomena that determine scientific knowledge and nature, but she insists that 
both the scientific and the social must be open to investigation. In particular, “one or 
another aspect of the ‘social’ risks being black-boxed, treated as fundamental, 
granted agency, and so exempted from further analysis” (p.20, ibid.). While this 
‘constitutive’ element of co-production, or the examination of the ways in which we 
arrive at particular knowledges about nature and society, draws on the concept of 
hybridisation developed by Latour to describe the (dynamic) ways in which objects 
that are in fact socio-natural come to be produced as either social or natural (Latour 
1993), co-production takes this further, examining their framing, legitimation and 
reception by different actors in the context of wider societal and policy processes in 
which power distributions, values, cultures and ideologies are seen as instrumental to 
shaping human agency (Jasanoff 2004). 
There are two core elements to co-production. The first, the constitutive, examines 
the ways in which particular states of knowledge about nature and society are arrived 
at and held (or not). The second, the interactional, examines the organisation and re-
organisation of knowledge after this fact, or how we know what we do. The practical 
framework that Jasanoff then proposes is to analyse the production of knowledge and 
technology alongside analysis of the making of identities, institutions, 
representations and discourses. Through this analysis, she argues, one can see how 
scientific ‘instruments’ serve particular functions in maintaining order (morally, 
politically and symbolically, although of course this may be contested) and help 
stabilise conceptions in both the constitutive and interactional domains (Jasanoff 
2004).  
Moving to analyse states and their knowledge claims, co-production can then 
exemplify “how knowledge-making is incorporated into practices of state-
making…and, in reverse, how practices of governance influence the making and use 
of knowledge” (p.3)(Jasanoff 2004). In the constitutive mode of thinking, the work 
of James Scott illustrates how knowledge is constituted as part of the exercise of 
modern state power (although Scott’s analysis does not exemplify co-production in 
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its totality; see below). States ‘see like states’ through practices of representation that 
reflect the exercise of state power. “The builders of the modern nation state do not 
merely describe, observe and map”, Scott states, “they strive to shape a people and 
landscape that will fit their techniques of observation” (p.82) (Scott 1998). 
Knowledge production by states, he posits, is simplifying, standardising and 
abstracting of the complex social and natural worlds states seek to govern in order 
that they can be made legible, acted upon and ultimately controlled. What is made 
legible and how, however, is a deeply political process in that it conforms to the 
interests of states (both for power but also the ‘modernist’ state’s cultural and 
aesthetic affiliation with regimented and ordered forms of planning), and may be 
contested by the subjects who are to be ‘read’ through new systems of classification 
and representation. Indeed, Scott argues that the principal reason for the failure of 
major modernising schemes lies in the de-privileging of (indeed the attempt to 
suppress) practical, local-based knowledge (or the complex systems of functioning 
found in the natural world), which re-emerges in tacit and not so tacit forms of 
resistance (for a discussion of forms of agency and knowledge see Section 3.4 of this 
chapter).  
Of course, Scott’s reading of the relationship between knowledge and power in high 
modern states is also deeply interactional, in the affinity that exists between 
particular forms of expertise, the aesthetic predilections and political interests of 
those in power and the (brute) exercise of state authority. Jasanoff provides other 
examples, however, through which to see this ‘conditional’ relationship between 
expertise (such as risk assessment) and politics. She inserts Wynne’s work to 
demonstrate how instruments of classification (such as risk assessment) are used in 
democracies to respond to public anxiety, both disciplining subjects but also creating 
a promise of control. In addition, her own work on the use of scientific assessment in 
US politics shows how the purported reliability, objectivity and expertise of 
vulnerability, risk and cost-benefit assessments provide the perception of neutrality 
that makes these approaches favourable for conflict resolution in the context of the 
scepticism of American politics. The result is not only the legitimation of science 
and technology but the constitution of a democratically accountable regime (Jasanoff 
2004). Other examples from more newly-fledged democracies (although not 
explicitly ‘co-productionist’ accounts) show how the creation of ‘regimes’ of state 
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citizenship based on the emergence of bio-medical risks (such as nuclear 
contamination), alongside the new ‘technologies’ of risk assessment and treatment, 
legitimates other forms of state identity. The Ukrainian state’s response to Chernobyl 
(although in practice limited), Petryna argues, works to uphold its claim to protect 
and recover the truth about the Chernobyl disaster’s impacts, in contrast to Soviet 
repression (Petryna 2005).  
Political influences on knowledge and studies of urban risk 
A number of studies concerned with urban disaster risk management in (what all turn 
out to be) informal urban settlements claim that risk assessment as a particular form 
of state knowledge forms one mode of enforcing state domination over people and 
spaces. As Rebotier highlights, the spatial demarcation of risk zones (an obvious 
form of abstract ‘mapping’) is often closely tied to state projects of territorial 
ordering in cities (Mustafa 2005; Rebotier 2012). A number of authors emphasise 
how technocratic, physical-based systems of risk management find ‘fit’ with 
centralised, elite-driven systems of government, and may in some cases be further 
legitimised by the assumed visibility and political un-contestability of engineering 
solutions (an argument made by Rebotier and Nathan for Caracas and La Paz 
respectively (Rebotier 2012; Nathan 2008).  
In direct response to Mustafa’s work, which highlights how a particular politics 
influences knowledge construction, Lane et al. write (in reference to flood risk 
management in the UK) that, as well as highlighting how a scientific account of risk 
comes to dominate in a particular context:  
….the work also points to the need to understand why it is that scientific 
accounts take on particular forms. The decisions to construct a levée or to 
embark upon upstream land management are both decisions to make 
interventions in a hazardscape. Such decisions aim to prevent certain 
kinds of futures from happening. However, there are a multitude of 
interventions that could be considered, each of which require and are 
sustained by particular (and overlapping) suites of scientific practices 
relating to how data are collected and used, how mathematical models 
are developed and implemented, the assumptions made regarding 
possible future scenarios and the weight given to non-conventional 
sources of knowledge such as the information provided by flood 
victims…….The notion that a ‘suite of practices’ exists and has impacts 
in terms of how it causes interventions to take on particular forms is 
troubling, precisely because it unsettles the assumption that scientific 
analysis can unambiguously inform risk management.” (p.1787) (Lane, 
Landström, and Whatmore 2011) 
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However, the existing urban risk scholarship falls short of engaging fully with these 
‘constitutive’ questions related to risk assessment, which allows us to see the ways in 
which socio-political assumptions are built into ‘technical’ knowledge. Where Lane 
et al. direct us, for example, is towards understanding not only how ‘expert’ 
knowledge is constructed in ways that do not conform to the physical and social 
world beyond the model, but also how they embody assumptions related to the 
institutional environment in which such expertise is made. Mustafa alludes to this 
but does not develop the point theoretically – he posits that “Many of the engineering 
solutions are driven by the explicit assumption…..that removal of people from the 
[flood] plain is impossible” (p.581) (Mustafa 2005). Lane et al. provide a more 
comprehensive analysis, and a converse scenario. They conclude that the need to 
provide flood risk assessments which can be operationalized in cost-benefit terms 
means closing down some of the ambiguity and uncertainty inherent in assessing 
future scenarios. What is allowed to remain ‘stable’ and what not is highly 
contingent and, in the process, particular institutional assumptions are written in to 
particular projections. One such assumption is that building and development will be 
prevented, despite knowledge that the consequences of floods are not simply related 
to the physical location of development but also to other factors beyond regulation 
(such as how properties are used and furnished) and knowledge indicating that 
regulation has been historically ineffective (Lane, Landström, and Whatmore 2011). 
In this regard, Lane et al. echo Wynne’s broader observation that assumptions made 
by ‘experts’ may take for granted the competence and trustworthiness of the 
institutions charged with controlling risk, or indeed may conceal failures to do so, 
thereby narrowing what may actually be ‘wider and more indeterminate’ risk issues 
(in which institutions themselves influence the scale of material risk) (Wynne 1996).  
Lane et al.’s analysis encompasses older concerns within the sociology of scientific 
knowledge, about how social assumptions become inscribed in knowledge systems. 
As Jasanoff and Wynne write in an earlier work: “constructivist policy analysis 
recognises not only that issue framings do not flow deterministically from problems 
fixed by nature, but also that particular framings of environmental problems build 
upon specific models of agency, causality and responsibility” (p.5) (Jasanoff and 
Wynne 1998). For example, in deciding safe exposure levels for pesticide chemicals, 
regulatory agencies make essentially normative judgements about the ways in which 
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workers should behave (ibid.). Although some of this earlier work in STS is very 
much tied to the expert construction of knowledge, devoid of considerations of 
political agency, the fact that such knowledge comes, as Wynne memorably 
describes, ‘dripping with meaning’ (Wynne 1996) is important to understanding the 
contingency of risk assessment, as well as how it is received and acted upon, as I 
discuss in Section 3.4.  
Co-production takes this analysis forward, examining the co-constitution of the 
natural and the social in ways unrepresented so far in the field of urban risk. In an 
example from the field of medical risk, Epstein shows how scientific and state 
policies and categories were essentially ‘hybridised’ to produce a form of health 
classification in the US (Epstein 2009). The importance of his study in this context is 
to show how the resulting form of categorisation ‘simultaneously served’ logics 
present in biomedicine, in the questions of identity around which lobbyists framed 
their concerns and in bureaucratic administration, or the way that the state 
administration inscribed categories used as standard in government. These were then 
built in to the procedures, discourses and institutions for governing health risk. The 
consequence, Epstein concludes, was to obscure important questions about the nature 
and causes of health problems, by classifying health risks based on biological 
difference – sex, race etc. – and thereby de-privileging a view of health risk as 
related to other, structural rather than biological, categories (such as social class) and 
practices (such as certain types of social behaviour) (ibid.). 
In this section, therefore, I have introduced the idea and importance of co-production 
and discussed the ways it applies to questions of the relationship between knowledge 
and state power. I have suggested that applying the idiom of co-production to the 
question of how states construct knowledge about climate-related risk and 
vulnerability is useful because it entails a closer questioning of the content of 
expertise and how it is embedded in state politics and practice than the relevant 
literature currently allows for. However, co-production seeks to open up processes of 
‘state-making’ alongside processes of ‘knowledge-making’. To deepen our 
understanding of co-production in the context of the urban governance of risk one 
must also ask: what of ‘states’? 
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3.3 Rethinking the state and the co-production of urban risk 
In this section I seek to re-work the idea of co-production in the context of state 
governance of informal urban areas, examining what particular re-conceptualisations 
of the state imply for the co-production of urban risk and governance and how these 
dynamics might be implicated in the making of vulnerability. First, I address debates 
in urban studies about state governance of informality in order to provide a different 
reading of how the state operates in such areas and the processes through which 
knowledge about risk might accompany particular forms of state governance. I then 
explore ways in which to address the main critique to be levelled at the literature on 
state governance I have examined so far: namely that it ‘black-boxes’ the state. In 
the second part I discuss how Foucauldian scholars have sought to unpack the 
practices of the state, but how theories of governmentality are limited in accounting 
for the ‘constitutive’ aspects of co-production. In the final part I bring together a 
critique of the Foucauldian elements of urban studies scholarship and of the 
governmentality literature, arguing that both fail to account for ways in which states 
may in practice be disunited, and state power takes ‘hybrid’ forms in informal urban 
areas. In opening up the ‘social’ through these new readings of existing literatures, I 
argue for a more robust framework through which to explain the co-constitution of 
the social and the natural in the context of urban informality.     
a. The urban governance of informality and co-production 
The literature on state planning in cities in developing countries has only fairly 
recently begun to consider urban ‘informality’ as a core theme (Varley 2013; 
Duminy 2011; Roy 2005)20. Although the literature is so far unconnected to the 
themes of risk and vulnerability, and, as I will discuss, has had little explicitly to say 
about expertise in politics, in this section I examine how critical theories of urban 
planning open up new ways of understanding the state, its knowledge practices and 
urban informality in ways that have implications for the analysis of co-production in 
informal areas.    
The prevalent ‘reading’ of the state and informality has been to view informal spaces 
as beyond the purview of the state. This dominant view is characterised by Roy as 
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 Here I refer to what Duminy describes as ‘planning in the context of urban informality’ or planning 
for illegal, unauthorised or unregulated practices rather than conceptualisations of planning itself as an 
informal process (through backhanders, favours etc.) or the informalisation of state provision, e.g. the 
rise of non-state actors in the delivery of services and infrastructures. 
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one that “conceptualises informality as a separate and bounded sector of unregulated 
work, enterprise and settlement…this framework presents informality as an extra-
legal domain and thus argues for policy interventions that would integrate the 
informal into the legal, formal and planned sectors of political economy” (p.82) (Roy 
2009). Further, such areas are seen as classically ‘illegible’ in the Scottian sense, 
with attempts to bring them into the arena of formal state control complicated by a 
complex social dynamic that defies state simplification and representation, and has 
often been seen as synonymous with resistance to the state (Varley 2013) (see also 
Ferguson 2007; Huchzermeyer and Karam 2006 for examples of this view). 
However, critical planning theory provides new readings of the state and its 
relationship to informality that, I argue, reshapes the way we understand the co-
production of risk, as not only referring to the co-production of risk knowledge and 
state power in informal areas, but the co-production of risk with (in)formality, and 
risk with (il)legality itself. Roy’s work is seminal to this idea, and I briefly outline 
her core propositions here. The first is that state planning is integral to the production 
of informality – informal activities may lie ‘beyond’ the state, but it is the state itself 
that designates activities as legal and illegal, legitimate and illegitimate, authorised 
and unauthorised (Roy 2005; Roy 2009). In doing so, states deploy ‘states of 
exception’ (a concept developed by Foucauldian theorist Agamben, discussed further 
below) in the exercise of state power, although, contra Agamben, Roy argues that 
these are invoked across multiple (and ordinary) domains, and through the assertion 
of positive values as well as in the violation of universal norms. The second 
proposition which follows is that informality, rather than constituting a constraint on 
state power, is the very mode through which states are able to govern. Here we find 
present an important inversion of Scott’s argument:  
While it has often been assumed that the modern state governs its 
subjects and conducts planning through technologies of visibility, 
counting, mapping and enumerating…I argue that regimes of urban 
governance also operate through an ‘unmapping’ of cities…forms of 
deregulation and unmapping, that is, informality, allow the state 
considerable territorialised flexibility to alter land use, deploy eminent 
domain, and to acquire land. [through which the state may also act 
contrary to its own stipulations, my addition from Roy] (p.81) (Roy 
2009)  
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The ‘also’ is important here, and it is important to stress that Roy still sees the spatial 
aesthetic as a driving force in much ‘modernist’ planning21. However, unlike the 
assumptions of modernist planning theorists that planning processes are formalised 
and rule-bound, for her and other critical theorists state planning reflects a “process 
of exceptions, contradictions, ambiguity and arbitrary decision-making” (Duminy 
2011), in which boundaries are not static, but shifting22. But while informality 
empowers the state, Roy continues, it also perpetuates the multiple, overlapping, and 
conflicting pre-existing social claims to land which the state now has to either 
compensate or ‘render illegal through new tactics of power and violence’ (thereby 
creating new exceptions, but also generating possible societal conflict around 
entitlements to newly ‘legitimate’ claims) (Roy 2009; Roy 2005). If Roy’s work 
suggests in this context that risk might also be co-produced with the production of 
(in)formality itself, it also suggests that knowledge is co-produced (and urban risk 
and vulnerability thereby re-made) with practices of mapping and unmapping.  
However, two critiques emerge in response to Roy’s work which further affects how 
we view the co-production of risk alongside the state construction of informality. 
The first, arising from within urban studies, objects to her association of state 
mapping, or formalisation, as allied with the interests of powerful elites, and 
unmapping, or the perpetuation of informality, as always reflecting the 
marginalisation of poor groups (Varley 2013). Indeed, from the vantage point of 
Latin American urban studies, Varley points out that mass formalisation has 
occurred in many cities, at least in some countries (ibid.). While this does not 
preclude the idea of ‘unmapping’ as a practice of urban governance, and the state as 
implicated in the perpetuation of informality, it implies the need to be attentive to 
state practices at sites of inclusion, beyond the mere subjugation of informality to 
elite power, and to investigate the potentially heterogeneous ways in which the state 
may be present in informal areas. 
More fundamentally, however, Roy, in inverting Scott but nevertheless retaining his 
characterisation of the state (and indeed invoking Agamben, see below for further 
discussion), guards a conception of the state as a unified agent, and offers little 
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 Which she criticises for privileging the reordering of space over the development of people’s 
capacities or livelihoods. 
22
 And informality is not only a mode of governing and of being, but a way of knowing, a possible 
device through which to understand the state and such state processes itself. 
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account of its inner workings. Indeed, Jasanoff, although celebrating Scott’s analysis, 
herself notes that Scott, amongst other social theorists and other forms of social 
construct, ‘black-boxes’ the state, in ways that perhaps preclude the analysis of the 
full interplay between the natural and the social (Jasanoff 2004). The following two 
parts of this section take up the challenge of unpacking the state and its relationship 
with expertise.  
b. From ‘state’ to ‘government’: urban governmentality and expertise 
Scott’s account of the state in ‘Seeing Like A State’ is in many ways a deeply 
Foucauldian one, in that its core concern is the production of knowledge as central to 
the exercise of power, knowledge which is in turn both concerned with visual 
representation (see Corbridge et al. for a discussion of the ‘visualisation’ of power in 
Foucault) as well as dependent on particular techniques and programmes23. 
However, it is through a deeper examination of the practices of government that 
Scott’s critics argue for an analysis that is more revealing of how state power 
actually works. Further deconstructing state practice and the “messy, contradictory, 
multi-layered, contingent” effects it generates, is required, Li argues, to move us 
beyond Scott’s analysis of the state around the question of ‘why state schemes fail’ 
(Li 2005). This part examines the work of ‘governmentality’ theory – defined by 
Inda as the “more or less considered and calculated ways of thinking and acting that 
propose to shape, regulate or manage the conduct of individuals or groups towards 
specific goals or ends” (p.6) (Inda 2005) – through this light. However, broadening 
out into a discussion of the relationship between conceptualisations of 
‘governmentality’ and of expertise, I discuss the on-going role for co-production in 
providing an account of government in which knowledge is not only embedded in 
power, but power is fully embedded in knowledge.    
In the only work to date that openly scrutinises urban disaster risk governance as a 
Foucauldian technique of power, Zeiderman exemplifies how the creation of disaster 
risk ‘zones’ in informal urban areas according to future-oriented, probabilistic 
calculations reflects a new form of urban ‘biopolitical’ rule, echoing Foucault’s 
notion of ‘biopower’ as a modern technology of power concerned with the care and 
                                                          
23
 Although Foucault himself distanced himself from any intent to provide a theory of the ‘state’, 
focussing his work on the ‘practices of government’ that make up states (for further discussion see 
(Gordon 1991). 
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growth of populations (Zeiderman 2012; Inda 2005). He traces the historically 
contingent emergence of risk as a government concern, its expression in particular 
forms of expertise and the way a particular system of risk governance comes to 
embody particular frames and discursive constructions. The more explicit 
engagement with Foucauldian thought in Zeiderman’s analysis advances our 
understanding of the nature of state power beyond the domination of authoritarian 
‘high modernism’ towards the multiple forms of government rationality that make up 
the art of government Foucault designates ‘governmentality’. In addition, in 
stressing the “forms of reasoning and practices with which experts bring threats into 
frameworks of technical intervention” (p.1575) (Zeiderman 2012), and, crucially, 
what these practices do, he provides a dynamic and relational account of the process 
by which ‘risk-making’ configures ‘state-making’ in the everyday. Far from treating 
risk as fixed (‘out there’), he shows how, as ‘expert’ risk assessments are 
materialised in the interaction between state officials and ‘non expert’ inhabitants of 
state-designated risk zones (people and landscapes that are constantly shifting), the 
boundaries of such zones may be altered or unaltered, be accepted or contested in 
highly contingent ways. “Risk remains a technique for rendering the uncertain future 
actionable in the present, and yet it is continually reconfigured in the everyday 
practice of urban governance.” (p.1574) (Zeiderman 2012). The very project of state 
governance – and thereby the making of risk – is ongoing and incomplete, or as 
Asher and Ojeda neatly remark in a different context: “the state appears as an 
unfinished project, always struggling to maintain dominance upon territories, nature 
and populations” (Asher and Ojeda 2009). More fundamentally, the practices of the 
state are not just instruments exerted by an outside actor (as Scott might lead one to 
think) but also the very mode of enabling and sustaining the state in a given territory, 
however unstable the process. 
However, despite the contingency of its practice, can the singular logic of ‘risk 
governance’ account for how states control for risk and vulnerability, both in terms 
of the process and its outcomes? In the remainder of this section I argue for two 
extensions, if not corrections, to this view. The first, rooted in co-production, returns 
us to the question of how risk knowledge is constructed. The second, the subject of 
part c., contends that other explanations of state processes, beyond biopolitics, are 
necessary to make sense of the outcomes of state practice.    
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The very idiom of co-production has its roots in Foucauldian theorising about 
knowledge as a means to power. However, through co-production, as Jasanoff uses 
political science to put questions of power back into STS discussions of expertise, 
she uses STS to put a more critical conception of expertise back into political and 
social theory. Co-production, she argues, invites us to “follow power into places 
where social theory seldom tends to look for it” (p.42) (Jasanoff 2004), i.e. back into 
the construction of ‘expert’ knowledge itself:  
Most generally, co-productionist accounts add to existing theories of 
power, refining our understanding of what power means, and how it is 
formed and exercised. That knowledge is a form of power is not, of 
course, any longer a new idea in either social theory or ST&S; nor does it 
come as a shock that institutions exercise power through specific 
knowledge-making practices that form and constrain human 
subjectivities. Yet there are several ways in which the idiom of co-
production inflects and accentuates these general propositions. First, it 
simply provides a constant reminder that, not only does knowledge 
constitute power, but equally power frames and organises knowledge; 
hence wherever power originates or is concentrated, one should also look 
for its expression through knowledge. (p.280) (Jasanoff 2004)  
To give an example, in Waterton and Wynne’s analysis of co-production in the 
construction of environmental knowledge by the European Environment Agency, 
normative constructs about what the EU’s identity should be (what Jasanoff 
describes as the ‘most fundamental kind of politics’) become embedded in the 
process of technical decision-making, defining what information ‘counts’ (Waterton 
and Wynne 2004). It is this kind of politics that Jasanoff argues has “tended to be 
leached away in most high-modern theorising about expertise” (p.279) (Jasanoff 
2004) as well as, I would argue, other forms of theorising about states and 
programmes of improvement. In their classic studies of the governmentality of 
development interventions, Ferguson and Li, taking her cue explicitly from 
Ferguson, describe how knowledge about the objects and subjects of development is 
‘rendered technical’, made to match the apolitical tools of the intervention, with 
politicised questions of root causes ‘screened out’ in the process (Ferguson 1994; Li 
2007). That purportedly technical knowledge may have political purposes and 
political consequences is commensurate with a co-productionist analysis. What co-
production exhorts, however, in line with STS more generally, is that we understand 
that there may lie a politics within what is purportedly technical and not just in what 
is ‘cast out’.   
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Two further implications follow from this observation. The first concerns how we 
view how scientific assessments interact with discourse. A key concern of 
governmentality analysis is to reveal how practices of government arise from and 
constitute a discursive field, coming to be linked to particular social imaginaries and 
other types of reasoning (Dean 2010). To give an example, in their analysis of 
sustainable development policy rooted in governmentality, Summerville et al. show 
how the discourse of Sustainable Development policy mobilises a particular 
construction of community attached to notions of rights and responsibilities 
(Summerville, Adkins, and Kendall 2008). This ties the right to participation to a 
responsibility to pursue a particular, pre-set sustainable development agenda (ibid.). 
Co-production would also insist, however, that we understand how these discursive 
formations are lodged (perhaps) in the content of scientific indicators of 
sustainability themselves. In addition, knowledge constructions – and this is the 
second implication – must be seen as constructions that are in part contextually re-
shaped, not simply given ‘instruments’ of power.  
To give a final, pertinent example that most clearly approximates a merged thesis of 
how a ‘biopolitical’ impulse is enacted in the practices of government and then 
comes to embody a particular politics of scientific categorisation, Biehl’s study of the 
distribution of HIV/AIDS risk in Brazil situates a government regime for HIV/AIDS 
treatment firmly in a biopolitical paradigm but examines how categorisations 
embedded in the programme create processes of exclusion, and therefore new risk 
distributions (Biehl 2005)24. Through a combination of bureaucratic procedure, 
informational difficulty, medical neglect and moral contempt the programme targets 
certain pre-defined social categories of what it means to be an ‘AIDS citizen’ (in this 
case a population who identify themselves as AIDS cases in an early stage of 
infection at a public institution and search for regular treatment), while those who 
cannot be framed within this planned demand remain unregistered (ibid)25. The point 
is that risk – as a newly enabled field of government – certainly enables and 
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 Although Biehl does not cite Jasanoff he does use Latour, but echoes Jasanoff’s critique of Latour 
that his work lacks both historical specificity and a way of understanding how scientific and social 
technologies become combined in governance. 
25
 The production of medical knowledge is also joined to the reproduction of social norms in a way 
that speaks to the linkages Jasanoff makes between knowledge, institutions and discourses: the 
unregistered are often only medically categorised when they die, but when they do so they are socially 
labelled (as robbers, prostitutes and so on) in ways that allow social blame to be attached to their 
deaths. 
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mobilises a new form of politics for people, but it is only by understanding how risk 
comes to be constituted in a ‘categorical matrix’ that we can trace its exclusionary 
effects.  
Drawing the analysis of this section together for my analysis of urban risk, I suggest 
that rather than adopting a view that sees risk as reconfiguring the political terrain on 
which states engage with citizens in a parallel manner to other forms of government 
‘rationalities’, such as the enactment of rights and citizenship, we ask how they 
function together and inform each other in the very field of expertise enabled by risk 
assessment. Drawing on the suggestion of part a. we might want to question too how 
the governance of risk not only accompanies but perhaps embodies the governance 
of informality, a question so far unaddressed in either literature. Only in opening up 
the ‘technical’ to question in this way, I argue, can we fully understand the layers of 
meaning that structure the state-citizen encounters Zeiderman describes, encounters 
which I further argue not only re-make the technical project of risk management but 
also restructure forms and distributions of urban risk and vulnerability.    
c. Disaggregating the state and the implications for urban risk 
This final part of Section 3 reviews a core implication of the theoretical literature so 
far, that states or fields of government practice both cohere around, and are able to 
enact, their given agendas. Here I unravel some of this conceptualisation of ‘state-
making’ by examining scholarship that, firstly, recognises internal divisions within 
states, and secondly, grapples with the role of non-state actors in relation to state 
governance. 
Numerous authors note that the state itself is not a monolith; state elites, agencies 
and levels of government may themselves be at odds around a given agenda (Joseph 
1994; Corbridge et al. 2005; Gupta 2012)26. However, for Gupta, this 
conceptualisation of a ‘disunited’ state is central to providing a different theorisation 
of the process through which state power produces, in his case of concern, mass 
poverty (for which we might substitute risk and vulnerability in conditions of 
informality). Biopolitics, he argues, cannot account for this disunity, and is therefore 
weak in explaining the differential outcomes of biopolitical regimes: 
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 Indeed, Corbridge et al. refer to the state as best thought of as ‘bundles of everyday institutions and 
forms of rule’, although I would argue that this underplays power and the state projects pushed from 
the centre (Corbridge et al. 2005) 
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Foucault’s argument for the rise of biopolitics depends on the 
convergence of diverse institutions in different settings around a 
particular way of conceptualising a problem, for which they then seek 
solutions that involve the control and care of the population (Gupta 2012 
p.42)  
Contra Agamben, invoked by Roy to explain the construction of urban informality, 
he argues that the state is in fact “an incoherent agent” for the violence of poverty. 
Agamben, he continues,  
…operates with a notion of a strong state insofar as he assumes that a 
decision to declare a state of exception is tantamount to its de facto 
existence. Agamben does not worry about whether such a decision is 
effective in creating a state of exception. (p.45) (ibid.).  
Gupta’s proposal to explain the production of poverty revolves around the idea of 
poverty as ‘structural violence’, enacted without a direct perpetrator, although in an 
environment in which poverty is ‘normalised’ by elite discourses and bureaucracy 
enshrines indifference, “a disaggregated view of the state makes it possible to open 
up the black box of unintended outcomes by showing how they are systematically 
produced by the friction between agendas, bureaus, levels, and spaces that make up 
the state.” (p.46-47) (ibid.).  
Key to understanding such outcomes is understanding how they are made up by the 
‘routinised practices’ of the state. Techniques of regulation, enumeration and 
accountability, for example, accompany new programmes for social welfare, in order 
to ensure their effectiveness. However, their operationalization stalls, with acts such 
as surprise inspections held up by tensions between different layers and levels of 
government (ibid.). Other practices such as corruption are less arbitrary in their 
outcomes, however, and more systematic in their exclusion of the poorest (ibid.).  
Although Gupta’s analysis lacks an explicit focus on expertise in government, I 
suggest it nevertheless has implications for the relationships between knowledge and 
power that I have posited influence how states control for urban risk and 
vulnerability. In terms of understanding not only how knowledge is arrived at but 
how it is enacted, Gupta suggests that the state may in fact be a weak agent of 
transformation. In addition, whereas previous authors have cast the problems of 
informality and risk as related to exclusionary policies, Gupta calls our attention to 
the possible persistence of risk and vulnerability at sites of stated inclusion. 
However, he allows us to see how the contingent effects of this ‘politics of inclusion’ 
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are nevertheless structured by specific practices of government, that may accompany 
– or even be co-produced with – new regimes of risk management.      
Gupta’s study is also confined to relationships between state-based entities and 
agencies. Theorists concerned with states and knowledge (and environmental 
knowledge production in particular) have, however, also been attuned to the role of 
non-state actors in mediating state-based knowledge. Birkenholtz, for example, 
drawing on Li, examines how, in relation to water management, the state shifts in 
and out of view for farmers near Jaipur, India, with phases of state retreat creating a 
‘knowledge gap’ in which farmers turn to alternative forms of expertise. At each 
stage the relationships between meaning and power in which farmers are engaged 
alter, complicating the state’s own project of groundwater regulation27 (Birkenholtz 
2008). Arguing against Li’s ‘postmodern’ vision of multiple knowledge actors 
exerting power through knowledge, however, he demonstrates that there is no uni-
directional relationship between non-state knowledge and power, which may also 
generate deeply contradictory effects (ibid.). 
Literature from urban studies certainly indicates that forms of ‘hybrid authority’ or 
‘legal hybridity’ may be an institutional feature of informal areas, through which 
state power and authority is both bound up in, and circumvented by, other actors. 
Against the notion of informality as an ‘exceptional’ space, beyond state authority, 
Varley writes “just as the informal is present in elite spaces, so too is the law present 
in informal spaces” (p.17) (ibid.). Even where, for example, land appropriation is 
undertaken illegally by non-state actors, such processes may still be conditioned and 
legitimated by law (ibid.). It is not clear, however, how these dynamics relate to state 
production of knowledge and expertise, and state attempts to control for risk and 
vulnerability in these areas.  
In sum, this Section (3.3) has suggested new theoretical directions for understanding 
urban ‘state-making’ and unpacking the ‘black box’ of the state in order to move to 
an account of how risk and government may be co-produced in informal urban 
settlements. To do so, I have drawn together theories of ‘exception’ developed in 
urban studies and of the ‘biopolitics’ of risk developed by Foucauldian scholars to 
develop our understanding of state practice in urban areas. However, I have then 
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 Also because state visibility is important to farmers’ trust in the state. 
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discussed the limitations of the purchase of these theories both on questions of 
knowledge and expertise – as critical to co-production – and on understanding the 
division and hybridisation of states. In the final section of this chapter I complement 
this work by moving from an examination of ‘risk and informality from above’ to 
examining ‘risk and informality from below’ – how we understand responses to the 
state and how this might also alter our view of states and co-production.  
3.4 The societal politics of risk in informal urban settlements 
In arguing for a more politically-aware and interpretive framework for understanding 
urban risk Rebotier remarks, “It is important to start from a grounded analysis of 
how risk is lived, experienced and given meaning by the different actors involved. It 
is on the basis of this subjectivity that these actors respond and act.” (p.393) 
(Rebotier 2012) But how, in informal urban settlements, do people respond to state 
interventions to reduce risk and with what implications for risk and vulnerability? 
What meanings ground their responses, and what do these reveal about risk? What 
agency do they have to respond and what is the potential of this agency to redefine 
their experiences of risk and vulnerability? These are important questions in their 
own right, but are also intrinsic to how we understand the state politics of risk, the 
limits to the power of the state (Li 2007) and the unevenness of its hold over its 
subjects (Birkenholtz 2008). In this section I examine how three bodies of 
scholarship have addressed these issues: writers in disaster studies, drawing heavily 
on work in political ecology; Foucauldian scholars concerned with the nature of 
subjectivity, and STS scholarship on public relationships with expertise.  
Conceptualisations of urban risk ‘from below’ in the disasters literature 
Numerous authors writing about urban disaster risk note the potential for societal 
contestation vs dominant knowledge actors around the causes, nature of and possible 
solutions to disaster-related risks (Pelling 1999; Mustafa 2005; Aragon-Durand 
2007; Rebotier 2012; Pelling and Wisner 2009). Authors in the field of disaster 
studies have sought to extend the application of political ecology to the field using 
post-structuralist ideas. These emphasise the role of discourse as critical to the social 
construction of hazards, and use sociological and cultural theories of risk to 
emphasise the its performativity, or sense in which risk is also a social product that 
does things in the world (Mustafa 2005; Rebotier 2012; Aragon-Durand 2007; 
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Pelling 1999). It is in these social realms that contestation can then be located28. 
Perhaps because of its roots in political ecology, this theorisation leans towards an 
emphasis on struggles over resources and societal resistance to dominant framings – 
to give one example from Rebotier, in which he draws on work by political ecologist 
Michael Watts and others: “understanding [the] meanings [of risk] to different social 
groupings highlights the differences in interest that are part of the struggle to claim 
rights and resources within the very territories at risk” (p.392) (Rebotier 2012). The 
meanings that underpin such struggles are discussed in order to show the dissonance 
between official and lay understandings. The authors situate lay understandings in 
differing psychologies of disaster, the meanings of place for people (Rebotier 2012), 
the experience of multiple and inter-related environmental hazards (Mustafa 2005; 
Pelling 1999), disputes over the causes of disasters, including the role of the state in 
causation (Aragon-Durand 2007), the livelihoods options offered by state solutions 
and the behaviour of the state itself (Mustafa 2005).  
However, to illustrate how state responses to risk are reworked in the local context of 
urban informality, and with what effects, I argue that additional theoretical insights 
are needed. Owing to the rootedness of these urban studies in political ecology more 
broadly, there is a tendency to reproduce what Agrawal describes as the ‘easy 
conflation of communities with resistance’ (Agrawal 2005). This has two 
consequences. First, it leads to an analytical neglect of the multiple forms that 
societal agency might take, reflecting multiple positionings vis a vis the state (Li 
2007), and their impact. Second, in stressing the ways in which societal responses 
work against the state, we miss the possible influence of state interpretations of risk 
on local understandings and actions. It is to this theme of the interpenetration 
between state power and societal response that I now turn.  
Subjectivity and agency in the governmentalisation of urban risk 
Foucauldian-inspired scholarship provides a more explicit treatment of how state 
power shapes subjects and how subjects negotiate that power (Inda 2005). To 
explore this in relation to urban risk governance, Zeiderman reworks the ideas of 
Chatterjee who, drawing on the concept of governmentality, examines the ‘politics 
                                                          
28
 Both Mustafa and Rebotier offer new spatial conceptualisations of risk – the ‘hazardscape’ or 
‘territorialisation of risk’ framework – in order to allow for the role of power dynamics in the 
construction of risk, including in shaping the possibilities for societal action and influence. 
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of the governed’ of the urban poor in response to new bureaucracies of 
governmentality (Chatterjee 2006; Zeiderman 2013). Zeiderman’s framing highlights 
how forms of societal agency may be co-created with a state politics of risk, as new 
forms of risk governance give rise to new sets of state entitlements around which 
individuals and groups mobilise (Zeiderman 2013). Echoing writings in disaster 
studies and political ecology, he shows how broader struggles around resources 
(such as housing) in the urban space are thereby also played out on the terrain of risk 
governance, with the governmental logics of risk becoming bound up with people’s 
broader aspirations for human security, citizenship and well-being in the city (ibid.). 
However, in its debt to Foucault, the work allows for a stronger understanding of the 
ways in which ‘local’ responses are enmeshed in systems of governmental power 
and practice, and Zeiderman illustrates how such negotiation ‘from below’ entails 
navigating new frames of inclusion and exclusion, legitimacy and illegitimacy 
created by the new state politics of risk, a process in which verification of ‘risk 
status’ (dependent on scientific assessment) is critical to acceptance and depends on 
specific practices and performances29. From Chatterjee, Zeiderman also brings, 
however, a reformulation of ideas about the practice of governmentality in the 
context of non-Western modernity, in which negotiations with the state do not just 
occur through a ‘politics of rights’, predicated on a liberal democratic theory of the 
social contract and universal citizenship and rights, but through a (more tenuous) 
‘[bio]politics of life’, or as members of politically-defined population groups entitled 
to care and protection (although, interestingly, he does not pick up on Chatterjee’s 
central argument about how such a politics relates to informality, which, in 
Chatterjee’s account, limits the state’s ability to legitimate popular association and 
extend universal rights) (ibid.). In the context of debates about the politics of urban 
risk governance, these ideas give more concrete form to the question of how agency 
is mobilised, as well as what it is mobilised to do.  
However, in seeking to render a more precise account of how such processes 
influence the form and distribution of climate risk and vulnerability in conditions of 
urban informality, I raise three issues problematic to the wholesale adoption of the 
Foucauldian view of agents as ‘biopolitical subjects’. The first reflects a charge 
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 These are not only determined by formal procedure, he highlights, but also call into play other 
culturally interpretive frames – in being too active in seeking state support one can arouse suspicion 
of cheating the system or preying on the vulnerable and invite denigration. 
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Agrawal levels at Foucauldian scholarship on subjectivity more broadly, namely that 
“There is little or no indication of…how one is to explain variations in 
transformations of subjects.” (p.12) (Agrawal 2005). Concomitant to this point is 
how to explain variations in forms of agency, accounting for the possibility of 
societal disengagement as well as engagement, and providing a broader register for 
how qualified particular forms of agency may be for particular groups or individuals. 
The point is addressed to some extent by Chatterjee, who argues in the particular 
case of the bookbinders that their mode of production prevents class-based 
organising, although, in doing so, he both privileges class as the basis for 
organisation and formal association as the mode of engagement with government 
(Chatterjee 2006). Kudva, by contrast, illustrates how multiple forms of societal 
response – an “everyday politics of stealth, survival and encroachment, as well as the 
seemingly sporadic episodes of collective violence and the politics of redress” 
(p.1615) – shape the construction of informal spaces in which people live and work 
(Kudva 2009). 
The second issue relates to whether the emphasis on the ‘politics of the governed’ 
implies a convergence by societal actors on and around a singular logic of 
government when, in fact, people’s possibilities for agency are conditioned by the 
presence of multiple state apparati, and broader shifts in state responsiveness 
(perhaps obscured in the Foucauldian concern with practices of government rather 
than state institutions). Indeed, the first argument follows from Gupta’s earlier 
critique of the biopolitics of government, and he illustrates how, in having to 
negotiate with different bureaus and offices who do not necessarily share the same 
agenda, people’s claims to entitlement may be restricted (Gupta 2012). 
Finally, I argue that a biopolitical approach to urban risk – focussed on the ways in 
which people become subject to and negotiate certain pre-existing, state-based forms 
of knowledge – neglects a full exploration of the meanings and knowledges that lie 
‘underneath’ societal responses to risk and to the state, how these are articulated in 
distinct social contexts and alongside distinct social and political concerns. In, again, 
isolating the technical paradigm of risk as the dominant discourse, we miss – and 
here I mirror the co-productionist argument about state knowledge – how 
understandings of risk might function alongside and become informed by other 
discourses and rationalities. As I go on to explore here, not only scholars of science 
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studies, but also those in a political ecology tradition, regard these localised 
meanings as intrinsically important to understanding what risk in fact is, but also 
recognise that these meanings feed into societal responses to risk assessment.  
Drawing together the implications of the last two sections, therefore, I stressed how 
those working in disaster studies tended to de-emphasise how local meanings related 
to risk and risk assessment arise in interactions with the state and state expertise, 
whilst Foucauldian theorists have paid little attention in the urban context to the role 
and content of local conceptualisations. In the final section dedicated to the societal 
politics of risk, I explore how scholars in STS – although not focussed on the context 
of developing world cities – articulate these concerns, critically adding a new 
reading of public conceptions of risk assessment linked to the public’s relationships 
with expertise.   
Identity, value and expertise: readings of lay understandings of risk from STS 
Co-production, as an idea tied to the creation and use of formal science, here in the 
context of what Jasanoff calls the ‘power of the rulers over the ruled’, affords little 
space to address questions about the construction of ‘alternative’ knowledge orders 
(which may, of course, include incorporations, borrowings and reinterpretations of 
formal science) in relation to the politics of the ‘ruled’. However, still within STS, 
discussions of ‘lay knowledge’ or ‘local, contextual knowledge’ offer both a distinct 
conceptualisation of risk based on this experience, and link the expression of local 
perspectives on risk to the public’s relationship with expertise. This ‘cultural-
hermeneutic’ reading of risk overlaps with the hermeneutic aspect of livelihoods 
analysis discussed in the previous chapter but, as well as taking a distinct form, adds 
a number of critical dimensions. 
Wynne, in a seminal critique of modernity’s relationship to risk as well as rationalist 
models for understanding public conceptions of risk (although he does not exclude a 
role for the ‘rational-calculative’), in essence proposes a different form of co-
production to the institutional forms of co-production discussed above, in which 
non-expert and non-institutional forms of experience and knowledge too are tied to 
their own ‘idioms of identity and social order’ (Wynne 1996). The content of these 
conceptions, he writes, is both revealing in its own right (often because it makes 
apparent the social values and questions of institutional responsibility contained in 
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risk assessment, which people may intuitively recognise), but is also conditioned by 
relationships of dependency on expertise. What is experienced as risk, therefore, is 
highly rational in involving judgements about the behaviour and trustworthiness of 
institutions. Critically – beyond physical risk alone – it also embodies and is felt as 
threats to cultural identity and the closing down of questions of social value that 
occur through risk assessment (what Wynne calls ‘identity-risks’). Wynne cautions 
us, therefore, against equating public trust of risk assessment with a lack of public 
contestation, arguing instead that public attitudes may in fact be characterised by 
deep ambivalence, but constrained in their expression by a social and psychological 
dependence on institutions and the fact that that dependence is normalised in the 
collective experience of less powerful groups (in itself an aspect of ‘identity-risk’).  
To give an example which serves to illuminate the possible natures of lay 
knowledge, Wynne highlights how the scepticism of sheep farmers in Cumbria in 
response to scientific assessments of the Chernobyl fallout was underpinned by 
doubts about the credibility and competence of expert authorities, in contrast to 
experts’ claims to authority. Farmers, however, expressed that they felt they had 
little choice but to believe them. In addition, experts neither understood the 
livelihoods implications of the restrictions they endorsed on hill sheep farming, nor 
had specialist knowledge of farming and local environmental conditions. The type of 
knowledge that the farmers displayed, in contrast to the risk assessment they were 
subject to, “assumed predictability to be intrinsically unreliable as an assumption, 
and therefore valued adaptability and flexibility, as a key part of their cultural 
identity and practice” (p.67) (Wynne 1996).  
The question that Wynne’s work raises here, therefore, is what idioms of identity and 
social order may shape cultural responses to risk in informal urban settlements, and 
how these might affect responses to state efforts to control for vulnerability. 
However, Wynne’s reading of local and contextual knowledge, and therefore the 
analysis of how risk is experienced as ‘identity-risk’ is not entirely unproblematic 
(Wynne certainly notes that it may also involve undesirable elements of social 
control too). The first critical point to make is that Wynne’s ‘dependency’ thesis 
allows little room to discuss the possibilities for, and ways in which, people may also 
overtly contest or covertly protest against risk assessment. A second point – and this 
applies equally to many of the authors referred to here in disaster studies whose 
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sympathies also lie with the promotion of ‘non-expert’ knowledge – is not to 
essentialise local and contextual knowledge, or attribute it to social groups without 
exploring the possible differences in conceptions held by those groups (Forsyth 
2003; Agrawal 2005; Robbins 2000). Such differences may in fact be the basis on 
which people resist the state, as simplifying their social experience (Birkenholtz 
2008). Given what Roy describes as the ‘inevitable heterogeneity’ of urban 
informality this is a critical point in context, and, although existing studies are scant 
and do not link the point with analysing responses to risk assessment, scholars have 
certainly suggested that there are differences within informal settlements in how 
newer and older settlers and those with different tenure statuses view and manage 
risk (Roy 2009; Baker 2012)30.  
3.5 Conclusion 
As the previous chapter laid out, the predominant tendency in contemporary urban 
climate risk debates has been to treat risk as a physical ‘given’, paying less attention 
to the ways in which the biophysical and socio-political aspects of risk may in fact 
be integrated. This chapter has broadly argued for a view that enables us to 
understand how knowledge about risk and vulnerability becomes a project for urban 
governance, and how the socio-political and physical become mutually constituted 
through this project and its application. In taking this view, we therefore see how the 
construction of knowledge is central to the ways in which states control for urban 
risk and vulnerability, with scholars of risk concerned both with the impact of 
‘closed’, technical systems of knowledge but also the ways in which these systems 
may carry embedded meanings for people. This form of analysis also moves us 
beyond the types of vulnerability theory discussed in the previous chapter, in which 
vulnerability is largely seen as a function of material and social resources and 
groupings, to understand how political categorisation and representation might 
function to illuminate or obscure particular questions about risk, and potentially 
drive the creation of particular forms or distributions of vulnerability (a charge as yet 
untested in the urban climate risk literature).  
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 Mustafa also expresses discomfort at using the term ‘indigenous’ in an urban context, and it is 
notable that Wynne’s examples draw on what he describes as ‘indigenous’ rural knowledge systems. 
Without wanting to deny a place for what might better be called ‘specialist’ local knowledge in the 
urban context (in that it is historically rooted and place-bound), of course the dynamics of urban life 
(possible mobility and heterogeneity) and the co-occurrence of urban hazards with the socio-
economic processes of urbanisation of which people are a part are potentially distinct phenomena that 
might affect how such ‘specialist’ knowledge develops and is manifest.  
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Underneath this broad view, the chapter has used a number of theoretical viewpoints, 
exploring the tensions between them, in order to develop a more critical conceptual 
lens for understanding the application of these arguments in the particular context of 
informal urban settlements. The idea – or idiom – of co-production from STS allows 
for an important conceptual departure from pre-existing ideas about the production 
of nature, and the production of nature in cities – and one which forces us to push 
questions about how knowledge comes to be constituted further than literature 
around urban risk – in either disaster studies or governmentality studies – has done 
so far. However, co-production necessitates understanding the mutual construction 
of the social and the natural and here I have sought to unpack the state, weaving 
together perspectives from urban studies and governmentality theorists, and their 
critics, to suggest a number of ways in which we might review the construction of 
social order in conditions of urban informality. Finally, I have set studies of societal 
responses to risk from disaster risk studies, governmentality theorists and STS 
alongside each other in order to understand how they address the issues of public 
understandings of risk and risk assessment, and the agency that those ‘at risk’ may 
exercise vis a vis the state. I have argued for an approach that not only addresses 
how people might hold their own conceptualisations of risk, distinct from that of 
formal risk assessment, but how the two may be co-constructed in relationships with 
the state and state expertise. However, in seeking to answer the question of what 
these meanings and interactions do for state efforts to control risk and vulnerability I 
have suggested that existing studies provide only weak explanation of the forms and 
potential for societal agency to re-frame the conditions that they face.   
Taken together, these two theoretical chapters set the stage for a different way of 
understanding how risk and vulnerability arise and are experienced in informal urban 
settlements. In Chapters 5, 6 and 7, I apply these theoretical insights to a single case 
study, examining, first, the co-production of state knowledge about risk and its 
effects; second, societal responses to state risk assessment and, third, how urban 
households and communities use their agency to re-shape the risks they face. 
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Chapter 4 Research Methodology and Context: 
Exploring New Directions for Vulnerability Research in an Urban 
Context 
 
4.1 Introduction 
The aim of the research was to explore the drivers of climate-related risk in informal, 
urban settings and to ask what risks were being adapted to, how and why. In 
addition, the research aimed to elucidate how state policies and practices – and the 
knowledge about risk that they embodied – shaped and re-shaped risks and 
vulnerabilities in informal urban communities. Two central research questions 
guided the research: 
Do existing approaches to risk need re-thinking in informal urban 
settlements and, if so, how? 
 
How do states control for risk and vulnerability in informal urban 
settlements? 
This chapter outlines the methodological approach taken to answering these 
questions, and provides an introduction to the empirical context for the research. 
Section 4.1 explains the research design and case selection, Section 4.2 reviews the 
methods of data elicitation and analysis and Section 4.3 discusses the challenges 
encountered during the research, including issues related to research ethics. Section 
4.4 then sets out the background to the research context, which frames the analysis 
that follows in Chapters 5, 6 and 7. 
4.2 Research design and case selection 
The over-arching strategy for the research was to use a multi-sited case study 
analysis. As Yin outlines, research that aims to 1) be broad in scope, 2) to examine 
contextual or multivariate conditions and 3) to rely on multiple sources of evidence 
is highly suited to case study analysis (Yin 2003). In addition, case study analysis is 
particularly apt for research into vulnerability to risk, given the place-specific nature 
of vulnerabilities, as Ribot details: 
Vulnerabilities and their causes are diverse. Responses to vulnerability 
must be developed from detailed understandings of specific problems in 
specific places—general principles and models are insufficient. Case 
studies inform us of a particular set of dynamics and opportunities for 
vulnerability reduction in a particular place. p.63 (Ribot 2009) 
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However, in electing for a single case study approach in order to provide a rich depth 
of analysis (see Ragin for discussion of the advantages of a small number of cases, 
(Ragin 2007), generalizability (or ‘transferability’ in qualitative research, given that 
one is not generalising from a population sample; see Maxwell 2009) from the case 
may be limited. For this research project, a case was chosen that not only met a set of 
criteria suitable to the research questions (a city with large informal settlement and a 
history of disaster risk management in those settlements managed at the municipal 
scale), but was a known ‘outlier’ among cases, because of its well-developed risk 
governance policies and programmes. Its uniqueness was felt to be useful because of 
the potential to draw lessons for other low to middle income cities where resources 
and institutions were only just being developed to tackle climate-related risks, and 
also because of the potential to add to the relevant literature which, in highlighting 
problems of financial and institutional capacity as central to the creation of risk and 
vulnerability, may have neglected other relevant aspects of the institutional context. 
The rationale for a Latin American case echoes this - Latin American cities remain 
under-studied in adaptation and disaster risk debates compared to their African and 
Asian counterparts, despite the potential lessons from cities that have, in general, had 
a longer history of urbanisation and where power is comparatively decentralised to 
municipal authorities. Section 4.4 provides further details of the case study – that of 
a landslide risk management programme in the informal settlements of Bogota, 
Colombia.  
A final point to note concerning transferability of findings is the choice of a disaster 
risk management programme, rather than a climate change focussed programme, 
despite using the case to draw lessons for climate change adaptation debates. 
Although landslides are hydro-meteorological hazards, affected (among other 
factors) by precipitation patterns, and are therefore climate-related, there may in fact 
be no linkage in this particular case between landslide occurrence and climate 
change. In addition, although disaster risk management programmes are often the 
‘entry point’ for new adaptation measures, disaster risk management policies in 
themselves may not achieve adaptation, as actions taken to mitigate disasters in the 
short-term may prove maladaptive to climate change in the long-run. However, the 
research strategy I adopted (given the lack of urban adaptation programmes 
underway in cities at the time of the research in 2009-2010) was to examine the case 
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as an analogue (or examination of a past or present experience of a climate change or 
extreme) through which to draw conclusions for adaptation debates (Ford et al. 
2010).  
Finally, although concentrated on one city, the research design allowed for multiple 
field sites within the one municipal context. Here, comparison can improve the 
validity of information (by triangulating across sites) but also highlight critical 
factors and spatial difference. Section 4.3 discusses the challenge in accessing sites 
and Section 4.4 provides a brief history of and context for the main risk zones chosen 
as study sites for the research. 
4.3 Information elicitation and analysis 
Data collection took place over a one year span in 2009-2010 during which time I 
undertook repeat visits to the case study site, the city of Bogota, Colombia. Data 
collection focussed on understanding the city government’s risk management 
policies and practices, in particular measures relating to the ladera (hill slopes) 
programme in the informal settlements of the south of the city, and their impact, and 
on investigating the drivers of vulnerability at the household scale, including 
household and community-level perspectives on risk and risk management. The case 
study design allows for the use of multiple methods to collect data. A summary of 
the methods used is provided in Table 2. 
1. Understanding state policy and practice ‘from the top down’ 
In order to understand the formal and informal mechanisms through which state 
institutions sought to control risk and vulnerability in informal settlements, and how 
risk assessments influenced and were influenced by the history, culture and practices 
of governance in Bogota, I interviewed present and former government officials 
responsible for different elements of the risk management programme. The 
interviewees ranged from former directors of the Disasters Management Agency (the 
DPAE) to those implementing resettlement programmes in landslide-affected risk 
zones. They were identified by contacting the relevant institutions and then by 
‘snow-balling’, or asking key informants for details of further informants. A table of 
interviewees is listed in Annex 1. The interview format was semi-structured, and 
although the format was adapted to the expertise of each interviewee and the 
objective of the interview, a broad topic guide was used to structure questioning. 
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This covered the processes of risk assessment, the procedures of risk management, 
how these had changed over time and why and how they were affected in practice by 
their implementation in an informal, urban zone. Key programme documents and 
risk assessment documents for each field site were collected and reviewed (where 
available). In addition, municipal decrees relating to the risk management 
programme over the past decade were downloaded and reviewed.  
 
2. Investigating community perspectives ‘from the bottom up’ 
To understand the processes driving risk and vulnerability in informal settlements, 
and local perspectives on risk and responses to the state-led risk management 
programme, I used the following methods across four landslide risk zones (although 
for reasons discussed in 4.3 the research eventually concentrated in only three risk 
zones and related resettlement sites). 
Participant observation  
As touched on in Chapter 2, in order to allow for a more contextually sensitive, 
relational and potentially political reading of vulnerability dynamics in cities, in 
which livelihoods are understood as embedded in networks of meaning and power, 
flexible and open methods were needed. Both participant observation and oral 
histories were used, supplemented by a semi-structured household survey for reasons 
described in section iii below. Participant observation, far from being passive 
observation, entails recording observations of daily life and informal interviewing, 
talking with people as the opportunity arises and learning about their reality (Agar 
1996). Such observation shaped later, more structured empirical work but was also 
well suited to the context, where visits to zones would arise at a moment’s notice, 
households had often moved on by the time of the next visit and the level of 
informality of this kind of method allowed for key insights into sensitive topics.  
i. Oral histories 
I used an oral history method in the sense suggested by de Haan and Zoomers for 
livelihoods analysis which, although derived from the method of taking life histories, 
focusses less on full life chronologies, and instead on particular ‘livelihood 
trajectories’: “Livelihood trajectories try to penetrate into a deeper layer of beliefs, 
needs, aspirations and limitations and especially need to be contextualized in relation 
to power and institutions” (p.43)(Haan and Zoomers 2005)  
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Oral histories are a useful method for probing the interactions between structure and 
agency (Lewis 2008). An actor-centred method, they can also give voice to 
marginalised groups, and reveal new narratives that challenge received wisdoms and 
policy narratives (ibid.). However, informants may have their own idiosyncrasies that 
influence the content of the interview, and may vary in their capacity to ‘perform’ 
these kinds of narrative interviews (Baulch and Scott 2006; Lewis 2008). Although 
the aim is to allow subjects to speak for themselves, in fact such interviews are ‘co-
constructed’, with the researcher still framing the material (ibid.). As with other 
qualitative methods, therefore, reflexivity about one’s own interpretation of the data, 
transparency about potential biases and triangulation and validation of important 
information is all key to the use of such data.  
Although the format was largely unstructured, to allow for new dimensions to 
emerge and for people to express their views in their own fashion, key questions 
focussed the discussion on understanding the history of people’s settlement in the 
zone, their responses to the impacts of landslides and the landslide risk management 
programme and their aspirations for the future. Interviewees were approached during 
site visits, and sometimes after a round of surveys had been undertaken, with the aim 
to broaden the range of interviewees as much as possible. In most cases I 
interviewed individuals, but in some I interviewed families (which helped me to 
understand the household dynamics of decision-making) and undertook repeat visits 
– both as the interviews were long and time-consuming and because this gave me an 
opportunity to observe decision-making processes as events unfolded in the risk 
zones.  
ii. Semi-structured household survey 
A household survey was used which consisted of a series of closed questions about 
peoples’ livelihoods (household origin, ownership, social structure, material, 
economic activities, assets, levels of education and health status, access to services, 
social involvement) followed by semi-structured questions about the official risk 
status of the household, risk perception and the impacts of landslides, coping actions 
and actions with regards to the risk management programme. The survey was piloted 
with ten households in one neighbourhood before being refined and used more 
widely. The survey is included in Annex 2. Household selection aimed to maximise 
the representativeness of different household types (in keeping with the aim of 
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qualitative research to sample a range of views (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). As far as 
possible, the survey was carried out across different areas of each neighbourhood, 
with households of different wealth status (indicated by the housing material) and 
with households of different risk statuses. The latter part of the semi-structured 
survey, as well as the use of semi-structured interviews (see below), allowed me to 
ask questions within a relatively confined time period (augmenting data from 
participant observation, for example, which requires absorbing the social milieu over 
a long time frame) whilst still retaining the aim of “a fine-textured understanding of 
beliefs, attitudes, values and motivations in relation to the behaviours of people in 
particular social contexts” (p.39) (Bauer and Gaskell 2000). The livelihoods data 
collected enabled me to put these beliefs and motivations into context, examining the 
attitudes and trajectories of different social groups.     
iii. Semi-structured interviews 
Semi-structured interviews were carried out with community leaders and other key 
informants in each risk zone. As for district officials, the format was adapted to the 
expertise of each interviewee and the objective of the interview. A common set of 
topics was covered, however, about the general history and the history of landslide 
risk and risk management in each zone, current risks and vulnerabilities and the 
operations of the risk management programme itself.  
iv. Document analysis 
Informants in the neighbourhoods passed on legal documents and letters to state 
agencies which were analysed alongside my interview transcripts. As well as 
collecting these in the field, I used internet searches to find documents relating to 
court cases brought in each of the risk zones.  
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Table 1: Example of methods used: the neighbourhood of Caracoli 
1 6 household surveys in March 2010 in upper and lower high risk zones ( 
research then halted after barrio murder) 
2 14 household surveys in August 2010 from medium risk zone that had 
been changed to high risk after a landslide in June 2010 
3 Key informant interview with Junta leader and former Junta leader 
(among original founders of the barrio) as well as Red Cross co-
ordinator for the zone 
4 One oral history 
5 Walks through with vigias (local ‘watchmen’) and informal 
conversations with householders 
6 Attendance at water company and community meeting 
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Table 2: Summary of methods used for data collection 
Method Data characteristics 
 Themes covered Temporal 
span Quantitative density 
Participant observation / field 
visits 
• With and without district 
officials 
• In 4 risk zones, 2 
resettlement sites, 
community meetings and in 
district offices 
n/a Present n/a 
Oral histories 
• In 4 risk zones and in 2 
resettlement sites 
• With individuals and 
families 
• Life trajectory 
• Risk perceptions 
and impacts 
• Experience of risk 
management 
programme 
Lifetime 
11 recorded in-depth 
interviews, plus additional 
vignettes from household 
and office visits 
Repeat visits in some 
cases 
Semi-structured household 
survey 
Convenience sampling in 3 risk 
zones, targeted at different 
geographic areas and types of 
housing  
• Social profile and 
livelihoods base 
• Risk perceptions 
and impacts 
• Experience of risk 
management 
programme 
Time of 
settlement - 
present 
57 High risk zones 
28 Medium risk zones 
Semi-structured interviews 
with community leaders and 
key informants 
In 4 risk zones 
• History 
neighbourhood 
• History risk 
management 
• Key issues for the 
community 
Time of 
settlement - 
present 
7 
Semi-structured interviews 
with district officials 
Present and past 
• Processes of 
assessment and 
procedures 
• Origins and history 
of programme  
• Challenges to 
implementation 
• Relationships with 
communities 
Beginning 
programme 
- present 
33 
Document analysis 
e.g. Programme documents, 
technical reports, legal 
transcripts 
n/a 
Beginning 
programme 
- present 
n/a 
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Data analysis 
Interview transcripts, notes and key documents were analysed using ATLAS.ti 
software, which enabled systematic coding according to certain themes. These codes 
were drawn both from pre-existing theoretical lines of enquiry (e.g. government 
influence on risk assessment) as well as inductive categories that emerged from the 
data (e.g. citizenship, an important aspect of the values and cultures that have shaped 
risk assessments in Bogota). Breaking down the data in this way was useful in order 
to find common themes and patterns but, as Maxwell warns, “fracturing and 
categorising your data can lead to the neglect of contextual relationships among 
these data……a research question that asks about the way events in a specific 
context are connected cannot be answered by an exclusively categorising analysis” 
(p.89-90) (Maxwell 2009). Care was therefore taken to also preserve a full reading of 
the texts, after general themes had been identified through categorisation. Closed 
survey data was entered into Excel alongside summaries of the open data, so that 
responses concerning beliefs, attitudes and perceptions could be understood in the 
context of the different aspects of people’s livelihoods, differences in livelihoods 
across social groupings and the political status of different households (e.g. whether 
they were in a particular risk zone or included under particular risk management 
measures).  
4.4 Research challenges and ethics 
One of the major challenges encountered in conducting this research was gaining 
access to high risk zones and the trust of affected communities, which caused initial 
delay in starting the research work and influenced the content of the research. The 
three main sites for the research were in the same district (Ciudad Bolivar), for 
example, and all exhibited similar patterns of settlement (although the differences 
between them are discussed below). The challenge reflected both my own position as 
a foreigner new to the research context, but also the sensitivity of the research topic 
and ongoing issues of security in risk zones in the poorest areas of the city. The 
controversial and highly politicised nature of the resettlement programme meant that 
I was refused access by some community leaders. The very nature of the project also 
meant talking to people about illegal activities, and I was concerned to talk to people 
without the continuous presence of state officials. As well as pursuing formal 
institutional channels for site visits with district officials, I therefore also contracted 
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a local research assistant who was better placed to liaise with community leaders and 
could accompany me on visits. He arranged for us to be accompanied in two zones 
by the so-called vigias (or watchmen), who were local residents employed by the 
district to maintain cleared risk zones. Only in the third site of Brisas de Volador - 
where I met families independently through the work of a local children’s NGO - 
was I able to build up strong enough ties with community members that I visited on 
my own, and went repeatedly to the site over the course of a year to follow the risk 
management process. Throughout the research I had to balance security concerns 
with the demands of the research. A fourth site was abandoned after two visits due to 
security concerns, and work was curtailed in the third site of Caracoli for several 
months after a murder in the neighbourhood mid-way through interviewing made it 
prudent to leave. However, I refused a police escort in the Altos de Estancia barrio, 
given that we had arranged for vigias to accompany us and I felt a police presence 
would prejudice the research.     
In addition, I was advised to leave communities before nightfall, which meant 
travelling back to the centre of the city by mid-afternoon. This affected the sample of 
people we were able to interview, as people who were working often worked in the 
north of the city (1-2 hours away) and therefore left early in the morning and were 
not back until the evening. In response, we tried to vary the days on which we 
interviewed (including weekends where possible) and made multiple visits to the 
same areas. However the profile of respondents was undoubtedly affected. In 
addition, the parts of the zones re-settled by displaced groups were regarded locally 
as more insecure, and we had less access to these areas. 
In terms of the influence of these considerations on the content of the research, in 
general people talked frankly and on the record about activities such as illegal 
settlement and illegal electricity tapping, for example. However, I did not press 
directly about the activities of local security groups, both for the safety of 
respondents as well as my own in the zones. Instead, I relied on volunteered 
information to draw conclusions about the influence of these groups. This limited the 
analysis. The fact of being a foreigner with perceived resources (and the 
commonality of being surveyed by the government for means-tested social 
programmes) also affected information people gave about their wealth status, and I 
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noted people downplaying responses about goods they owned, presumably to 
emphasise their poverty. Having local research assistance helped to combat this. In 
general, I attempted to triangulate the information I was given by asking repeat 
questions across interviews with different respondents and verifying factual 
information against formal documentation.    
Another challenge related to the social flux of the zones which meant that, over the 
one year period of the fieldwork, informants often moved on, either voluntarily or 
through the formal resettlement programme. However, this formed part of the 
research story, and I built into discussions with remaining community members 
questions about who was able to leave, and why. In one case where I had developed 
strong ties with a particular family I was able to speak by telephone with a family 
member who had left the zone, and visit her in her new home.  
Because the research concentrated on interviewing households in the risk zones 
themselves, there was a strong possibility of bias in the sample towards groups 
excluded from risk management operations. To counter this, interviews and oral 
histories were also taken in two resettlement sites, one a community-led resettlement 
project and the other in the case of a woman resettled by the district, whose name 
was passed to us by a district official. Additional questions were included that 
probed what factors enabled these people to access resettlement programmes (see 
Chapter 7). 
Finally, in terms of the community-level fieldwork, although focus groups have been 
a key method for vulnerability and livelihoods research, this was practically difficult 
in this context, where communities were fragmented by resettlement programmes 
and people’s working patterns meant that it was possible only to convene groups at 
weekends, in precious leisure and family time. Where I did attend meetings called by 
community leaders, diverse viewpoints were often crowded out and meetings only 
attended by small groups close to the community leadership. I therefore decided 
against using focus groups as a formal strategy for the research, focussing instead on 
household interviewing. However, where they did occur, I did attend community 
meetings and interviewed groups of neighbours as well as individual households, 
recognising the need to account for social dynamics as well as the personal 
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worldviews revealed through individual and household interviews (Bauer and 
Gaskell 2000) .  
In undertaking district-level interviews, a key challenge was a bureaucratic culture in 
which it was common to rely on citing formal regulations and norms in response to 
interview questions, and therefore difficult to probe underlying social and political 
dynamics. In addition to interviewing officials in post, therefore, I sought contact 
with officials who had formerly worked in the risk zones and who could provide a 
more open, as well as historical, perspective on the activities of the risk management 
programme. These interviews also often took place in more informal places than the 
district offices. Site visits with district officials were also useful in providing a freer 
context for discussion.    
The principal ethical issues that arose were those of remunerating interviewees for 
their time, and of gaining their consent to be interviewed, and in some cases to be 
audio recorded. As regards the first issue, payment for interviews, after consultation 
with local researchers and my research assistants, I decided against such payments. I 
concluded that payments would set an awkward precedent for local researchers, and 
would alter the interviewer-interviewee relationship. With regard to the second issue 
of informed consent, each interviewee was informed of the aims of the project and 
how the material would be used (with interviewee names anonymised in data 
reporting). I asked to audio record long narrative interviews for my own textual 
analysis and so as to follow up on any language issues that arose in the interview 
(although I speak fluent Spanish and had worked before in an urban Latin American 
context, there was a tendency in community-level interviews for local jargon and 
slang to be used). Interviewees were informed before the interview took place that 
the audio recording would only be available to myself and a transcriber, and were 
given the option to decline the recording if they wished.  
4.5 Research context: the ladera programme, Bogota, Colombia 
As mentioned, the city of Bogota was chosen as the case study site for the research 
as it has a long history of state disaster risk management interventions in the city’s 
informal settlements, informed, according to the World Bank, by some of the 
world’s most detailed records of risk and vulnerability (Dickson et al. 2010). 
Multiple disaster risks are mapped and scaled in severity by the city’s engineers, 
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including landslide risk. The ladera (or hill slopes) programme focusses on the 
11,500 hectares of city land that extends up the hillsides to the east and south of the 
city centre, of which 910 hectares is assessed to be at ‘high risk’ of landslide 
damage, affecting thousands of families in the lowest socio-economic brackets, who 
live predominantly in informal settlements31 (Mayor of Bogota 2006).  
 
Figure 1: Landslide risk map for the city of Bogota 
The red zone depicts the high risk area, yellow medium risk and green low risk.  
 
Source: DPAE, Bogota 
This urban ‘hazardscape’ is described in terms familiar to vulnerability scholars of 
disasters and climate risk, that areas prone to a physical hazard (due to steep slopes, 
particular geomorphologies and the presence of old quarry sites) are occupied by 
economically and socially marginalised populations living in poor quality housing 
with poor access to public services (with their marginalisation driven by the absence 
                                                          
31
 Although exact numbers should be treated with caution, as they vary wildly between official 
documents. In 2005, the Caja de Vivienda Popular (Housing Agency, responsible for the resettlement 
programme) put the number of dwellings in non-mitigable high risk zones (for all types of disaster 
risk) at 8405, twice the number estimated in 2000 (Caja de Vivienda Popular 2005). Chapter 5 
touches on how such numbers have become part of the state politics of risk management itself.  
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of particular entitlements, such as the inequality of access to affordable urban 
housing and land, as well as the political economies of the labour markets into which 
people are inserted). Water filtration exacerbated by the lack of formal water supply 
and drainage and bi-annual rains most often trigger landslides that threaten both life 
and property.  
Despite nearly two decades of state risk assessment and intervention through 
infrastructure works, the resettlement of communities away from high risk areas, 
community education projects and new land use policies, large numbers of families 
still remain vulnerable and illegal settlements in these areas continue to grow 
(Dickson et al. 2010). Landslide disasters are an ongoing occurrence during the rainy 
seasons. While resettlement has certainly enabled some groups to move away from 
the zones, both pre- and post- the occurrence of disasters, the process has often been 
marked by significant tension between the state and communities, and long delay. 
“In some communities they love us, some hate us”, a social worker in the DPAE 
reported to me in an interview. In the past, she herself was held hostage in a building 
for an hour by a community in protest. “It is very difficult to get people out of these 
zones” she continued (DPAE Social Management Team – June 2010).  
4.6 Study sites: the landslide risk zones of Ciudad Bolivar, Bogota  
The three principal study sites for the research were all sited in the district of Ciudad 
Bolivar, in the south of the city32. Of all the districts in Bogota, Ciudad Bolivar is 
one of the most marginalised – it has the second highest proportion of citizens 
classed in the two lowest socio-economic strata, and this without including those in 
informal settlements (Alcaldia Mayor de Bogota D.C. 2004). The study sites all 
shared – in common with other peri-urban informal areas of the city – a history of 
unplanned development through migration, by people violently displaced from rural 
conflict zones and moving away from economic hardship (both from other parts of 
the city as well as from the countryside), with the predominant wave of settlements 
occurring in the 1990s. The majority home owners (rather than renters or squatters) 
had bought illegally from ‘piratas’, or the main protagonists of informal land 
development in Bogota, who were land owners or occupiers who sub-divided 
                                                          
32
 The fourth site, Nueva Esperanza, lay in a different zone, Rafael Uribe Uribe. Two visits were 
undertaken to this zone before concerns were expressed by my research assistant about the level of 
insecurity in the zone, and fieldwork in the site was stopped. The interviews undertaken on these 
visits nevertheless informed the analysis of Chapters 5-7. 
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unoccupied areas and sold off the plots with an informal title document (known as 
the promesa de venta or ‘sale promise’)33. However, the three zones also have 
distinct histories and differ in geographical scope, despite being subject to the 
standard procedures and operations of the ladera programme. 
Figure 2: Map showing location of Ciudad Bolivar district, Bogota 
 
Source: www.bogotamiciudad.com 
 
a. Brisas de Volador 
The high risk zone situated within the barrio of Brisas de Volador affected an 
estimated 1000 people living on a steep slope above a main road, but covered only a 
small area, of around 7 hectares34. Part of the zone included a disused quarry cut into 
the hillside. The barrio had been settled from the late 1990s, with the first risk 
assessment carried out in the zone in 1998. A concerted evacuation into resettlement 
had taken place in 2005, which, official documents indicate, was prompted by a 
court case brought by a small group of inhabitants of the zone to demand 
resettlement. The court case concluded in 2004 with the ruling that risk management 
agencies should update their risk concepts for the zone, and led to new inclusions in 
the resettlement programme.  
                                                          
33
 And often provided credit for the purchase, as well as in some cases arranging basic services for the 
plots.  
34
 Estimates from 2008 according to the latest DPAE risk analysis ‘concept’ for the zone. Source: 
Base de datos para legalizacion, April 2012, SIRE, Bogota.   
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At the time of fieldwork35, in the central part of the zone, the original inhabitants of 
the upper part of the barrio had been resettled, but not those below. Meanwhile, near 
to the quarry the land was destined to be re-forested. On the opposite side, residents 
reported being under an eviction order brought by the original landowner against a 
group of inhabitants both within and without the high risk zone36. In general, 
although local inhabitants reported the usual state visits to the zone, Brisas was not a 
large or important enough area for risk management agencies to get involved; 
although there were recurrent landslides there had never been a major ‘event’ on the 
scale of the other high risk areas studied. Officials never mentioned the area and 
there were few public documents related to it. The area had previously been part of a 
‘red zone’ for crime and violence reduction and inhabitants reported ongoing 
operations of paramilitaries in the area, which affected attempts at community 
organising (although those under the eviction order did associate with the local junta, 
unlike other groups). The high risk area was excluded from the legalisation of the 
wider barrio, which took place in 1999, and people in the area retained informal land 
titles and organised their own provision of services, illegally tapping water from the 
tank belonging to the neighbouring barrio above. Community informants reported 
that the Mockus government had started to provide drainage to the area but stopped 
when the high risk classification was issued. This had been only partially extended 
by a community drainage system cut out in one part of the area by a group of longer 
term inhabitants.  
  
                                                          
35
 In the rainy season after the fieldwork had been completed – 2010-2011 – a major landslide 
occurred in Brisas affecting around 60 families, who had to be evacuated.  
36
 And fiercely resisted by the inhabitants, with the support of the Junta de Accion Comunal. See 
http://www.desdeabajo.info/ediciones/item/475-%C2%A1el-desalojo-no-pasar%C3%A1-brisas-del-
volador.html for coverage of a transport blockade in protest at the eviction, and the rough treatment of 
protestors by the local police.  
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Figure 3: Photograph of the Brisas de Volador risk area 
 
 
Source: author, 2010 
 
b. Altos de Estancia   
In contrast to Brisas, the area of Altos de Estancia is reported to be the largest urban 
landslide zone in Latin America, and is the largest high risk zone in Bogota, 
affecting a total of 15 barrios and around 100 hectares of land. The extent of the 
disasters that had occurred in this zone from the late 1990s – with hundreds of 
people affected by four major landslide disasters to date - made it a site of 
importance for the municipal government, deserving of special mention in strategic 
government planning documents, such as the city plan.  
In Altos, a history of mass evacuation also sits alongside a history of community-
organised contestation in a manner that has not occurred in Brisas de Volador or 
Caracoli. By the time of the landslides and production of the first ‘risk concepts’ for 
the zone, communities were already organised around the legalisation process 
promoted by the Penalosa government. Many of the barrios were in fact legalised in 
the 1999-2000 period, legalisation that was then rescinded by municipal decree when 
the zone was formally declared as ‘high risk’ in 2002. The experience of collective 
protest is informative as historical account, and these early protests shaped the nature 
of the risk management system operating today.  
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The Altos de Estancia zone has also been the site of sophisticated spatial planning to 
regulate risk in the area. The high-risk zone is known by officials and local 
inhabitants as the ‘polygono’, or polygon, because of its shape. From 2003 on, 
within this polygon, the state has demarcated three different types of area for action 
according to their prioritisation by risk ‘level’: Phase One, subject to evacuation and 
total resettlement and now officially ‘emptied’; Phase Two, undergoing resettlement 
and Phase 3, ‘medium’ risk and being monitored (through the use of technical 
instruments and house visits by engineers). At the time of the research, fringes of the 
existing zone were described by state officials as among most critical zones for 
landslide management in the city (with emergencies declared in the barrio of Tres 
Reyes, where we were able to do field visits and surveys). In addition, risk 
management agencies were pushing hard to complete the resettlement phases and, 
with the active involvement of the district environment ministry, promote a 
‘greening’ agenda, with the aim of turning the area into a ‘recreational park’.  
  
89 
 
Figure 4: Risk map of Altos de Estancia 
The red zone depicts the high risk area (the ‘polygon’), yellow medium risk and 
green low risk.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Source: DPAE, Alcalde Mayor de Bogota D.C. 
 
c. Caracoli 
The third site, the barrio of Caracoli, situated on the very border of Bogota with the 
neighbouring settlement of Soacha, contained four areas deemed high risk: on the 
steep slopes to the top of the barrio (where earth and mud ‘creep’ took place from 
above, but also undermined levelling undertaken under properties to provide a flat 
surface for construction), in two lower sites of gully erosion running down the main 
slope (also exposed to flooding) and on a slope overlooking the main stream channel 
at the bottom of the community. The population of the high risk areas reportedly ran 
to around 520, of which an estimated 150 had been resettled, mainly from the upper 
areas (Secretaria de Habitat 2010). Landslide events had occurred in 2006-2007 and 
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then again in 2010, during the fieldwork. Known for high levels of insecurity, the 
neighbourhood had been legalised in 2007 and, more recently, designated a priority 
zone for improvement by the municipal government, although the four areas 
demarcated as at high risk were exempt. As Chapter 5 discusses, those in the risk 
zones retained only community drainage and paid a minimal amount to tap water 
from a central pipe. 
4.7 Conclusion 
This chapter has highlighted how, in order to investigate new directions for 
vulnerability research in an urban context, and answer the question of whether new 
approaches are needed to understand vulnerability in informal urban settlements, 
new, more open methods are needed, even in the context of traditional case study-
based research designs. It has outlined how I tackled the question of how states 
control for risk and vulnerability with empirical work rooted in a historical, 
institutional analysis of a state risk management programme in conjunction with 
household-based interviewing and survey work which aimed to uncover the 
determinants of ongoing vulnerability and risk. The chapter has also discussed some 
of the challenges to doing this work in an informal, urban setting and how this 
shaped the overall analysis of this thesis. Against the brief backdrop to the case study 
and study sites provided here, it is to this analysis that the next three chapters turn. 
Chapter 5 examines the state co-production of landslide risk assessment with the 
history, values and cultures embedded in the practices of governing in informal risk 
zones. Chapter 6 explores the meanings and values in which societal responses to 
risk assessment are couched in turn. Chapter 7 discusses how agency and access 
function to transform the environmental risks faced by informal urban communities.   
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Chapter 5 
States of Risk: The Co-production of Landslide Risk Assessment in the 
Informal Settlements of Bogota, Colombia 
5.1 Introduction 
Using analysis of Bogota’s landslide risk management programme, this chapter 
shows how knowledge about risk used in government programmes influences and is 
influenced by the politics and practices of government in ways that reconfigure the 
occurrence of vulnerability and disaster. Reflecting the theoretical arguments of 
Chapter 2, the findings presented in this chapter demonstrate how a government 
approach to risk management informed predominantly by the conception of risk as a 
physical impact overlooks critical aspects of the social context, and the ways in 
which risk is socially driven. This ultimately limits the state’s efforts to control 
vulnerability. While this much is well laid down in existing literature about risk and 
vulnerability, the chapter presents further evidence to show how the political as well 
as social context is important to the occurrence of vulnerability and disaster risk. It 
flags the importance of understanding how urban governance works – in terms of 
both the workings and practices of the state in informal settlements, and the 
knowledge claims that underpin these – in order to understand how and why risks 
occur. This takes us onto the terrain of Chapter 3, which set out how scholarship in 
Science and Technology Studies, political science and urban studies might lead us to 
think about how the state, state politics and state knowledge about risk function 
together to influence how (urban) states act on risk in informal urban settlements and 
with what consequences. This frame is applied here.     
The chapter sets out the findings from the case study of Bogota’s landslide risk 
programme in two parts: 
The first section (Section 5.2) focusses on how the politics and practices of the city 
government have influenced the production of knowledge used by the state to 
manage landslide risk in the city’s informal settlements, in particular in the three 
landslide risk zones where the fieldwork was concentrated. The first part of the 
section explains how technical assessments of physical risk came to predominate in 
the context of the city’s politics but also reinforced aspects of the political culture, in 
ways that have been exclusionary of local perspectives on risk and of understanding 
the social drivers of vulnerability to risk. The second part of the section, drawing 
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more explicitly on scholarship in Science and Technology Studies (STS), advances 
this reading by showing how assumptions about the causes of and responsibilities for 
risk built into risk assessments themselves are influenced by the political and social 
context of urban informality. Politics, therefore, is lodged in the very processes that 
govern how risk is defined. The third part of the section extends this analysis further 
to show how knowledge about risk is in fact co-produced alongside particular 
practices of government that govern who is to be defined as at risk, and how they are 
to be treated.  
The second section (5.3) opens up the idea of co-production in the context of the 
urban governance of risk by showing how the practices of urban governance in 
informal settlements shape how knowledge generated through risk assessment is 
deployed. It thereby unpacks how both the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’ are produced 
together. In the context of the ladera programme I show how a politics of inclusion 
and exclusion has functioned to determine exposure to risk, and how, utilising ideas 
from urban studies about modes of governance in informal areas, this has reflected 
government practices of ‘flexibility’ and ‘un-mapping’ alongside formal government 
mapping and regulation. The final part of the section takes a broader view of state 
practice, examining both what the case study illustrates about how the ‘urban state’ 
operates (or not) as a singular, purposive agent and how it operates in a hybrid 
fashion, connected and unconnected to non-state actors in the particular context of 
informal urban areas. The analysis shows how coherence, tension and contradiction 
between the agendas of the different actors affect the occurrence of risk and 
vulnerability.  
5.2 The production of knowledge about risk in Bogota’s ladera programme 
This section illustrates how the ways in which knowledge about risk and 
vulnerability are produced in government risk management policy influences how 
risk and vulnerability unfold among hill-side communities in Bogota, Colombia. 
Divided into three sub-sections, the first exemplifies how a physically-based 
paradigm for assessing risk overlooks the structural and social causes, agency and 
coping strategies and local perceptions and meanings of risk, in ways already 
discussed by vulnerability analysts (Blaikie et al. 1994; Forsyth 2003), but highlights 
further how this reflects, enables and sustains a particular state politics (Scott 1998; 
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Mustafa 2005). The following two sub-sections take the analysis further, however, 
interrogating how this knowledge system about risk is constituted in ways that are 
deeply influenced by particular political assumptions and, finally, ‘co-produced’ 
alongside particular practices of government (Jasanoff 2004) in ways that create new 
distributions of vulnerability in high risk zones.      
5.2.a Political influences on knowledge: The politics of technical diagnosis  
This section illustrates how the project of assessing landslide disaster risk in 
Bogota’s informal settlements has reflected an ongoing geophysical/technocratic 
paradigm in disaster research and management (see Varley 1994; Blaikie et al. 1994; 
Pelling 2003), with its emphasis on the prediction and reduction of hazards, a narrow 
approach to vulnerability as exposure and a focus on what Varley, citing Hewitt and 
others, refers to as a ‘behaviourist’ element to the paradigm, or an emphasis on 
disseminating knowledge and information based on state-based risk assessments. 
The way in which knowledge about risk is constituted within this paradigm is (as in 
Scott), both simplifying and abstracting of the social and political processes that 
contribute to that risk. Furthermore, politically, it has provided a system of 
‘legibility’ which has allowed for particular forms of territorial planning, and both 
reflected the authority of and conferred new forms on authority on the state.       
Disaster risk assessment in political context 
Existing analyses show that the impetus for and instruments of Bogota’s risk 
management programme have their origins in both the national and international 
domains, before they are taken up in the city itself (Zeiderman and Ramirez 2010; 
Zeiderman 2012; Robles Joya 2008). In 1989, a national urban reform law obligated 
municipalities of a certain size to compile inventories of risk exposure and undertake 
relocation programmes if local mitigation was not possible. Bogota was the first city 
to concretise this, with the Castro administration of 1994 introducing the first 
analysis of risk distribution. However, it was the administrations of Mockus (1995-
1997 and then 2001-2004) and Peñalosa (1997-end 2000) who gave the system of 
risk analysis and management its full form (Zeiderman 2012; Robles Joya 2008). 
The Mockus and Peñalosa administrations marked a critical juncture in Bogota’s 
political history. They are credited with driving a transformation in its development 
and management that altered the city both physically and socially through policies 
guided by principles of equity, integration and security (Berney 2010). There was 
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continuity in policy across these administrations, although differences in priority, 
vision and approach, with Mockus focussed on protecting life and security through 
the construction of new social behaviours and norms while Peñalosa focussed on the 
physical reconstruction of the city itself (ibid.).   
Risk management was undoubtedly a political project, the history and values of 
which – as I go on to develop – infused the very project of constructing knowledge 
about risk. However, in the interactional sense of co-production, or the way in which 
knowledge is re-organised after the fact, its implementation was to be inherently 
apolitical, with risk assessment the domain of scientific experts. This reliance on 
expert knowledge in the history of Bogota’s transformation is explained by Berney: 
“The (re)emergence of the professional class in city planning and design issues 
became a reflection of the deep-seated tradition in Colombia of expert-led 
government. Even with the decentralization of government power to the local level, 
much of the power to act remains with the powerbrokers and the experts, not with 
the users” (p.544)37. Salcedo and Zeiderman reflect on how Mockus’s political 
project arose from the ideas of a group of intellectuals and experts who believed in 
applying knowledge and science to create a new form of government that would 
show results, through both statistics and technical argument (Salcedo Fidalgo and 
Zeiderman 2008).  
My own interviews also revealed how technical knowledge provided a means to 
manage political difficulties, as high risk areas were excluded from the legalisation 
programmes championed by both mayors. Some neighbourhoods or barrios had 
been slated to be legalised but were then the subject of risk assessment studies, some 
of which concluded that they should be excluded. Although the process had not been 
completed, the initiation of the process gave people the expectation that they would 
be able to live there. In other barrios, the legalisation process was complete, but the 
onset of a landslide triggered a new technical study that declared it uninhabitable. In 
these cases, the state rescinded the legalisation, declared the land ‘protected’ state 
land and attempted to resettle its inhabitants. Given the stated aims of the respective 
mayors – and the political capital at stake – these processes were contentious and 
often contested by communities, who had organised for the purposes of the 
                                                          
37
 This technical bias in state planning is also reflected in Asher and Ojeda’s analysis of Colombia’s 
territorial zoning policies, see Asher and Ojeda 2009.  
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legalisation process. Having technical criteria with which to make the decision was 
seen as a way to deflect criticism and contest (Disaster Risk Consultant, Ministry 
Environment – January 2010; former Ladera Programme Co-ordinator, DPAE – 
June 2010). 
i. The risk assessment process: calculating risks and vulnerabilities in the 
ladera programme 
In this political context, the actual process of assessing risks in the city has remained 
the domain of engineers, who seek to demarcate spatial boundaries of high, medium 
and low level risk at the household scale. These can then be mapped and governed38. 
In the landslide risk programme, engineers from the disasters agency evaluate the 
likelihood of physical threat according to the geological and slope characteristics of 
the area, hydrology (rainfall and ground filtration such as public service networks) 
and seismic activity. This is overlain with a Physical Vulnerability Index based on an 
assessment of the quality of the housing infrastructure, and therefore the likelihood 
of damage from the different types of possible hazard. Combined into an index of 
risk, risk levels are set according to the likelihood of losses to housing and the 
proportion of people affected falling between certain ranges. The assessment is 
therefore probabilistic, and futuristic.  
  
                                                          
38
 The city produces both threat maps and risk maps. Threat – or the likelihood of physical hazard – is 
mapped at the city scale, and forms the basis for more detailed maps of risk at lower scales. Such risk 
maps are discussed here, and reflect the likelihood of hazard multiplied by the extent of vulnerability.  
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Figure 5: Landslide risk map for the risk zone of Caracoli, Ciudad Bolivar 
 
Caracoli landslide hazard map, 2006 Source: Lopez, D.H. 2007.  
Red shading denotes the high risk areas. 
Within high risk areas, risk assessment is further used to distinguish who has priority 
in the government resettlement programmes that apply in the area, ‘rendering 
technical’ highly contentious and often disputed decisions. Introduced in 2003 (at a 
critical historic juncture for the programme, discussed further below), in this 
assessment process engineers judge whether houses have technical priority 1 (facing 
either partial or total housing loss in an emergency) or 2 (houses affected by 
landslides without possibility of mitigation) based on the physical infrastructure of 
houses in high risk zones.  
The first key point to make about this schema is the absence of knowledge about 
broader patterns of social vulnerability, possible coping strategies at the household 
level and questions about social (including institutional) causation. This reflects the 
nature of state intervention, which is heavily focused on reducing exposure to hazard 
through resettlement policy and providing infrastructure to mitigate physical risk, but 
has not addressed questions of socio-economic sensitivity to risk and its causes (in 
terms of wider issues of poverty and inequality, manifest, for example, in the lack of 
a broader housing policy affordable and available to the poorest groups)39. In terms 
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 Within this framework, the state resettlement policy caters only to those in the lowest socio-
economic strata – reflecting their vulnerability – but social vulnerability assessment is not a feature of 
risk analysis per se. In the same vein, in certain evacuations – such as those undertaken in Nueva 
Esperanza and Altos de Estancia – particular social groups were prioritised on account of their 
vulnerability, but this appears to have been a discretionary response and one that has occurred in light 
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of the localised causes of landslide events – informal water supply and drainage 
being a key factor – while technical and programme documents recognise the role 
that this plays, subsequent sections highlight how and why this has often remained 
unaddressed in practice, and how official state narratives often transfer the blame 
onto communities themselves citing their lack of care for the environment40.   
Despite this, a huge amount of social data is collected from households (see Poveda 
Gómez 2011 for a full description of the social variables collected from households 
in the Nueva Esperanza risk zone, for instance). However, social analysis takes place 
in order to facilitate the resettlement programme and is collected by the Caja de 
Vivienda Popular, the state housing agency charged with resettlement41. For 
example, in Nueva Esperanza, a socio-economic survey from 2008 applied to all 
households in the zone asked about the health status of individuals and their 
affiliation to the public health subsidy scheme. On the basis of the findings, the Caja 
de Vivienda Popular team recommended that the District Health Department include 
those houses without the subsidy, that people in temporary resettlement sites receive 
medical attention at their nearest centre, and that information about the final 
resettlement destination be passed to the health secretariat to ensure proper 
registration in the health system (Caja de Vivienda Popular 2008). The health status 
of those remaining – both temporarily and permanently – in the high risk zone, the 
links between health and risk (across all levels of risk zone) and possible health-
related measures to protect particular households in risk zones is subsumed in the 
focus on moving people away from the area. 
The second key point to make about this mode of risk assessment as a knowledge 
system is the way in which it has been closed to localised conceptions of risk, in a 
manner also reminiscent of Scott’s emblematic modernist planning schemes 
(although as I discuss in the subsequent chapter this local knowledge should not be 
                                                                                                                                                                    
of an emergency, but not as a component of pre-existing vulnerability assessment per se (for mention 
of this practice in these cases see Poveda Gómez 2011; Robles Joya 2008). 
40
 To give one example, in a court case brought by inhabitants of the barrios of Altos de Estancia 
against state agencies for failing to protect their rights, as part of its defence the state water company 
claims ongoing earth slides and water run-off are due to lack of care by the community in disposing of 
rubbish, which blocks pipes  (Court proceedings in the case of Tutela N 041-06, Juzgado Noveno 
Penal Municipal de Descongestion, Bogota D.C., 12 June 2006).  
41
 This is in accordance with the stipulations of the 2000 city land zoning plan that a socio-economic 
study be undertaken to identify the impacts of resettlement, but also in accordance with ‘safeguards’ 
required by the World Bank, a funder of Bogota’s project, for their resettlement programmes. 
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conceptually bounded and romanticised as a result). The aim has been to project, 
even enforce, the results of risk assessments, with no active involvement by those 
affected in the assessment process or the design of the programmes that follow42. 
Communicating risk according to risk assessment has become a major strategy of the 
programme, both through the erection of billboards in high risk zones and in the day-
to-day task of state officials visiting households. According to many state officials I 
interviewed, a major block on the programme has been that ‘people don’t see risk’, 
or that they only do so in the event of an emergency or if their houses are affected. 
Getting people to ‘see like the state’, however, requires the adoption of a future-
oriented, aerial viewpoint. “The problem”, one official told me, “is that people are 
not able to project what risk is” (Housing secretariat official formerly involved in 
Altos de Estancia evacuation – January 2010). Official documents from the Altos de 
Estancia project belie the same notion: citing inhabitants from the zone who say they 
have seen no landslides for ten years, no land movements and no cracks in their 
houses, the report concludes that “from these declarations we can establish that there 
exists a low perception of risk” (p.80) (DPAE 2009). It goes on to assert “residents 
think that problem will solve itself with little, isolated mitigation works which 
doesn’t take into account the environment in which landslides develop” [and which 
the state is able to assess] (p.24) (DPAE 2009).  
  
                                                          
42
 In general terms, the style of government followed in Bogota in recent decades has been one that 
Berney argues has privileged ‘progress over participation’ (Berney 2010). Community meetings I 
attended became a forum for explaining district policy and procedure, and one official told me his 
team preferred to avoid community meetings “as people just come to vent their anger, which is a 
waste of time” (Caja de Vivienda official – June 2010). Where participation has been formally 
encouraged in the ladera programme it has most actively involved encouraging the communities 
remaining around the high risk zones to participate in schemes to monitor new settlement in the 
zones. Strategies of participation also often involved an agenda pre-set by state agencies. In 
documents produced for the Altos de Estancia programme, the DPAE concludes that there is the need 
for participation of people living in Phase 3 of the programme, who are currently under risk 
‘monitoring’. However, it goes on to link this with the need to find a development angle to the 
programme, and a proposal to offer subsidies for housing improvement, in this case for structural 
reinforcement, which it says will be of ‘great relevance’ to the population (p.103) (DPAE 2009). The 
following chapters discuss how communities and households have sought to open up political space 
to discuss their concerns about risk assessment and management.   
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Figure 6: Photo of a risk communication sign, Altos de Estancia  
 
The sign reads ‘Danger: High Risk due to Landslide’. Source: Author, 2010. 
 
In fact, the state has fought fiercely to defend its authority to define risk over and 
above conflicting local interpretations. In a 2004 court case brought by a group of 
inhabitants of Brisas de Volador against the municipal disaster agencies, the 
inhabitants appealed to be resettled due to the effects of landslides. In its formal 
response, the risk management agency makes a striking statement about who is to 
judge risk in the sector, asking the court to “disregard the pretensions of the claimant 
given that the competent authority to establish the level of risk was this institution 
and not the claimant.”43  
Risk assessment has therefore enabled and sanctioned new forms of authority to 
decide who can be designated ‘at risk’ and who will be entitled to new forms of risk-
related government support. Reflective of the broader political project underway in 
Bogota, which was critiqued as a form of mass pedagogy, officials cast themselves 
                                                          
43
 From court documents in the case of an Accion Popular brought by Marco Tulio Ararat Sandaval 
and others against the FOPAE (disasters agencies), October 8 2004. The documents can be found at 
http://190.24.134.67/SENTENCIAS/ACCION%20POPULAR/2004/ (Last retrieved August 27 2012). 
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as educators in this ‘risk campaign’ in order to persuade people to leave high risk 
zones – telling families that their houses would fall down, or that they should inform 
themselves of the science (DPAE official – January 2010; Field visit with Caja de 
Vivienda officials – June 2010). In Altos de Estancia, to prevent new settlement, a 
recorded history of the nature of the soils and the resettlement programme was 
played on the buses “to teach people that the soil was not apt for urbanisation” 
(former official responsible for resettlement policy – June 2010)44. Beyond 
persuasion, however, officials complained of the way in which these interactions 
become ‘a negotiation’, as if the state were a private enterprise. “We have to 
convince people we are not a housing company”, says one Caja employee (Field visit 
with Caja de Vivienda officials – June 2010). Behind this lies the sentiment that the 
state is not to be bargained with. Negotiation, according to one former senior official, 
reflects the fact that the state has ‘no control’ in these zones (former planning official 
– January 2010)45.  
In Bogota, therefore, (as discussed for other cases of disaster risk management in 
cities, see, for example, Rebotier 2012; Mustafa 2005) a union of technocracy and 
hierarchy has certainly generated a politics of risk that has been both reductive of the 
social causes of risk and exclusionary of social perspectives on risk and risk 
management. The rest of the chapter, however, argues that underneath this reading of 
the knowledge politics at play in the city lies a set of more complex dynamics that 
further influence how disasters and vulnerability occur. Understanding this 
necessitates opening up the practices of knowledge and the practices of the state to 
further analytic scrutiny. The next section illustrates how the practices of risk 
assessment, despite their technical construction, embody not a value-free science, but 
one imbued with a set of particular political values.    
                                                          
44
 The manner is again reminiscent of Scott’s characterisation of the politics of agrarian resettlement 
in Tanzania: “Educating the people did not mean asking their consent, it meant telling them that they 
had to move and why it was in their best interest” (p.234) (Scott 1998).  
45
 While those eligible for the programme who choose not to go cannot be forced, they can be issued 
with an evacuation order, after which point the state is no longer responsible for their welfare, and 
those in breach of programme stipulations can be evicted. See Gupta 2012 for a discussion about how 
coercion and well-being work together in development programmes.   
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5.2. b  Political influences on knowledge: Notions of causes and responsibility in 
the drawing of risk boundaries  
Disasters analysts have noted how the way that risk assessment exercises fix 
particular physical phenomena can lead to partial solutions as such phenomena are 
inherently dynamic (Mustafa 2005). Yet, as Zeiderman also notes for the Bogota 
case (Zeiderman 2012), the agency responsible for measuring risk, the DPAE, 
recognises that landslide phenomena are dynamic, with monitoring exercises in the 
Altos de Estancia zone to keep track of the physical evolution of landslide events and 
an official requirement to habitually re-undertake risk assessments across all zones. 
Nevertheless, both during and subsequent to my fieldwork, landslides occurred that 
affected people and property outside the demarcated high risk zones and resulted in 
the re-classification of the boundaries of high risk areas, in all cases expanding their 
scope46. As this section shows, these issues of boundary classification not only relate 
to a technical diagnosis of a physical event, but illustrate how, as discussed in 
Chapter 3, assumptions about institutional behaviour and politicised notions about 
responsibility with regards to the causes of landslides are built into, not screened out 
of, the risk assessment process itself (Lane, Landström, and Whatmore 2011; Wynne 
1996).  
One example from the third risk zone I studied, that of Caracoli, on the very south-
western border of Bogota, had its first technical assessments of landslide risk in 
1999-2000. These recommended that the neighbourhood be provided with basic 
infrastructure to reduce risk (such as wastewater and storm drainage) and that a 
system of land zoning be introduced, with resettlement undertaken for those in the 
‘highest’ risk areas. Importantly, these considerations were built into the ways in 
which levels of risk were graded across the area, with a ‘medium’ as opposed to 
‘high’ level classification reflecting the assumption that infrastructure upgrading 
could be undertaken which would mitigate levels of risk. However, this technical 
assumption failed to reflect the ways in which the institutional politics of the zone 
would actually preclude such interventions from occurring. In fact, Caracoli, despite 
settlement in the zone since the 1990s, had been officially designated as a forest 
conservation zone and the state and community remained in conflict over the legal 
                                                          
46
 During my fieldwork in 2010 emergencies were declared in Caracoli and in Tres Reyes, to the north 
of the Altos de Estancia high risk zone. In 2011 a landslide was reported in Brisas de Volador which 
affected houses in the medium as well as high risk part of the zone. In all cases, this expansion of the 
high risk zone led to new incorporations into the state resettlement scheme.   
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right of people to remain there. While this dispute remained unresolved, unplanned 
urbanisation continued and landslides became more frequent. In 2006 a landslide 
disaster in which several people died led the community to demand that the 
government take action to protect peoples’ lives. This prompted a new technical 
assessment, which found that some of those households affected by the disaster lay 
outside of the ‘high’ risk zone defined in the earlier assessments. As a result, 
‘medium’ risk areas were now upgraded to ‘high’ owing to both increased 
urbanisation levels and the physical deterioration of the landscape caused by the lack 
of adequate infrastructure. In this way, while the state addressed the need for 
physical risk assessment, the assessments themselves concealed the broader risk 
issue related to questions of institutional responsibility for risk mitigation in 
settlements whose legal status remained undefined (Sources: Lopez 2007; DPAE 
2006; Duvan H. Lopez pers. comm. 2013).  
Similar boundary re-classifications occurred whilst I was conducting my own 
fieldwork, triggered by new landslide emergencies. A disaster in Caracoli in June 
2010, in which a rescue worker died, prompted a similar reassessment and again the 
incorporation of ‘medium’ risk zones into the ‘high’ risk area. As one of the 
engineers responsible for the technical studies told me, although the previous risk 
assessment had taken place just two years prior, the conditions of the soil had 
changed, with deterioration due to the on-going lack of a legal water and drainage 
system, and subsequent water filtration (DPAE official – July 2010). The issue this 
time was different, as by 2010 the status of the barrio had been recognised by the 
city government (with its legalisation in 2007). However, work to upgrade the 
infrastructure on the back of legalisation was only just underway at the time that I 
undertook fieldwork in 2010, despite the money reportedly having been allocated 
from 2008. The provisional and community systems of water and drainage that 
operated in the meantime unfortunately exacerbated erosion47. While a provisional 
water service was ensured by the state on the basis that it had a duty to uphold 
people’s right to water, this did not extend to drainage, compounding the problem. In 
conjunction, the state water agency has no mandate to repair community-constructed 
                                                          
47
 As reported by inhabitants of the zone. Technical risk assessments for the zone undertaken in 2006 
also noted that ‘non-technical’ excavations – undertaken in the direction of the slope – aggravate 
erosion (DPAE 2006). 
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drainage. However, again, questions about institutional responsibility for risk 
mitigation are unaddressed in the assessments.  
As well as making assumptions about how the state acts, technical assessments of 
risk also incorporate politicised assumptions about the responsibilities and capacities 
of individual homeowners to act to mitigate risk. The risk assessment process 
distinguishes between ‘mitigable’ and ‘non-mitigable’ levels of ‘high’ risk. Areas 
deemed to be ‘non-mitigable’, or where it is either technically unfeasible or too 
costly to undertake in situ mitigation, are earmarked for resettlement projects, whilst 
‘mitigable’ areas might be temporarily evacuated or the use of houses restricted until 
the necessary works are undertaken. The responsibility to mitigate in terms of 
upgrading housing infrastructure (as opposed to providing large infrastructure works 
such as contention walls) is designated to be an action on private property that rests 
with homeowners themselves. In the case of the Caracoli, for example, the Technical 
Assessment Report of 2006 makes clear that “these actions [mitigation works] must 
be undertaken by owners of the lots, given that the DPAE [the disasters agency] does 
not have house improvement programmes and that it cannot intervene on private 
property” (p.54) (DPAE 2006). However, fieldwork in Caracoli as well as in the two 
other high risk zones found that such actions (such as stabilising cuttings in the hill 
slopes for construction) were widely beyond the financial reach of many households. 
In the Brisas de Volador high risk zone, for example, two households interviewed 
reported that putting in channels as recommended by engineers would mean missing 
work and studies, with one respondent saying that it could take weeks to dig out the 
mud at their own expense (Brisas de Volador – 14.03.2010 and 20.07.2010). The 
absence of such actions exacerbated risk levels for people who were technically 
excluded from resettlement because the risks had been deemed as ‘mitigable’48.    
This section has linked the ongoing occurrence of landslide disasters in risk zones to 
the assumptions built into risk classifications themselves about who is to take 
responsibility for the causes of the landslides. The following section furthers this 
analysis of how the political assumptions attached to state knowledge about risk 
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 State policy in this regard also became a point of contention in the 2004 judicial case brought by 
inhabitants of Brisas de Volador against the disaster management agencies. In the case the judge 
upheld the view that given the economic condition of the population, they could not be asked to 
assume responsibility for such measures (Source: http://190.24.134.67/ 
SENTENCIAS/ACCION%20POPULAR/2004/ Last retrieved August 27 2012) 
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influence on-the-ground vulnerability to those risks, using the idiom of co-
production to conceptualise how such knowledge is harnessed to new political 
practices and discourses.  
5.2.c The co-production of citizenship and risk in the construction of vulnerability  
In this section, I argue that risk knowledge has not only embodied particular political 
assumptions but has been co-produced as part of an institutional (and political) 
project tied to the formation of a new urban identity for some of the city’s poorest 
inhabitants, accompanied by new representations of and discourses concerning poor, 
informal urban populations. In this way, particular government practices have 
influenced particular knowledge practices.  
These representations and discourses arise from the political and cultural ideas 
surrounding the project to transform Bogota described above, which have had 
remarkable continuity in the discourse of both programme documents and the 
common parlance of officials49. In the recent political history of Bogota, these ideas 
took two – conjoined – forms. Firstly, for the Mockus administration, transformation 
entailed the creation of a new type of culture, a culture of legality where norms and 
rules would be respected (Salcedo Fidalgo and Zeiderman 2008). This ‘citizens 
culture’ aimed to generate a sense of belonging to the city and facilitate collective 
life, a process through which people would internalise norms of behaviour and 
eventually ‘auto-regulate’, leading to respect for common property and recognition 
of the rights and duties of citizens (ibid.). Berney highlights how the reconstruction 
of citizenship was linked to an identity of Bogotantud, or a positive identification 
with the city and fellow citizens (Berney 2010).  
Secondly, the promotion of these socio-cultural practices was accompanied by 
material investment in changing the physical landscape of the city, through 
improvement programmes that implied particular modes of formalisation and state 
control of ‘illegal’ zones. Programmes of barrio legalisation and improvement and a 
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 Fundamentally a political discourse, it is nevertheless overlain in practice with elements of social 
and cultural discourses – and stigmas - that reflect and accompany the vast inequalities present in 
Bogota, principally between north and south, as well as between Bogotanos and the rest of the 
country. Officials involved in the day-to-day practice of the programme talk of people in high-risk 
zones as having distinct ‘cultures’: both a poverty ‘culture’ of expecting benefits from the state and 
avoiding payments but also one tied to having an indigenous identity, associated by one official with a 
“malicia indigena” or ‘indigenous cunning’ (although few community respondents I spoke to 
espoused this identity). 
105 
 
new approach to territorial planning were enshrined in the City Land Use or Master 
Plan (Plan de Ordenamiento Territorial or POT) of 2000, overseen by the 
government of Peñalosa. Risk assessment became integral to these, both because 
zones at ‘high risk’ were to be declared not eligible for legalisation and because, 
organisationally, risk management was implemented as part of improvement 
programmes50. According to my own interviews with district officials, risk 
management was thereby seen as a “way to consolidate development measures” 
(former DPAE Director – April 2010). In turn, the POT enshrined the view of 
resettlement from high-risk zones as a social objective, of providing goods and 
services to all citizens and promoting equality in the city (Decreto 619 2000). It also 
promoted an integrated vision of the territory of the city, of which zones of ‘special 
treatment’ due to risk were part. From this perspective, risk mapping provided a new 
way for the state to ‘see’ parts of its territory – in most cases, these spaces were 
illegible to the municipal government as nothing was known about those who had 
occupied the city’s periphery, with new arrivals continuing to set up informal 
settlements throughout the 1990s. Control in these areas was therefore difficult. As 
Scott writes, the state did not just seek to understand these areas, it sought to shape 
them according to its techniques of observation (Scott 1998). Risk-related 
resettlement became an opportunity for the state to reorder illegal zones, with the 
POT declaring as a strategy “the conversion of the resettlement of the population 
into an opportunity to push urban ordering and improve conditions of life in the 
sector” (p.55) (Decreto 619 2000). This framing guided the Development Plans of 
future mayors: in Mockus’ 2001-2004 Development Plan resettlements of 
populations at risk of landslides and floods was declared a measure “integral to the 
improvement and reordering of sectors of the city of illegal origins” (Decreto 441 
2001, cited in Robles Joya 2008). The ways in which these political values, identities 
and accompanying discourses infused the project of mitigating disaster risk remains 
critical to the practice of disaster management.  
The section has two parts: the first explicates how the management of risk in high 
risk zones has entailed the remaking of citizens, livelihoods and landscapes, and the 
                                                          
50
 The DPAE (the Departamento de Prevención y Atención de Emergencias or Disasters Prevention 
and Attention Department) formed part of legalisation committees from 1997. Rebotier notes for other 
Latin American contexts how programmes for disaster risk and territorial planning have often been 
inter-linked (Rebotier 2012).  
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second shows how risk assessment has been accompanied by particular political 
stipulations concerning who is to be formally classified as at risk. I underscore here 
how this has legitimised and delegitimised, legalised and criminalised certain 
activities and populations in ways that have effected new patterns of inclusion and 
exclusion in high risk zones. The next chapter develops further how people have 
responded to risk assessment, as it arrives intertwined with these political 
assumptions and values.       
i. New landscapes, new livelihoods 
Risk-related resettlement evolved as an instrument to move people out of ‘risk’ 
zones but also a policy – congruent with the politics of the era - for ‘bettering the 
quality of life’ of their inhabitants and reordering informal zones51. Under this broad 
aim lay explicit political commitments related to the formation of citizens alongside 
the city. To give one illustration of how this has been replicated in the framing of 
risk management programmes, in a detailed project assessment from Altos de 
Estancia, the largest high risk landslide zone in Bogota, the objectives of the project 
are said to meet the aim of facilitating the ‘right to the city’ both through 
guaranteeing the right to life and bettering the lives of those evacuated thereby, 
critically, “constructing in this way citizens and city with a sense of equity” (p.126) 
(DPAE 2009). In this process of inserting people into new physical spaces – and also 
into new relationships with state institutions – state officials I interviewed talked 
about the accompanying transition of people from illegal to ‘legal’, informal to 
‘formal’ and rural to ‘urban’52. Further, this required behavioural change on the part 
of the scheme’s newly-integrated and identified citizens, not only to integrate 
harmoniously in new districts, but also to assume new duties and responsibilities. In 
a DPAE publication from 2003 (during the second Mockus administration) 
documenting the official story of risk management in Altos de Estancia, the author 
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 To understand the intensity of the engagement of the city’s social agencies in these zones, see p.74-
78 in Poveda Gomez, which describes the wealth of programmes offered to those eligible for 
resettlement in the zone of Nueva Esperanza.  
52
 Decreto 94 of 2003, issued by Mockus, describes the movement of people into secure and legal 
housing as guaranteeing their ‘definitive insertion into the legal city’ (Decreto 94 2003). The notion is 
still alive in the common parlance of officials: in one interview, a DPAE official described the process 
of passing people onto the Caja de Vivenda Popular for resettlement (along with their ‘ficha social’ or 
the social data collected to identify them for resettlement) thus: “you pass them from illegality to 
legality” (DPAE District Co-ordinator – March 2010). The next chapter illustrates how inhabitants 
contested state ideas about their legality and illegality, revealing them to be much more ambiguous as 
categories. 
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propounds “Urban planning must become the principal instrument for improving the 
quality of life of Bogotanos who on feeling part of a citizen’s ‘order’ with a 
communal proposition will change from being subjects of only rights to being 
subjects of duties for and with their community and state.” (p.27) (Guzman 2003). 
Ultimately, she adds, this requires a reconfiguration not just of behaviour but of 
attitude; in marginal sectors of illegal origin the state needs to create the necessary 
spaces to convert families into “Citizens who are active, interested and committed to 
improving their quality of life” (ibid). As interviews with present and former DPAE 
and CVP officials showed, both informing people about risk and resettling them was 
described as a way of educating people, through which “they change their 
conceptions and have a new idea about being part of the city” (Caja de Vivienda 
official – January 2010), or, even, of “re-educating” people to “value what they 
have” [in terms of opportunities in the formal city] (former district official 
responsible for resettlement policy – June 2010).  
However, the positive discourse of creating citizenship also has its negative 
counterpart - the labelling of people who do not conform with the expectations of the 
state programme. Present and former officials of the relevant state agencies report 
that communities in high risk zones “don’t self-manage like citizens”, “don’t have a 
citizen’s culture” or “were required to make an effort like a citizen” (DPAE social 
management Team – June 2010; former district official responsible for resettlement 
policy - June 2010). Just as being Bogotano is integral to what it means to be a 
‘citizen’, those without the requisite ‘citizen’s culture’ are said to “lack a sense of 
being in Bogota” or to have “no territorial identity” [with Bogota, because they 
come from other places all over Colombia] (DPAE social management Team – June 
2010; DPAE local management Team – June 2010). This very language posits 
people in high-risk zones as outside the city and outside the remit of citizenship but 
also reinforces the mission of those ‘inside’ the city to think and operate in particular 
ways.   
In practical terms, the formalisation process that has occurred through resettlement 
has bounded people’s livelihoods in new ways. Families are encouraged to take up 
new (state-build) housing, rather than existing housing stock, in part because those 
going into new social housing receive post-resettlement support such as community 
training in the “rights and duties of citizenship”, whereas in rental accommodation 
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the family tends to lose contact with the state housing agency charged with 
resettlement, the Caja de Vivienda Popular (Caja de Vivienda officials – January and 
July 2010). However, in such housing, existing ways of living are curtailed as 
families can no longer keep animals. They also find there is no longer space to 
accommodate large and extended families (former DPAE official and director of 
resettlement – June 2010; former head of Altos de Estancia Social management team 
– July 2010; former Caja de Vivienda official – January 2010)53. While some 
officials described living in risk zones as the ‘ideal situation’ – as people live free 
from certain service and tax costs (former DPAE official and Director of 
resettlement – June 2010; DPAE local management team – June 2010) – the point 
also reflects the fact that formal integration brings increased payments for families, 
on top of the costs of the programme.   
The reshaping of livelihoods has also been accompanied by an aesthetic as well as 
practically-driven vision to create public space in the city, with the new land use 
conceived of as a means of preventing illegal settlement54. Cleared high risk areas 
are slated to be turned into ecological parks, an ideal that has meant further 
regulation of existing livelihoods. A new regime of land use is proposed for the 
Altos de Estancia zone, according to the impact of use on its natural resources. 
Prohibited activities include any physical infrastructure and residential dwellings and 
mining, fishing or forestry activities (DPAE 2009). The district environment 
ministry proposes tighter restrictions on the practice of inhabitants in and around the 
zones of keeping animals to graze in cleared areas – in line with city regulations that 
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 In addition, in a revealing passage from a project assessment document, DPAE officials 
acknowledge that the re-establishment of people’s economic activities is not a key concern of the 
programme in Altos de Estancia, but also note that the size and conditions of social housing make it 
virtually impossible to restart the types of activities found in the zone (room rental, small food shops, 
recycling, childcare, shoe repairs and clothes making) (DPAE 2009), although this was not cited in 
my own interviews as a particular issue. 
54
 This emphasis on public space as a way of consolidating the social glue of the city has its 
antecedents, as Berney shows, in changes in the focus of city development in Colombia from the early 
1990s, but is brought to the fore under Mockus and Peñalosa. Peñalosa in particular invested heavily 
in the provision of public spaces, which he viewed as a way of promoting equality, security, culture, 
citizenship and improving the quality of life (Berney 2010). In Nueva Esperanza, the vision was 
central to the whole project – in fact of the whole area just under 20% was actually classified as at 
high risk from landslides, but half was in the Parque de Nubes national park, which was declared an 
environmentally fragile zone in the 2000 City Land Use Plan (or POT) (Poveda Gómez 2011). The 
‘risk’ areas were incorporated into the national park, and made part of the so-called ‘ecological 
structure’ of the city. In Altos de Estancia, the idea of rehabilitating the land occurred later in the 
process, after the zone was declared at high risk and resettlement was underway, with social-
environmental agreements between the mayor, DPAE and the district environment agency to 
undertake the work signed in 2006.   
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animals must not be kept in urban areas (Ministry of Environment official – January 
2010, my emphasis added). In addition, as Section 5.3 develops, the ideal of creating 
(uninhabited) public space clashes with the way the existing risk management 
regime manages the flux of people living in the zone. 
ii. Categorising those ‘at risk’ 
This second part focuses on issues related to who becomes entitled to resettlement, 
and how the right to resettlement is conferred. Through the frame of co-production, I 
show how modes of risk categorisation are intertwined with forms of socio-political 
categorisation, in that a restricted notion of rights and a complex set of eligibility 
criteria curtail the right to resettlement and access to a particular form of state-
sanctioned citizenship. The pivotal moment for this was the issuing of a municipal 
decree - Decreto 094 - in 2003, which has framed the practice of risk management to 
the present day.  The forms of categorisation in the Decreto – based on state 
simplifications about both risk and the social context – cut across the realities of 
informal life in high risk zones, creating new patterns of vulnerability. Echoing 
Epstein, in his co-productionist analysis of how categories of government function to 
obscure a particular view of risk, I argue that this co-production further obscures the 
social dynamics and its causes and social perceptions of disaster risk (Epstein 2009).  
Primarily, Decreto 094 of 2003 aimed to improve people’s access to government 
social housing by making available a subsidy known as the Valor Unico de 
Reconocimiento (VUR). The VUR awarded an amount based on a special 
commercial valuation of the land and property plus an ‘economic vulnerability 
factor’, applied when the valuation was less than the minimum cost of a typical 
home in a low-cost housing programme55. However, the Decreto also reflected an 
attempt to delimit the entitlements available to those in high risk zones and who 
would be entitled to them. It did this, first, by establishing the ‘technical’ mode of 
prioritising families in socio-economic classes 1 or 2 for evacuation and resettlement 
through risk assessment, as discussed above. Second, the decree also established new 
socio-political criteria for those seeking the subsidy, stating that they should have:  
i) documents showing that they were the proprietors or in possession of the 
lot - a deed of sale or improvement (promesa de venta or mejoras), 
invoices from public service companies, judicial declarations by the Junta 
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 The idea of the VUR was introduced in the POT of 2000 but only defined in 2003.  
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de Accion Communal (or locally elected committee) testifying this - and 
were to have lived on the plot at the time of its declaration as a high risk 
zone56  
ii) were not owners of another title and  
iii) that no other member of the family group had been resettled (Decreto 94 
2003) 
Under these stipulations further qualifying details were developed by implementing 
agencies: those in ownership or possession, for example, should have been so for at 
least five years and they should have cleared all debt with public service companies. 
Groups such as renters were not to qualify, on the grounds that they are able to take 
up residence in other areas of the city (Caja de Vivienda official – June 2010). The 
requirement to have been living on the plot at the time of the declaration was 
motivated not only by the genuinely thorny dilemma of wanting to dis-incentivise 
new settlement in the zone, but also by the guiding logic of the programme that 
focussed on protecting the right to life. This translated into the practical stipulation 
that the programme should apply only to persons physically ‘at risk’ at the time of a 
given emergency.  
The stipulations in Decreto 094 from 2003 reflect, I argue, limits to eligibility based 
on the view of the municipal government about who had a legitimate claim, not only 
to subsidies, but with it to the right to resettlement, and, ultimately, the right to 
citizenship and a place in the city itself. The decree thereby produced a form of 
‘structured containment’ by the state (Biehl 2005) based on the fusion of risk 
knowledge, political categorisation and a particular – and limited - conception of 
rights. While this functioned to enable a new way of life for some groups of people, 
it also marginalised others.  
As outlined by officials working in risk management institutions at this time, driving 
this containment was both the need to set financial limits on the programme and fix a 
way of working in informal zones. By the second Mockus administration of 2001-
2004, during which the Decreto was passed, the municipal government was 
confronting the fiscal consequences of the policies set in motion by Mockus’ 
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 In some zones this meant needing to be there when the technical concept for the zone was 
produced, in others when the census that followed was undertaken. The next section discusses how 
these cut-off dates became flexible in practice.  
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predecessors57. There were further pressures on the risk management budget. In 
Altos de Estancia, the largest landslide zone in Bogota, damage from the landslide 
accelerated from the start of 2002, along with the number of evacuations (Guzman 
2003). As technicians assessed the risk level in the zone, their recommendations 
were staggering: thousands upon thousands of people needed to be resettled58, with 
enormous financial consequences (former director social management team, DPAE – 
June 2010; former DPAE official and director of resettlement – June 2010; former 
ladera programme coordinator, DPAE – June 2010).  
In addition, prior to 2003, those evacuated by disaster risk agencies were either given 
a cash transfer to find their own housing or had their rent subsidised. This was seen 
as both unsustainable and ineffective - with the value of the houses in the zones so 
low, the cash transfer was very small and had to be supplemented by credit if 
families were to afford a house. Others, meanwhile, were having their rent 
subsidised on a seemingly indefinite basis. This was seen as part of a wider problem 
state officials were facing - that people were not leaving the high risk zone. As 
recounted by the Director of the DPAE’s social management team at the time: “We 
had to call in the fire brigade to evacuate people as they didn’t go. We created 
emergency shelters and people would leave” (June 2010). Officials therefore sought 
a ‘definite’ solution that would create a ‘finite’ programme (former DPAE official 
and director of resettlement – June 2010; former ladera programme coordinator – 
June 2010; former DPAE Director – January 2010). This was reinforced by what 
state officials describe as the other “peverse” effects of the programme (former 
DPAE Director – January 2010), effects which structure the predominant narrative of 
those recounting its history. As well as still leaving people ‘at risk’, resettlement, in 
the words of one former official, also motivated further illegality (former district 
planning official – January 2010). People simply cheated the state, splitting lots 
between families, for example, to gain more housing (former ladera programme 
coordinator – June 2010). The promise of a subsidy also drew people back into high-
risk zones: either the same families, who often bought again in the name of a 
different family member, or other families, sold lots even after the original owner 
had been resettled (local management team DPAE – January 2010; former ladera 
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 The change of mayoral administration from Peñalosa to Mockus in 2001 led to new questions about 
financial sustainability, after Peñalosa’s investment programmes led the city to spend heavily. 
58
 Up to ten thousand, according to one former official. 
112 
 
programme coordinator – June 2010; Caja de Vivienda official – January 2010; 
former district planning official – January 2010; official, Secretariat for Community 
Development – December 2009; DPAE official – January 2010; Poveda Gómez 
2011). The problem was merely displaced as people bought lots in different high-risk 
zones (former DPAE official and director of resettlement – June 2010; former 
director social management team, DPAE – June 2010).  
Finally, while there was no formal social analysis of lives and livelihoods in the 
zones, in practice officials gathered and created their own forms of contextual 
knowledge based on their experience of working in the social conditions of the 
zones, that came to frame the programme from 2003 more or less unchanged into the 
present. In order to operate, state officials had to accommodate the informality of 
barrio life. The social dynamics in the risk zones confounded the technicians 
undertaking house-by-house inventories, who found families without documents, 
houses with multiple families and families with multiple plots (former head of Altos 
de Estancia social management team – July 2010). Often the people who signed their 
documents were not those who had possession of the plot (social work officials Altos 
de Estancia team, DPAE – June 2010). After legal studies were undertaken, 
therefore, officials decided that possession titles (promesa de venta) – the 
predominant form of title document – could be used to establish who occupied a 
plot, rather than formal land title documents. In addition, given the difficulties of 
establishing land title, the municipal government decided not to buy up the land, but 
instead to compensate for mejoras, or the housing improvements on the plot 
(Guzman 2003).  
What began as an improvised response by state officials therefore became formalised 
in Decreto 094, which not only promoted a new economic instrument to facilitate 
access to social housing programmes but also sought ways to impose control over 
access both to subsidies and to the use of high risk zones. The understanding of the 
social context reflected in both forms of contextual knowledge that officials brought 
to bear on the Decreto, however, was partial.; It reflected the interests of the state in 
containing the programme, and it neglected other important social dynamics of the 
context (such as the way people moved between urban and rural areas, their building 
practices, the commonality of long-term renting, the practice of obtaining credit from 
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public services companies for the purchase of domestic goods and patterns of 
ownership and habitation).  
To give one example of how this has functioned to limit claims in practice, in the 
Altos de Estancia zone I interviewed a community of people inhabiting the former 
barrio of Cerros de Diamante, one of the most extensively cleared following a 2002 
landslide. Although the majority were squatting, not necessarily on their original 
plots, they in fact made up an association of nearly 50 plot owners who were either 
absent in person at the time of the census carried out by the DPAE at the time of the 
landslide59, or whose houses were at that time incomplete, and would therefore have 
been marked on the census as uninhabited (many had only just begun the lengthy 
process of house-building, which could take up to four or five years to complete). 
The houses were therefore officially classified as without inhabitants whose lives 
needed saving, and, although people are afforded the right to life they have no right 
to their assets or possessions. The families, however, had returned so as, as one 
inhabitant expressed it, ‘to not lose possession of their plots’. They were living in 
some squalor in predominantly poor quality shacks of zinc and wood (as they only 
planned on temporary shelter while their situation was appraised) with few services, 
tapping electricity illegally with the permission of their neighbours and without any 
water or drainage service.   
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 In two of the five households we interviewed in Cerros, people reported being away in rural areas, 
going there for a two-three year spell but coming back regularly to pay the services and other costs on 
their houses.  
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Figure 7: Former community of Cerros de Diamante, Altos de Estancia 
 
Source: Author, 2010 
 
Even for those eligible for the state programme, however, programme stipulations 
could pose significant hurdles to access. The fieldwork revealed how the costs 
coupled with the bureaucracy of the programme continued to block or delay people’s 
ability to enter resettlement programmes. In addition, the formal requirements of the 
programme continued to lie at odds with the social practices of families in the zone, 
such as living on a plot owned by an estranged or deceased family member, so that 
families had to go through a process of transferring ownership documents before 
they could be resettled. The table below lists the reasons cited during the fieldwork 
for exclusion from or delay in accessing government resettlement programmes. 
(Chapters 6 and 7 elaborate on how this reflected the meanings and values attached 
to people’s livelihoods and how different groups negotiate access to the state.)  
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Table 1: Reasons cited for exclusion or delay in accessing the government 
resettlement programme from high risk zones 
Exclusion Delay 
Away from address at the time of declaration or 
census or address does not appear on formal 
records 
Negotiating for used housing rather than state-
built housing; lack of state approval of used 
housing chosen 
House only partially built Fighting for perceived correct valuation for 
existing house 
Squatting Problems with title (due to family sub-letting or 
ownership of another property) 
Classified as displaced and therefore receive 
another form of state subsidy 
Time and money to complete on paperwork or 
debts owed to public service companies 
Renters Slow state process – infrequency of state housing 
projects 
Risk classification (either medium or low 
priority) 
 
Source: author’s elaboration from fieldwork 
 
Access is and has been organised around the framing concept of ‘co-responsibility’ 
between state and citizen for the management of risk. This further, accompanying 
discourse reflects a broader national political discourse that has tied the granting of 
rights to the exercise of duties and obligations by those with formal citizenship (see 
mention of this in Coleman 2013), and one that was incorporated into risk 
management as the programme was formalised and delimited, firstly by the POT, 
and then in the 2001-2004 city Development Plan60. In the context of eligibility61, 
ideas about responsibility serve to delimit the state’s role, and can reinforce barriers 
to access. The four components of the Caja de Vivienda’s guiding methodology 
define the respective responsibilities of state and citizen, which includes setting out 
the documents that people are required to have to gain access to the resettlement 
programme (Caja de Vivienda Popular 2005). To give one example of the way this 
has become linked in practice, a Caja de Vivienda official who works with 
households in Altos de Estancia relates, “Often people can’t pay for their papers 
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 This proposes improving the access of people vulnerable to landslides “using the criteria of shared 
responsibility” and ties notions of co-responsibility to the duties and obligations of formal citizenship 
for those who are resettled, who should then be supported to behave responsibly. Pardo argues that the 
shift to co-responsibility also occurred with a change in institutional culture away from risk 
prevention to a paradigm of integral risk management, which marked a move away from a paternalist 
view of the state’s role in disaster management (Pardo Torres 2010). 
61
 The discourse of ‘co-responsibility’ is used both by officials and in project documents to refer to 
several practices – firstly, that of a household signing an agreement for resettlement with the Caja (a 
‘shared responsibility’ pact), secondly, in relation to that household’s behaviour in their new host 
community and, finally, in relation to the remaining communities’ care for the environment of the 
‘recuperated’ risk zone. 
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[such as ownership documents], and you have to explain that they have to take some 
responsibility” (Caja de Vivienda official – June 2010). In this sentence, conditions 
related to vulnerability, poverty and inequality are relegated to issues of individual 
responsibility, and away from the state62.    
This section has illustrated how new political discourses, representations and 
practices have been co-produced alongside risk assessment and management in ways 
that come to explain the complex and enduring patterns of vulnerability found in 
landslide risk zones. Such practices have effectively functioned as another form of 
determining risk for people, engendering a dynamic of inclusion and exclusion 
across populations, in which particular groups are excluded in ways that could be 
considered arbitrary both in relation to their formal risk designation and in relation to 
their own experience of risk (see Gupta for a discussion of the ways in which state 
governance may become arbitrary in nature, Gupta 2012).  
However, as I go on to develop, the consequences of these policies have set up an 
on-going tension between inclusion and exclusion that poses problems for risk 
management agencies themselves and that the state is still navigating. How we 
understand the state practices through which it does so, and which accompany the 
production of knowledge about risk, is the subject of the following section.  
5.3 Unpacking the practices of urban risk governance: flexibility, un-mapping 
and the politics of inclusion and exclusion   
This section is the first of two final sections that concentrate on unpacking the 
practices of urban risk governance, seeking to re-work the idea of the co-production 
of risk in the urban context by unpicking how both the ‘natural’ and the ‘social’ are 
constructed, in their formal embodiments and in the everyday. It is only through 
understanding these practices, and through understanding them in their full 
institutional and political context, I argue, that one can understand how vulnerability 
has been made and re-made in the landslide zones of Bogota.  
The central tenet of this section is that the ‘structural containment’ of the risk 
management programme discussed above, and the desire to dis-incentivise ongoing 
                                                          
62
 Biehl shows how social labelling and the stigmatisation of particular AIDS victims provides both a 
rationale for their invisibility and for the negation of responsibility for their care (Biehl 2005). In this 
case, the discourses discussed around ideas of co-responsibility and narratives focussed on 
illegitimate over use or misuse of subsidies and the negation of citizenship function to attach reasons 
for exclusion onto the behaviours of excluded individuals themselves. 
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settlements in high risk zones by withdrawing state support from certain groups, has 
come into conflict with the imperative to clear high risk areas, driven by the stated 
mandate of the programme to protect people from risk, but also the ‘greening’ 
agenda described above – which relies on the production of empty space – and 
meeting the numeric targets for resettlement which govern the programme (see Scott 
for a discussion about how this kind of counting allows officials to deliver results 
more easily, and Gupta for a discussion of enumeration as a ‘routinised’ practice of 
the state: Scott 1998; Gupta 2012). According to critics, this imperative simply to 
move people drives the programme above and beyond considerations of the process 
and vulnerabilities that ensue for people who are resettled (Robles Joya 2008). 
Certainly accounting for the numbers of resettled and numbers to be resettled are the 
hallmark of programme documents, but also emanate from higher level planning 
documents63. 
The result has been a pragmatic but arbitrary process of incorporating people into the 
resettlement programme, alongside attempting to harden control of new settlements 
in high risk zones. This has been underpinned by governance practices that – to echo 
authors such as Roy writing about the governance of informality more broadly – 
have operated flexibly, differentially across the landslide zones, and in part been 
enabled by the social ‘un-mapping’ that has accompanied risk ‘mapping’, in which 
particular population groups are unrepresented in the formal schema of the 
programme.   
The formal state response has consisted of continuous – and ongoing – efforts to 
modify the strictures of the resettlement programme to bring down the barriers to 
access for those eligible for the programme. These modifications – changing the way 
in which the ‘household’ is defined to include multiple family structures, increasing 
the housing subsidy, bringing down the time required in possession of a property, 
and agreeing that debts to public service companies could be carried over to the new 
house64 – undoubtedly have and will speed up access for some (with debts, for 
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 The POT established the goal of resettling 4,200 families from high risk landslide zones by 2010. 
Similar quantitative targets were also set in the mayors’ respective City Development Plans. In project 
documents for the risk zones, the project indicators refer to the number of evacuated properties, the 
number of families temporarily relocated, the hectares cleared for development and the number of 
families benefitted by mitigation works (DPAE 2009).  
64
 In 2005 the Caja de Vivienda changed the way it referred to those to be resettled from ‘family’ to 
‘household’, in recognition of the fact that houses often contained multiple families (Robles Joya 
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example, a significant problem for households I interviewed at the time of the 
research). The modifications have also, nevertheless, left particular social dynamics 
untouched (as for the Cerros de Diamante community discussed above) and contain 
their own elements of arbitrariness in the ways in which they ring-fence particular 
issues (land title issues, for example, despite the decision to work with informal land 
title documents described above, certainly remain complex and are still cited in 
recent project documents as slowing the resettlement programme (DPAE 2009). A 
decree issued as recently as 2011 attempted to further clarify how eligibility for 
resettlement would apply to cases of separated families or where there were multiple 
claims to title (Decreto 40 2011).  
At the same time, the state has continually shored up the structures of exclusion 
through legal measures. Renting or selling in high risk zones was made a crime, and 
those moving into the zones after cut-off or declaration dates are seen as illegal 
occupants, with responsibility passed to local mayors, with policing powers, to evict 
them. By the same token, building modification is prohibited in high risk zones and 
public services are cut off once resettlement has officially ended. However, the 
ongoing tension in this ‘dual strategy’ is evidenced in recent programme documents, 
which continue to define both the need to tackle exclusion from the resettlement 
programme whilst reinforcing urban control of cleared areas (FOPAE 2012)65.   
However, this process has also been accompanied by other, more flexible, techniques 
that have made it possible to move people on whilst avoiding enshrining and 
normalising new principles for inclusion. Ad-hoc, arbitrary and sporadic 
accommodations have been reached in numerous cases across the zones (including 
an offer of a ‘special agreement’ to the group who re-occupied plots in Cerros de 
Diamante, Altos de Estancia, discussed above, an offer their leader rejected as 
insufficient). In 2007, for example, the DPAE issued a new Technical Concept in 
                                                                                                                                                                    
2008). In 2006, seeing that the resettlement process was still slow and that people were still in debt to 
attain social housing, the administration of Lucho Garzon increased the amount of VUR subsidy (Caja 
de Vivienda official – June 2010; former director social management team, DPAE – June 2010). The 
amount of time for which people had to demonstrate possession of a property was then brought down 
from five to three years, while a recent inter-institutional agreement established that debts to public 
service companies could be carried over to a new house (Caja de Vivienda officials – June 2010).  
65
 And indeed, a new decree in 2011 modified the 094 decree of 2003 to clarify that housing subsidies 
would not be available for those who settle on land already purchased by the district, who bought or 
constructed on it after the declaration of the high risk zone and or for construction which does not 
conform with urban development regulations as set down by the district (Decreto 40 2011). 
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Altos de Estancia that changed the technical priority for resettlement for a number of 
families from 2 to 1 (top priority), and at that moment included 92 families who had 
built their houses after the census of 2003 and were therefore not formally eligible 
with the aim of “saving life…and making the plots available for mitigation works…” 
(DPAE 2007)66. Precipitated at times by landslide ‘emergencies’ – or those which 
incurred lasting property damage and / or casualties – and at other times by state 
drives for environmental recuperation projects67 such accommodations were highly 
uneven in practice.  
Underpinning these techniques of government, I argue, lies the dynamic of ‘un-
mapping’ proposed by Roy to describe the governance of informality, in which 
formal mapping based on risk assessment is accompanied by a mode of governance 
in which social relations are left visually unrepresented and indeterminate, and 
through which new legalities and formalities are accompanied by new illegalities and 
informalities. The most obvious manifestation of this is the formal invisibility of 
groups still living in high risk zones, both in maps and in formal state discourse. In a 
formal interview, a DPAE official described to me the process of resettlement in 
Altos de Estancia, outlining the different zones and works planned for them, 
including how the central zone, the first to be resettled, was ‘empty’, in contrast to 
the second, in which resettlement was underway (Head, Altos de Estancia Social 
Management team, July 2010). Obviously my own research confirmed a different 
reality, one also acknowledged in programme documents (which in the case of Altos 
de Estancia refer to at least 30 different groups inhabiting the zone, see DPAE 2009).  
This governance through ‘un-mapping’ also takes other forms, however. In the zones 
of Caracoli and Brisas de Volador there was on-going confusion about 
neighbourhood boundaries and plot addresses in which the social remained ‘unfixed’ 
despite risk mapping. In Brisas de Volador, a group of neighbours petitioning to be 
included in the resettlement programme described to me how state officials they had 
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 In another form of such management, in Nueva Esperanza the problem of what to do with a 
particular group of ongoing settlers was resolved by passing their case to the mayor for executive 
decision – an ‘extraordinary’ act despite the normal nature of the flux of people in the zone. The 
original census was also undertaken again in Nueva Esperanza. In a sign that people were aware of 
this ‘room to manoeuvre’ with the state, one family in Brisas de Volador reported that although they 
had moved in after the original census in the zone, they would simply wait for it to be re-done to be 
included in the resettlement programme.  
67
 In the risk zone of Brisas de Volador, for example, one household reported their re-prioritisation as 
the result of a planned re-forestation programme around the old quarry area of the barrio. 
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met de-legitimised their claims partially on the grounds that they did not appear on 
the maps of the zone (an assertion residents were contesting using their electricity 
bills as proof) and were administratively part of another neighbourhood. In Caracoli, 
too, residents reported both how state officials had told them their lots did not appear 
on formal maps, which may have been affected by the fact that the addresses in the 
barrio kept changing. In addition the community leader described how it was still 
unclear whether people at the top of the barrio should be classified as in Caracoli or 
in Santa Viviana, the neighbouring barrio, which, unlike Caracoli, had not yet been 
legalised and was not yet eligible for public service improvements. The consequence 
of this for affected groups was not only the denial of formalisation – either through 
resettlement or the service upgrading of the barrio – but also of informal ways of life 
(due to building restrictions in the zone), such as upgrading one’s house through the 
process of building a brick house to replace the original zinc sheet and wood 
constructions, both of which negatively affected people’s vulnerability to risk.  
However, to fully unpack some of the contradictions inherent in this system of 
governance, I argue, as Gupta does, that we need to see the operations of the risk 
management agencies not as those of a singular, purposive state, but in the context of 
the practices of multiple state agencies, and, in this case, in the context of the 
relationship between the state and local institutions. It is to these issues that the final 
section turns.   
5.4 State practice in broader institutional context   
In this final section, I draw together an analysis of state practice that seeks to show 
how risk and vulnerability are produced, as Gupta argues, in the friction between the 
agendas, bureaus, levels and spaces that make up the state, but also in the ways in 
which these formal institutions of the state are embedded in local institutions. As in 
Gupta, I therefore shift the focus from the intentional practices of risk management 
to the unintentional practices that create new contradictions and tensions at the heart 
of the programme. These, I argue, complicate the drive to reduce exposure to risk 
which, when combined with an absence of measures to address sensitivity to risk, 
create new distributions and forms of vulnerability.  
The disjunct between the multiple agencies involved in the programme, and their 
different mandates, affected the provision of infrastructure in risk zones. The lag in 
providing drainage to the barrios of Altos de Estancia and Caracoli, for example, was 
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attributable to the inaction of the Aqueducto – or state water company. As mentioned 
in relation to the ongoing occurrence of disasters in the barrio of Caracoli, while risk 
focussed agencies are mandated with protecting the right to life, the (public run) 
water company is mandated to protect constitutional rights to water – but not 
drainage. This contradiction was said by numerous district officials to be the cause of 
recurrent landslides in the zone.  
The complications in reducing exposure through both resettlement and eviction 
illustrate how risk management agencies were enmeshed in a broader institutional 
politics that drew in state agencies, quasi-state agencies, private companies and local 
institutions. Firstly, a complex politics of land claims both facilitated and restricted 
people’s access to risk zones for land for housing. An interview in the local district 
office revealed how active local mafias still were in selling land in risk zones. A Caja 
official and a new beneficiary to the programme showed me a photo of a lot that had 
been cleared by the district in Caracoli the day before, and the house demolished. On 
the ruins of a wall, a sign had already been painted ‘a vende’, for sale. The woman 
described how she was offered a lot and told she should buy it ‘before the DPAE 
comes to assess it’ (field visit with Caja de Vivienda officials – June 2010). The 
‘mafia de los lotes’ (plots mafia), as one informant described them, still purportedly 
sell lots with ‘rights to resettlement’. In an indirect politics of entitlement, mafias 
continuously appropriated the source of state entitlements, benefiting from zone 
clearance. Their role in relation to formal state agencies remained obscure; they 
remained unmentioned in any documents relating to the programme, and 
undoubtedly operated with the blessing of local paramilitary and vigilante groups, 
active in all the risk zones, who undertook security operations with the local police. 
In turn, the enmeshment of local mayors in this politics (despite them being political 
appointees of the city mayor) often prevented them from exercising their formally 
mandated role to evict people, as one informant explained “if they pull down houses, 
they may get death threats” (Disaster Risk Consultant, Ministry of Environment – 
January 2010).     
The other major players with claims to land were the owners who had publicly 
registered title to the land, some of whom had sub-divided and sold the land 
themselves whereas others had the land appropriated by the piratas for that purpose. 
The ability of state agencies to obtain the land from them affected the extent to 
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which they could claim public ownership of the land and turn it into public parks – 
in Nueva Esperanza, for example, state agencies had been able to rent the land off 
the original owner, but it had been more difficult to locate and negotiate with owners 
in Altos de Estancia. In other cases, however, land owners could be directly involved 
in collaborating with state officials to evict inhabitants, as was the case for a 
particular community of inhabitants in the Brisas de Volador risk zone, who were 
resisting state efforts to evict them, allegedly because the owner had returned to 
reclaim his rights to land.  
In addition, whereas risk management agencies wished to remove all services to high 
risk zones once resettlement projects were complete, thereby making the zones less 
attractive for settlement, this practice was constrained by the actions of service 
companies, with whom there was no legal framework for such a practice. Instead, 
electricity companies continued to provide services, in lieu of the illegal tapping of 
electricity. Secondly, as the water supply could not be taken away as a matter of 
right, communal tubes were left in place in high risk zones by the state authorities, 
which remaining households could then connect to.  
The final dimension I raise here is the way state agencies organise themselves 
around competing rights agendas (touched on in the case of water provision). 
Whereas risk management agencies were concerned to uphold the right to life, state 
human rights and civil protection agencies (the key port of call for inhabitants 
seeking support to bring legal cases against risk management agencies either for 
eviction or the failure to evict) supported broader constitutional rights to livelihoods 
and quality of life. In some cases, human rights agencies asked that newly displaced 
settlers in the zones be allowed to remain on humanitarian grounds rather than being 
evicted (as happened for one group in Altos de Estancia, see DPAE 2009).  
These at times contradictory dynamics – in which institutions both inside, outside 
and with non-formalised links into the broader state apparatus complicate and 
facilitate the movement of people in and out of risk zones and with it both 
complicate and facilitate the project of clearing and bounding risk zones – add to the 
ways in which governance ‘on the ground’ can become ad hoc and arbitrary, but can 
also lead to greater exposure for people who are formally unprotected, living as they 
do under threat of eviction.   
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5.5 Conclusion 
This chapter shows how, firstly, in stark contrast to impacts-based models for 
assessing risks, which privilege and fix ‘hazard’ as risk, risk assessments embody 
particular assumptions, rooted in politics, history and culture. This influences the 
process by which risks manifest themselves in physical events. Secondly, with 
reference to existing frameworks for understanding risk as vulnerability, the chapter 
shows how vulnerability is also shaped and re-shaped through the production of 
knowledge about risk, and the ways in which this influences and is influenced by the 
practices of state institutions. In the informal urban context, I stress how this 
embodies politicised assumptions about how formalisation is to take place and for 
whom. A process of co-production occurs in which ideas emanating from the state 
about what it means to be at risk come to be inscribed onto new forms of urban 
citizenship, at the same time that ideas about what it is to have ‘legitimate’ claim to 
citizenship come to define who is at risk. I echo Foucauldian scholars in drawing 
attention to the everyday practices of the state through which the ‘natural’ is, 
effectively, co-produced, with the chapter showing how these practices may, in the 
face of the flux and social complexity of urban informal life, be both flexible and 
discretionary in nature. However, not only does the chapter draw attention to the 
inner workings of the expertise driving these practises, but in the final part, it extends 
this view by showing how state practice also emerges out of institutional 
multiplicity, both within and without the state. The following chapter explores how 
societal actors respond to risk assessment and the meanings and values it embodies, 
on the basis of their own meanings and values.  
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Chapter 6 
‘But we are not illegal’: Responses to Landslide Risk in Three Informal 
Settlements of Bogota, Colombia 
 
6.1 Introduction 
Chapter 5 set out the state politics of risk. This chapter is the first of two empirical 
chapters that now examine how people themselves determine and respond to 
environmental risk and risk assessments in informal urban settlements. It aims to 
shed light, first, on the ‘what’ of urban adaptation, asking what risks people are 
responding and adapting to, and how these reflect changes to their livelihoods as 
much as the fact of physical events themselves. Second, it aims to extend 
livelihoods-based vulnerability analysis by accounting for the role of socially-
embedded meanings and identities in people’s responses to risk. Third, it sets out to 
analyse how people’s responses to risk are shaped by the institutional relationship 
between state and citizen, and relationships of trust and inter-dependence with 
institutions. New to the context of urban vulnerability theory, it draws on ideas 
discussed in Chapter 3 to show how peoples’ responses to risk are framed by the 
values and meanings embedded – indeed co-produced – in risk assessments (echoing 
Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; Wynne 1996; Birkenholtz 2008 in their discussions of 
public responses to formal expertise). Furthering accounts of societal responses to 
risk assessment discussed in Chapter 3, however, the chapter highlights how such 
responses vary across the social groupings found in informal, urban communities 
and shows how agency is shaped by convergence, resistance and ambivalence; state 
framings and local idioms of identity and meaning.     
This chapter is based on the fieldwork conducted in three landslide risk zones in 
informal settlements of Bogota, Colombia (Caracoli, Brisas de Volador and Altos de 
Estancia). It uses oral histories and other interview material drawn from different 
types of household across the three zones. It is also informed by analysis of 
secondary documents relating to risk management in the zones (such as transcripts of 
court cases brought by inhabitants). In the informal, urban context, the chapter 
highlights how people’s experience of risk is framed by their own concerns around 
housing, shelter, access to services and security; their own understandings of their 
status and rights as urban citizens, and the possibilities opened up and closed off for 
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them in the arenas of risk management and housing policy (more influential than 
their ability to engage in short-term coping actions, which most residents recognised 
as extremely limited in effectiveness).      
The chapter is structured in five sections. The first section gives an overview of how 
the knowledge produced through state-based risk assessments (discussed in the last 
chapter) relates to the views expressed across the three risk zones. The second 
section examines in more depth how people respond to risk in the context of the 
meanings, values and aspirations attached to their livelihoods and the broader sets of 
risks to livelihoods that they experience. The third section examines responses to risk 
assessment in the context of local understandings of legality and formality. The 
fourth section analyses how state practice affects attitudes to risk assessment, and 
how these practices run, in some cases, counter to people’s lived experience of 
landslide events and impacts. The final section sets out how contests around 
causation and responsibility mark attitudes to risk. The approach of the chapter is not 
to suggest that people’s attitudes to risk should be romanticised or reified vs state-
based expertise, but to explore how particular approaches to risk might account for 
these local dynamics.  
6.2 Convergence and contrasts in state and local responses to landslide risk  
The following table presents the ways in which the knowledge generated through 
state-based risk assessment related to views and attitudes expressed across the three 
risk zones. As the table shows, there was both divergence and convergence between 
residents’ views and the knowledge communicated from risk assessments. In 
addition, at certain moments, state risk assessments did influence the attitudes of 
residents (i.e. the state perspective was ‘absorbed’), but the reverse effect was less 
common - as highlighted in the last chapter, the state was mostly closed to 
incorporating societal perspectives. The rest of the chapter explains and develops the 
points made in this table.   
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Table 2: Characterisation of state and local responses to landslide risk 
 Areas of divergence Areas of convergence Areas of absorption 
State 
perspective 
1. Probabilistic / futuristic 
2. Universal to a given area 
3. Given risk levels based on 
technical assessment of causes 
and possible solutions 
4. Physically-given risk 
assessment 
5. Causes of risk often attributed to 
individual and community 
processes of urbanisation 
1. Recognition of 
localised causes of 
risk in technical 
assessments (e.g. 
poor drainage) 
1. Local perspectives 
acted on only in 
emergency 
situations (when 
people call to 
report disasters) 
Local 
actors’ 
perspective 
1. Historical / presentist 
2. Highly localised / specific to 
particular social groups 
3. Risk appraisal based on daily 
experience 
4. Risks experienced in the social 
context of the threat to 
livelihood and broader sets of 
social risks 
4. Causes of risk often attributed to 
state 
1. Role of localised 
causes  emphasised 
in local discourses 
1. Risk assessments 
integrated into 
community 
perspectives at 
particular moments 
(e.g. emergencies), 
in highly localised 
spaces and among 
particular social 
groups 
Source: author’s elaboration based on fieldwork.  
 
6.3 Finding a home in the city: Risk and the meaning of livelihood 
This section shows how responses to risk are embedded in the broader project of 
building a livelihood and the risks to those livelihoods. I break down the section 
according to a basic typology of different groups – present across all of the high risk 
zones – who exhibit different livelihoods ‘styles and pathways’, a terminology 
adopted by de Haan and Zoomers to move away from the strategic individualism 
implied in the more commonly used notion of livelihoods ‘strategies’ (de Haan and 
Zoomers 2005). Instead, one finds social groupings with ‘styles’ based, in this 
context, on ownership history and status (owners or renters/squatters) but also, 
critically, political status, both in relation to the inclusion or exclusion criteria for 
resettlement, but also other forms of political categorisation. These groups – owners, 
the recently displaced (desplazados, or those who have migrated from rural conflict 
zones) and those who rent or squat in the zones – respond to risk management with 
distinct purposes related primarily to either claiming, defending, transforming or 
receiving housing assets, not only for their material value but also for their meaning 
(see Bebbington 1999) for these distinctions and discussion of the importance of the 
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material and non-material dimensions of asset holding). Whether these aims bring 
them into conflict or co-operation with risk management agencies depends both on 
their status within the programme but also how their livelihoods aspirations fit with 
the livelihoods transformation envisaged by the state through its resettlement 
programme.     
a. Home owners 
The majority of people I encountered in all the high risk zones were home owners 
(albeit through illegal purchase, a fact I discuss further in Section 2.). Many could be 
called ‘long-term settlers’, in that they arrived as part of the main wave of 
urbanisation of the zones from the 1990s. Theirs is the project that James Holston 
has described as ‘auto-construction’, or the gradual and lengthy process of self-
building, through which people would fulfil their greatest life-time project, building 
a house to live in (Holston 1991). For those that had arrived in the 1990s, this 
personal project was often accompanied by collective efforts to found a barrio, 
firstly, through the attainment of services and, secondly, through inclusion in 
legalisation programmes (which in turn secured further rights to public services). 
Among the groups of home owners in high risk zones were both those who were 
technically eligible to be resettled but faced difficulties completing the 
administrative hurdles for access, those who refused to leave despite being eligible 
and those who were petitioning for eligibility. A further group I was able to 
interview were home owners who were eligible, but had rejected the housing option 
offered by the state and forged their own collective solution. The common theme 
underlying all of these actions was the search to complete the project of owning a 
home in the city. What I stress in this section is how these aspirations converged and 
diverged with the new form of livelihood offered by the state as the solution to risk, 
how interpretations of risk assessment were embedded in these livelihoods 
aspirations, and how this modifies the ‘social landscape’ of risk, or the actual 
patterns of who continues to inhabit high risk zones.  
There is a strong sense of a shared language between the aspirations of most, if not 
practically all, owners and the stated aims of the state project, to improve conditions 
for the city’s poorest inhabitants. As Maria68, a 36 year old former inhabitant of 
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 All names have been changed.  
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Altos de Estancia who left the countryside with her family due to economic hardship, 
recalled, the DPAE and the Caja de Vivienda “told us that they were going to give us 
a better house, a better life, that we would have better opportunities for our 
children” (Interview 11.02.2010). A family of sisters and their children that I 
interviewed in Brisas de Volador described how they wished to move, not only 
because of the conditions in which they were living, and the shame they felt at living 
in their house, but because they were glad of the opportunity to move to a house that 
would have public services and to bring their children up in a different area 
(Interview 17.01.2010). Their neighbours, petitioning for resettlement from the 
‘medium risk’ zone, described how they were interested in participating in the 
resettlement programme as they feared for their lives and sought a ‘vida digna’ 
[dignified life] (Interview 12.03.2010).  
Given the opportunity, many people had left the zones through the resettlement 
programme, even when they did not feel at any personal risk from landslides, or only 
experienced minor effects. Accessing the programme as a means to transform one’s 
livelihood had also become an important activity for many owners who had not been 
evacuated, especially given that once they were included in a high risk zone they 
were no longer permitted to modify their houses, and their desire to finish house 
building in situ was curtailed69. In ‘Phase Two’ of Altos de Estancia, the area 
undergoing resettlement, some inhabitants described how the biggest implication of 
being in a high risk zone was not necessarily the risks that they faced, but the fact 
that they hadn’t been able to carry on building their houses (interviews 
27.06.2010)70. High risk zones were also no longer eligible for public service 
improvements. In Brisas, inhabitants described how they felt they could not leave 
(because they were not eligible for resettlement and because to abandon one’s house 
was also to abandon one’s investment in it, see below) but they couldn’t better their 
situation in the zone. As one woman, a mother who shared her house with her two 
sisters, all of whom were struggling to make the payments necessary to be included 
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 This ‘conditional use’ or restriction on house building also applied in Phase 3 of Altos de Estancia, 
technically a ‘medium risk’ zone, where residents (who were not included in resettlement) reported 
thinking of selling their houses as a result. One inhabitant complained that being in a risk zone also 
prevented them asking for a loan to make house improvements (21.08.2010).  
70
 In addition, inhabitants reported wanting to leave the zone due to the impacts of resettlement itself, 
which meant houses were often left isolated as people lost their neighbours, and the zone felt more 
insecure. Many parents also hoped that by moving they would be able to live in an area that was more 
secure in general for the sake of their children.   
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in the resettlement programme, expressed, “they [the state institutions] neither help 
nor allow us to improve ourselves” (interview 17.01.2010).  
As Biehl and Petryana discuss in their analysis of citizenship formation based on 
bio-medical ‘regimes’ (Biehl 2005; Petryna 2005), this opportunity to remake or 
move forward with one’s livelihood is rooted in scientific process. This engendered a 
dependence on the state as people depended on the DPAE to give them their 
‘official’ risk status for inclusion, whatever their own experience of risk. This is in 
stark contrast to the autonomous manner in which people constructed their own 
livelihoods in these zones, which often meant fighting the state for recognition and 
services71. Ironically, it is through the state that the prospect of home-building now 
lies, and it is this sentiment that was reflected in a phrase I heard across the high risk 
zones – “que nos den solucion” (the state needs to give us a solution). This was 
encapsulated in an interview with one resident of Altos de Estancia who was 
awaiting news of whether his house was to be included in the high risk zone after a 
re-appraisal of the risk assessment. The only solution, he explained, lay with making 
visits to state offices:  
…to see what resolution they give us…if it’s true that we are in a high 
risk zone, then they should give us the solution and if not we can finish 
making good our home [or ranchito, literally little ranch, the popular 
(and rurally-inspired) name for people’s plots], or at least see what is to 
be done, because it doesn’t have floors and we can’t invest in it because 
the DPAE doesn’t let you (Interview 15.01.2010). 
Contained in this dependence on the state for a solution was also a need for certainty 
through risk assessment, in order to know how to continue with one’s project of 
building a livelihood. This also underlay the tension with the state for people who 
found themselves in situations of uncertainty with respect to their risk classification, 
as discussed in Section 4.  
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 Both aspects of this experience were also mischaracterised by state officials I met, who generalised 
this dependency as a form of ‘benefits dependency culture’ among the inhabitants of high risk zones, 
which fed into the narrative that people were out to ‘take from’ and ‘cheat’ the state, a narrative that 
has underpinned the creation and maintenance of eligibility criteria. On the other hand, autonomy was 
seen as a form of anti-social ‘individualism’, a characterisation which overlooked the collective nature 
of the struggles to form these barrios and the social ties that had been built up between older home 
owners.   
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Alongside the search to transform one’s livelihood, which in many ways found 
expression in the state’s promise of formal housing and services, I found deep 
ambivalence in many home owners’ attitudes to the state programme. This was 
rooted in two aspects: the desire to defend existing assets as well as transform them 
and reservations about the form their new state-sponsored livelihood was to take. 
The direct effect of this was often that people would stay in high risk zones even 
when they had the opportunity to leave – and even when they themselves expressed a 
desire to leave - in order to try and negotiate an outcome more commensurate with 
their ways of life. 
Those eligible for resettlement were awarded a form of compensation for the 
mejoras or ‘works’ they had done on the plot, as well as a state housing subsidy. 
This value was often contested72. Recouping this monetary value was important to 
home owners – particularly those who had progressed further with their house-
building project, to the point of putting in brick walls and cement floors – as saving 
up financial capital to improve their homes had often been a major part of their 
livelihoods ‘strategies’ so far, and it often reflected an investment for their families 
(confirming findings from other studies that the most significant asset for the urban 
poor is housing – see Moser et al. 2010). This had also been an emotional 
investment. One of the original inhabitants of the San Rafael barrio in Altos de 
Estancia, himself a construction worker, whose two-storey brick house now stood by 
itself in the street as he, alone among his neighbours, resisted attempts to resettle 
him, described the valuation process: 
In the planning department the house is declared at 120 metres but the 
DPAE and the Caja put it at 90…when they came to do their famous 
valuation they didn’t look at the structure but only the walls…but I had 
put in foundations – to put up walls you can do it less than 3 days and 
you see it, but the foundations, time, money, but you don’t see it, yes? 
When the man came to measure the construction I made him note the 
structure….the reinforced beams, the columns….the dividing wall…..” 
(interview 17.01.2010) 
Later in the same interview he described the sacrifice of investing in his home: 
                                                          
72
 In the barrios of San Rafael and Mirador de Estancia, Altos de Estancia, for instance, inhabitants 
told us the houses were being valued at 20 million pesos, when home owners felt their constructions 
were worth around 30 million. An owner of a well-built two-storey brick construction said his was 
publicly valued at 40 million. Of course for other households, particularly newer settlers with more 
rudimentary shelters, the valuation could be advantageous.  
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All that we were sacrificing (to put into the house) meant that sometimes 
we didn’t even have money to give a soft drink to the children, or for 
their toys, we were putting it all into the house to have what we have 
today.   
Such was the value of one’s house that it was common practice to leave a family 
member in the house even when the rest of the family moved out (through 
resettlement programmes or of their own accord), to ensure empty houses were not 
vandalised. In addition, in some cases in Brisas and in Altos de Estancia state 
officials offered other housing options such as rental accommodation to groups who 
were technically excluded from the resettlement programme to induce them to go, 
but people refused as it meant “losing what we have” – their house and the 
investment it represented, which would not be compensated by a subsidy under these 
arrangements.  
There was a generalised ambivalence, too, about the housing options on offer from 
the state. The new build houses were smaller than the spaces on the lots, and referred 
to by families in both Altos and Caracoli as ‘jaulas’ or ‘jaulitas’ [cages or little 
cages]. As one inhabitant of Altos de Estancia, a home owner for 23 years, 
explained, they felt entitled to receive a house of the commensurate size to the one 
they owned (interview 04.07.2010). More commonly, house size was often cited as a 
problem for those with large families, both because in some cases there were large 
numbers of children, but also because many households consisted of multiple 
families or included family members beyond the nuclear family (particularly elderly 
relatives, but also siblings-in-law). In Altos, it was this issue above all else that 
motivated the formation of alternative housing associations (Organisaciones de 
Vivienda Popular (OPV)), whereby people attempted to use the state housing 
subsidy to found their own housing co-operative73. As Maria, a participant in the 
Renacer project, explained: “Victor [the leader of this particular OPV] said that we 
should unite for a better life, for better houses, and that [the OPV] could offer us 
much bigger houses” (interview 11.02.2010). As with the issue of valuation, though, 
one long-established respondent hinted that attitudes to the new houses varied with 
the socio-economic status of the household: “those houses [which he calls 
ratoneras, literally rat houses] are no good for me, not even as a gift, they are good 
                                                          
73
 Only one of the attempts to do so – the Renacer project – was actually successful. 
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for displaced people [referring to poorer, newer settlers], for guerrillas [referring to 
those displaced from political conflict]” (interview 17.01.2010).74 
For reasons of size, most people tended to prefer the option to take up ‘used housing’ 
rather than new build. However, for reasons examined in the previous chapter, the 
state has preferred to offer new build housing, with strict stipulations attached to the 
type of used housing that could be approved for use with the state subsidy. A case in 
Altos de Estancia typified the way this would prolong the process of leaving the 
zone; the family (whose responsibility it was to find the house) had found numerous 
houses in the six years since they had been classified as at high risk, but all had been 
rejected as suitable by the Caja. Finally, under pressure from state officials, who said 
if they did not take up the opportunity to be part of a new housing development they 
would lose their subsidy entirely, they were resigned to accepting a “small house, 
even though it was very narrow” (interview 22.08.2010)  
The final option offered by the state – in emergency situations or when new or used 
housing could not yet be found – was to move into rental accommodation. Again, 
this option carried a huge stigma for the majority of home owners, who had bought 
their lots in order to be able to move out of rental accommodation, which was costly 
and insecure. Of the family of sisters I interviewed in Brisas de Volador all had 
returned to live on their parents’ plot after they ran into problems with rental 
payments, as this vignette shows:  
O was widowed after her husband was murdered in a local park, and was unable to 
pay her rent, or to feed her two daughters. T separated from her husband and, 
without a job and her own house, couldn’t pay her rents. Y and her husband were 
working, but in her brother’s workshop and he paid them so little they couldn’t 
afford rent or food. As one sister explained, “It’s that if here they resettle you, then 
you go to your own house and live well, then you can work at least to have good 
food, education for the children, but you can’t if you are paying rent” (interview 
17.01.2010).  
                                                          
74
 To be eligible for resettlement, the household had to be in socio-economic bracket 1 or 2 (the 
lowest strata). This reflected quite wide internal variation, however, as indicated by differences in 
housing structure – from the 2 storey brick construction (more commonly found in Altos) to the zinc 
and wood makeshift shelters put up by new settlers and partially developed by poorer long-term 
settlers.  
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The case of Alfonso, from the Altos de Estancia risk zone, exemplifies how these 
livelihoods claims, and questions of housing security and choice, were bound up 
with his actions in response to risk management agencies:  
A settler of 12 years still inhabiting his plot in ‘Phase 2’ of Altos de Estancia (which 
was undergoing resettlement at the time of the research) Alfonso lived with his wife 
and some of his children and grandchildren. Aged 54, he made a living selling 
tomatoes and onions and playing his guitar, while his wife worked as a domestic 
help. He received no state help, having failed to register for the displaced persons 
programme. Alberto refused to be pressurised into going into rental accommodation 
offered by the DPAE and the Caja when he didn’t currently have to pay rent. 
Instead, he said “the hope is to come out of this with the keys: that gives you the full 
security of knowing, look, I’ve got my house.” While he didn’t believe there would be 
a landslide in his part of the zone, he said he would like to live in a house offered 
through the social housing programme. He wasn’t yet entitled to one owing to 
complications with his title over another rural property, for which he had made 
many journeys to sort out the papers, while his son was also engaged in negotiating 
with the Caja de Vivienda [state housing agency] to claim entitlement for two new 
houses, given that the family was large, and had built on two plots. The solution, he 
said, is to wait and see, “because he who is rushed is sent where he shouldn’t be 
sent” (Interview 28.01.2010).  
b. Desplazados, or newly displaced settlers  
The term ‘desplazado’ referred to a political category of people who were formally 
recognised by the state as having been displaced by the country’s political conflict 
(although many people who settled earlier were effectively displaced, there was no 
special recognition for them), and entitled to forms of humanitarian assistance as 
well as afforded special rights. For these groups of people, risk zones offered shelter, 
a foothold in the city from which to establish a livelihood. Those who settled after 
the establishment of risk zones, had their presence deemed illegal by risk 
management agencies, and their main objective was to access a different set of state 
agencies in order to be officially recognised as displaced, and then secure entitlement 
to another form of housing subsidy and other benefits. Their discourses about being 
in a high risk zone were markedly different to those of home owners, with concerns 
about landslide risk muted by the immediate demands of their livelihoods. In 
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addition, their illegal status (but lack of alternatives) brought them into direct 
conflict with risk management agencies (one association of displaced people carried 
radios to warn each other when police were coming to evict them, threatening to 
move to another high risk zone if evicted). 
The case of Manuel, who had been living for two years in a cleared area of Altos de 
Estancia, exemplified the aims and discourses of this social group:  
Aged 31 and with 5 children, he was dispossessed from his land in a rural area by 
armed groups. Whilst staying with an uncle in a nearby barrio someone told him 
there were lots in the zone that he could occupy without anyone bothering him. “Yes, 
I knew [about it being a high risk zone], but it didn’t matter to me because what was 
more important to me was being there in the street with the children, I didn’t want 
that so I made this lot, we’ve been here all this time and we’ve at least managed to 
get food on the table and dress the children along the way…..when they say that it’s 
a high risk zone, that’s when it makes one think a little, that if that’s true one could 
have a problem, in any case be in danger, but as, as such a poor person what can 
you think about that as well”. He said he would return to the countryside if he had 
the financial means to own an animal or plant a plot, but that the children needed 
access to schooling which he had hoped they could get in Bogota. (Interview 
28.01.2010) 
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Figure 8: Home owner’s house in the San Rafael barrio, Altos de Estancia 
Source: Author, 2010 
 
 
Figure 9: Home owner’s house in the former barrio of Santo Domingo, Altos de 
Estancia 
Source: Author, 2010 
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Figure 10: Temporary shelter erected by newly displaced settlers in a cleared 
zone, Altos de Estancia 
In an ironic subversion of the state’s view of emergency (as disaster risk), the tarpaulin reads ‘In case 
of emergency’ (referring to the lack of shelter).    Source: Author, 2010.  
 
6.4 Risk in the context of meanings of informality and illegality 
This section discusses a further, critical dimension to the way in which risk is viewed 
and negotiated by inhabitants of high risk zones: the meanings given to state 
definitions of legality and illegality, formality and informality. As discussed in the 
previous chapter, the emergence of a planning regime in the city based on disaster 
risk assessment also gave rise to new official definitions of legal and illegal activities 
as a way to regulate the use of ‘high risk’ spaces, and bound claims for resettlement. 
These regulations define – in statute, if not always in practice – what groups are 
officially considered as ‘at risk’ and affect both the livelihoods of inhabitants and the 
scope for people to modify risk. However, people’s expectations of how the state 
should act on risk, the claims they made on the state to act, and trust in state 
institutions were grounded in different conceptions of their own activities. The 
section discusses three issues: land purchase and title, legalisation and the rights of 
illegal groups.   
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Land purchase and title for home owners 
Illegal and informal land purchase – the basis for settlement in all the 
neighbourhoods – meant that the state only partially accommodated claims to house 
ownership. Although it recognised informal titles - promesas de venta – as proof of 
ownership, compensation for resettlement, as mentioned, was restricted to the value 
of housing improvements (mejoras) as official land title remained with the original 
owners (large land owners who may or may not have sold off the land to settlers). In 
addition, as discussed, some home owners remained excluded from resettlement 
programmes. However, home owners I interviewed expected the state to take full 
responsibility for resettlement and compensation (contrary to the state discourse of 
co-responsibility). Some settlers protested that the fact that their purchase had been 
illegal was not necessarily known until the state entered and made it known. An 
interview with three sisters of one family in Brisas de Volador waiting to access the 
resettlement programme, illuminated how the arrival of risk management agencies 
revealed to the family how, in the eyes of the state, their tenure transaction had been 
illegal. As far as the family were concerned they had been given a paper which was 
commonly used and produced in any local notary’s office. For them, the discovery of 
illegality provided an additional reason to be moved away, given that they had been 
cheated. As expressed by one of the sisters: “Here was where, living on this plot, it 
was that we came to know that the land wasn’t legal and all that story…So seeing 
the tragedy that happened over there [an earlier landslide in the zone], then all the 
world began to call the DPAE and ask for visits and the rest, that they get us out of 
here, because this wasn’t legal…” (Interview 17.01.2010). The sister reiterated the 
view, also expressed by other home owners, that they should be treated and 
compensated as legitimate owners, not stigmatised as ‘invaders’. As a former settler 
in Altos de Estancia, now resettled through the Renacer housing project, explained, 
“We felt they had to give us a solution because we had bought the land” (Interview 
11.02.2010).  
Legalisation  
The history of legalisation processes also influenced local discourses about 
responsibility for risk and relationships of trust with the state. This was particularly 
marked in Altos de Estancia, where some barrios were legalised but legalisation was 
then rescinded when they were declared high risk zones. In court cases brought by 
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inhabitants and community organisations in the zone against state risk management 
agencies, this fact was used to revoke state claims that responsibility for risk lay with 
the community, given that the state had originally recognised the settlements (Court 
proceedings in the case of Tutela N 041-06, Juzgado Noveno Penal Municipal de 
Descongestion, Bogota D.C., 12 June 2006).  
The rights of ‘illegal’ groups  
Although groups excluded from the resettlement programme were declared illegal, 
without rights to housing in the zones, inhabitants countered in legal cases with 
claims to legal and citizenship status grounded in a wide set of rights. A 2011 court 
case brought by a family living in Brisas de Volador but excluded from the 
resettlement programme because the family was alleged to have settled after 
eligibility for the programme expired exemplifies this – their petition, or tutela, 
invokes the constitutional rights to children, to family, to equality, to petition, to 
private property, to due process and to dignified housing (Sentencia T-104 de Corte 
Constitucional, 22 Feb 2011).75 Displaced families also found additional rights 
claims through the fact that they had been displaced and therefore had an alternative 
political status that grounded their entitlements to welfare.  
6.5 State practice and the social experience of risk 
This section examines societal responses to risk assessment in light of people’s own 
experiences of landslide events. In addition to the previous chapter, which examined 
how state policies of inclusion and exclusion became arbitrary in relation to the 
state’s own goals for risk management, I show how (with people’s own experience 
of risk devalued in formal assessments) state risk assessment becomes arbitrary in 
relation to lived experiences of risk in a number of ways. Both of these dynamics 
create societal contestation, which may be more or less explicit in its manifestation, 
but which shapes how risk assessments are received and acted upon by the very 
people whose lives they were meant to transform.  
                                                          
75
 Acción de tutela instaurada por Henry Poveda Rodríguez y otra, contra la Dirección de Protección y 
Atención de Emergencias (DPAE) y la Alcaldía Local de Ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá. 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2011/T-104-11.htm 
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Across the three study areas, those interviewed usually based their observations on 
direct experience as well as highly localised understandings of where landslides did 
and could occur within the high risk zones. In some cases, the observations 
converged with formal assessments and in others they diverged. The first example 
concerns households who found themselves either graded as at a lower scale of 
likely risk - ‘medium’ - within a high risk zone and/or down the priority list for 
resettlement owing to engineers’ judgements of their risk status. This was the case 
for many of the households surveyed in the lower, central zone of Brisas de Volador. 
People described being told by engineers that the ground was firm, and that 
landslides would not penetrate down to the lower part of the barrio. However, many 
reported feeling direct impacts on their houses due to regular mudflows, such as 
humidity and cracking, and on their health, as the humidity was conducive to flu and 
bacterial infections and attracted mosquitoes and other pests. They were advised by 
engineers to take particular measures, such as digging ditches behind their houses. 
However, even these type of measures involved too much time and expense for some 
households, while those who did take them reported that they were limited in effect, 
and had to be re-done after each rainfall. The point is that risk as a social 
phenomenon, judged by the ability to cope with and manage impacts, had not been 
taken into consideration.  
In addition, this example from Brisas de Volador sits at odds with the predominant 
narrative of Bogota’s officials that people ‘don’t see risk’, and that this (irrational or 
‘strange’, in the words of one official) behaviour explained why people would refuse 
to leave their homes despite the prospect of disaster. Many of those who had not 
experienced impacts directly in Brisas (bearing in mind this was a small zone in 
terms of area) nevertheless answered in the affirmative when asked if they perceived 
that landslides could occur in their zone. This led to a common feeling that ‘it could 
happen to us’ while another respondent described how the impacts were still felt 
close to home: when it rained, muddy water would pass right by the house 
(interviews 12.03.2010, 14.03.2010, 20.07.2010). Most people who answered in this 
way certainly engaged in some form of ‘preventative’ coping action (such as 
modifying their houses). The official narrative hid the experience of people who felt 
at risk, but encountered state inaction. 
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On the other hand, some households were classified as at high risk, but discounted 
that they were at risk - these were the households state officials had in mind when 
they characterised peoples’ attitudes to risk. The point is in many senses obvious: 
risk as constructed in the state’s field of vision - based on probability into the future - 
wasn’t always visible in the landscape for people to ‘see’. When probed in interview, 
many of these people founded their views on where landslides had historically 
occurred – a form of realism, perhaps, rather than denial. This was the case for just 
one respondent in Brisas de Volador, who noted that his family wasn’t at risk, 
landslides had occurred in a different part of the zone (interview 14.03.2010). In 
Altos de Estancia, the response was more common as people were spread over a 
much larger area, at much greater distance from landslide events. Interviewees 
would describe their situation relative either to where landslides had occurred in 
space or in time (as being a specific number of blocks away and more or less 
recently). Often, this fed into the converse scenario to the one described above – 
those exiting for resettlement actually expressed no personal feelings of being at risk. 
Alfonso, an old-time settler still inhabiting his house in Phase 2 of Altos (the part of 
the high risk zone undergoing resettlement), expressed these dynamics: “No [my 
family doesn’t feel at risk], [pointing] from there to that fence and below, yes, but 
from the fence upwards no…..most of the people have now gone, but if all of those 
who felt that nothing was falling in had stayed, everyone would be here” (interview 
28.01.2010). Even where the experience was not as marked – where people leaving 
for resettlement did experience minor effects (such as houses with small cracks) or 
where people were fearful – these gradations of personal experience nevertheless 
bore no relation to the logic of official gradation.  
Other related aspects of the practices of risk management agencies added to the 
sense of arbitrariness that people expressed in their analysis of state actions. Firstly, 
many inhabitants perceived that the agencies would only act to resettle when there 
was an ‘emergency’, resulting in either loss of life or property, usually during the 
winter, or rainiest seasons. Describing the failure to resettle the group of inhabitants 
in the lower ‘medium risk’ zone of Brisas de Volador, another inhabitant commented 
“the health secretariat, the DPAE, they’ve all come, but until they see a death they 
won’t resettle them” (interview 17.01.2010). Not only did this feed into a common 
sentiment that state institutions actually cared little for their welfare, it also reflected 
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the fact that for some groups, the experience of landslide risk was a constant 
experience – punctuated by moments of ‘emergency’ - that had negative 
repercussions for people’s livelihoods, an experience devalued by the state.  
Secondly, the way in which risk levels and prioritisations were set was not 
comprehensible to inhabitants. The first issue was that, although engineers operated 
at the plot scale to avoid splitting properties across risk boundaries, neighbours could 
still find themselves classified differently. “How is it,” one respondent asked, “that 
some houses [in the barrio] are low, some medium or some high?” (interview 
15.01.2010). The second issue was that, as discussed in Chapter 5, levels and 
prioritisations changed over time. The critical point for the people concerned was not 
only that this process was not understood, but that it created huge uncertainty for 
their livelihoods. However, there was also deep ambivalence as the dependency on 
the state to define one’s livelihoods through risk assessment meant that, through all 
the critique of state practices, many inhabitants nevertheless looked to state assessors 
to stabilise risk boundaries and levels. As official emergencies in ‘medium risk’ 
zones illustrated to people (and as discussed in Chapter 5 there were emergencies in 
medium risk zones in Caracoli and Brisas in 2010 as well as the emergency in Phase 
2 (a lesser priority zone) of Altos de Estancia in the same year) state risk assessments 
were unreliable guides for action.  
6.6 Risk through relationships with expertise: contests over causes and 
responsibility in informal, urban settings 
 
Across all three of the high risk zones, existing inhabitants contested state 
interpretations of the causes and responsibility for landslides. In particular, they 
raised issues of drainage and water management as critical to the occurrence of 
landslides, critical to their livelihoods and as unaddressed by the state.  
In the Brisas high risk zone, the official line that cut the zone into high and medium 
risk areas, in which all those in the upper part were to be resettled, and those below it 
not, rested on judgements by engineers about slope stability, or whether the ground 
was firm. Inhabitants, however, reported that the problem lay with water filtration – 
both from the barrio above them and due to problems with broken water pipes and 
tubes within their sector (as people were resettled and houses demolished and as 
working tubes were managed informally by groups of neighbours). For one 
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inhabitant in the upper ‘resettled’ part, this grounded his view that he was not ‘at 
risk’ (or not risk in the way that engineers described), as the issue could be remedied: 
“The ground itself is firm, if the rocks fall it’s because badly intentioned people do it 
on purpose [tamper with the water supply tubes] and because the water escapes. We 
were asking them to put in a grill [to protect tampering with the water supply tubes] 
but they [state officials] left it as just a project and never returned” (interview 
20.07.2010).  
In Altos de Estancia, in an ongoing dispute over the management of the Santa Rita 
tributary, court case documents also demonstrate how questions of cause and 
responsibility fed into resistance to state risk management. While the state presented 
the case that ongoing flooding from the Santa Rita was due to the community’s own 
lack of care for its environment, community representatives maintained that the lack 
of official water and drainage was to blame.  
In addition, as discussed in Chapter 5, the state considered that in certain situations 
(such as in medium risk areas) it was the responsibility of inhabitants to undertake 
mitigation. In the absence of a view of risk as socially conditioned (and social factors 
as part of risk, not just the target of social management), however, this was not only 
inadequate, but led to contests about the responsibility of different actors to address 
the causes. In one such case in Brisas, in which a group of families took risk 
management agencies to the courts for their failure to resettle them, analysis by the 
public water company confirmed that it was the drainage of wastewater and 
rainwater towards a depression in the road that was causing erosion and 
environmental problems for inhabitants. In the defence mounted by risk management 
agencies, they argued that it was the responsibility of the claimant to take mitigation 
measures they had suggested – channelling rainwater, linking the channels into the 
community drainage system and closing up septic tanks. However, the court upheld a 
different view grounded in a judgement about the socio-economic ability of the 
families to undertake these kind of works - given their economic condition, the judge 
concluded, the population could not be asked to assume this kind of responsibility76. 
                                                          
76
 From court documents in the case of an Accion Popular brought by Marco Tulio Ararat Sandaval 
and others against the FOPAE (disasters agencies), October 8 2004. The documents can be found at 
http://190.24.134.67/SENTENCIAS/ACCION%20POPULAR/2004/ (Last retrieved August 27 2012). 
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The state was also implicated in inhabitants’ analyses of the causes of landslides 
owing to its role in the original development of the zones. In the Altos de Estancia 
zone – where a significant amount of urban development took place before the area 
was declared a high risk zone – existing and former inhabitants described how there 
had been excavation to put in new roads (interview 11.02.2010), and explosives had 
been used by the water company when putting in new drainage (interviews 
11.02.2010 and 01.03.2010). One long-time settler and former community leader 
from the Cerros de Diamante barrio, in recounting the history of the zone,  described 
how early official studies about mining activity in the zone (which had destabilised 
some areas) only came to light after the landslides occurred, but were unheard of 
during the urbanisation and legalisation process (interview 01.03.2010).   
6.7 Conclusion 
In answer to the research questions posed in this thesis, this chapter shows how the 
existing approaches for understanding urban risk laid out in Chapter 2 – both 
impacts-based and vulnerability approaches – might account for: firstly, the ways in 
which people respond to climate risk in the context of the risks to their livelihoods, 
as encompassing the meanings, values and identities inherent in those livelihoods; 
and secondly, the ways in which people respond to risk through their relationship 
with state expertise and responses to the values and meanings lodged in purportedly 
technical models of risk. In terms of understanding agency in response to urban risk 
assessment, the subject of Chapter 3, the chapter has further deepened and nuanced 
existing theoretical perspectives. In particular it has highlighted how different 
meanings are held by different social groups (home owners or desplazado groups) 
and how inhabitants respond to risk in ways both conditioned by the new ‘frames’ of 
risk management and on the basis of their own ‘idioms’ of identity and meaning.   
Concretely, the chapter has shown how the aspiration to establish a home in the city 
and the self-perception of inhabitants as legitimate citizens leads to both 
ambivalence and resistance by different social groups in response to the state’s 
presentation of risk (both as a dynamic (but therefore uncertain) physical 
phenomenon to be controlled by altering human exposure and because its approach 
embeds certain values about how urban citizens should live, and who should be 
entitled to do so, which are felt as ‘identity risk’ by residents). In addition, the ways 
in which people understood and responded to environmental risk was, in contrast to 
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the physical gradations established by state-based risk assessment, based on the 
multiple livelihoods risks they faced, and risk as judged against their own abilities to 
cope with both disaster events, but also the continuous impacts of living in a 
landslide-prone area. The chapter highlighted how the ways in which the state was 
‘seen’, through state practices such as slow response, intermittent visibility and 
arbitrary exclusions and boundaries, as well as differing interpretations of the causes 
of and responsibility for risks, affected trust in expertise and with it responses to 
landslide risk.  
Having examined the ‘what’ of people’s responses to risk, therefore, the next chapter 
moves to examine how people use their agency - based on the responses highlighted 
in this chapter, but not determined by them – to re-shape the environmental risks 
they face. In particular, the following chapter asks how agency is exercised in 
informal, urban settlements, how it is facilitated and constrained and for whom this 
occurs.  
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Chapter 7 
Re-defining Risk from Below: Agency, Access and Vulnerability to 
Climate Risk in the Informal Settlements of Bogota, Colombia 
 
7.1 Introduction 
In this third and final empirical chapter, I examine how inhabitants of risk zones use 
their agency to re-define the risks they face, and what facilitates or constrains 
possibilities to re-shape risk ‘from below’. The chapter contributes to the overall 
argument of the thesis in two main ways.  
First, it shows how the ways in which inhabitants of informal, urban settlements 
respond to risk – in the context of the meanings and identities discussed in the 
previous chapter – depends on access to tangible and intangible resources through 
social and institutional relationships at different scales. Although an ‘assets’ 
approach to understanding vulnerability implies that households might substitute one 
type of asset for another to boost their ability to cope with risks, the possibility of 
rearranging one’s asset portfolio is in fact constrained by these social and 
institutional arrangements. Such arrangements are contingent and underpinned by 
different power relations, more a ‘fragile accomplishment’ (to use van Dijk’s phrase) 
(van Dijk 2011) than a fixed resource. This discussion of agency in turn adds to 
debates examined in Chapter 3 concerning societal responses to urban risk 
assessment and management. This chapter draws on theories of vulnerability to 
deepen our analysis of the multiple forms of agency exercised by poor, urban groups, 
and the factors that constrain or enable that agency.  
Second, the chapter shows how questions of agency, access and the vulnerability of 
the urban poor are not just social, but also deeply political. It discusses how forms of 
socio-political agency are exercised by the urban poor as an ‘adaptive strategy’ in the 
face of risk. The chapter also shows how agency is shaped by political processes at 
multiple scales, from the politics of local, community-based organising to broader 
processes of state reform.  
Overall, therefore, the chapter contributes new insights to analysis of ‘how’ people 
adapt in informal, urban settlements and ‘who’ adapts.        
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To make this argument, the chapter uses case studies from households across the 
three risk zones with different asset statuses. As Chapter 4 discussed, household 
interviews were conducted with as representative a sample of social groups as 
possible, including by political status (legal or illegal, for example), risk zone and 
apparent wealth (judged primarily by housing quality). For the analysis, therefore, 
households were divided into high asset, medium asset and low asset groups, for 
example, and compared. As Chapter 4 also outlined, oral histories and semi-
structured interviews were used in conjunction to allow for depth, complexity and 
understanding of the influence of power relations on decision-making at different 
historical junctures, and in order to put these narratives in the context of different 
forms of livelihood. To contextualise the rich, narrative information, case studies or 
household vignettes are used to report the findings, alongside the identification of 
common themes through the coding of interview texts.   
The chapter is structured in two parts. The first part examines the strategies that 
people adopt to re-shape risk in the political arena and the political context that has 
both enabled and constrained such action. The second part focusses on broader forms 
of agency, examining the livelihoods context that shaped people’s responses to risk. 
It examines the socio-economic barriers to accessing resources that allowed people 
to transform the risks they faced (such as state programmes or financial capital) and 
shows how socio-economic status and political categorisation function together to 
influence vulnerability to environmental risk. The ensuing section then develops this 
point, discussing how sets of social and institutional relations constrain agency to 
transform livelihoods and risk at the household and community scale.  
7.2 Urban adaptation as politics: negotiating risk in the political domain 
This section examines how vulnerability to landslide risk is negotiated in the 
political domain by the inhabitants of informal settlements. The first part highlights 
how forms of socio-political agency are mobilised by individuals, households and 
communities to renegotiate the risks they face in accordance with people’s 
livelihoods capacities, needs, aspirations and values. This is not to say that there was 
a deterministic link between expressing a contrasting viewpoint to the state and 
seeking action or redress in the political arena; as the following section highlights, 
many individuals did not take any action at all, while the previous chapter 
highlighted how local views were often marked by deep ambivalence rather than 
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outright opposition. However, as I explore, these views certainly grounded the 
complex patterns of action that were taken in the political arena, in which citizens 
sought to access, evade or renegotiate terms with state agencies. The second part of 
the section then examines the ways in which the political context shaped these 
avenues for action, across different agencies and scales of the state, illustrating how 
political action was institutionally embedded.   
The use of socio-political agency to transform risk 
Tracing the history of mobilisation over the course of the ladera programme and the 
patterns of mobilisation across the three risk zones, one is struck by the multiple 
forms of political practice through which people sought to use their social and 
political agency to redefine the risks that they face. From verbal and written petitions 
directly to the risk management agencies to court cases against state agencies as well 
as community organising and street protest, the way in which agency is and has been 
exercised has involved complex manoeuvring in the state apparatus. This has 
occurred across multiple state agencies and at different levels of state bureaucracy 
(i.e. over the heads of officials with whom inhabitants had direct contact). It has 
involved both a formal politics of civil society organisation (however weak) and the 
informal politics of political brokerage and patronage.  
In the barrio of Brisas de Volador, for example, where a group of five neighbours in 
a medium-risk zone was petitioning to be recognised as high-risk and included in the 
resettlement programme, the petitioners described to me how they had sent petitions 
to the disasters management agency, but also the Defensoria del Pueblo and 
Personería (the national Ombudsman’s office, charged with the protection of civil 
and human rights, and Bogota’s human rights body, charged with overseeing the 
conduct of the city’s ministries and service providers). On the advice of these bodies 
they then sent their papers to the local mayor and city mayor. Documents from court 
cases brought by inhabitants during the course of the programme also indicate that 
the Personaria and Defensoria played critical roles in supporting claimants to bring 
legal action. Agency could often be sporadic, however, with families petitioning only 
when family members were ill, for instance. Different social groups also had 
different avenues for accessing the state: desplazado families and communities, or 
those classified as displaced from Colombia’s political conflict and more recently 
settled in the areas of risk zones cleared for resettlement, sought recognition and 
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housing through the displaced persons’ programme and state bodies specially 
charged with managing displacement, such as the Comision de Paz.  
As well as directly appealing to state institutions, people relied on brokers and local 
political figures to negotiate on their behalf. Maria’s narrative of how she secured a 
place in the Renacer community housing project77 shows the role that local power 
brokers could play for people in facilitating access to state subsidies:  
Maria, 38, lives in the Renacer community housing project for those evacuated from 
the barrio of Cerros de Diamante, one of the barrios worst affected by landslides in 
the Altos de Estancia zone. She described how she struggled to find housing after she 
was evacuated into rental accommodation following the landslide. Although her 
husband was there on the day of the census in the zone he had left the family, and 
she had to go through an extra-judicial process to change the ownership title to the 
plot (and therefore entitlement to the subsidy). A single mother of three children, she 
was told she couldn’t receive a housing subsidy as she had no fixed employment, she 
just worked days when there was work. She was given a certain amount of time to 
make the payments required to secure the subsidy, but she worried as this was 
running out before she had the money. Then she met an old neighbour from Cerros 
on the bus who recommended she talked to Victor Neira, the leader of the housing 
co-operative and a local political leader. When other members of the project were 
given the subsidy and she wasn’t, it was Victor who took copies of her papers to the 
Caja de Vivienda and complained. In the end, she received the money. (Interview 
01.03.2010)  
In Caracoli, two contrasting cases exemplified how higher status, political 
connections could facilitate entry into the resettlement programme:  
To try and advance her progress in the resettlement programme, an elderly home 
owner of 65 had secured the support of the community leader through her brother’s 
involvement in the junta, and through her son the support of a local politician. With 
this support and that of a lawyer (paid for thanks to the employment of both sons, in 
particular the permanent job the eldest son held as an electrician) she had written 
the previous year to the city’s civil defence bodies, the Personería, Defensoria as 
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 Renacer was the only community-based alternative housing project in the three landslide zones to 
succeed in securing a new housing project, for the former inhabitants of the Altos de Estancia zone.  
149 
 
well as the local mayor. She said she had been promised a place in a housing project 
due to be completed in 2011 (the following year). (Interview 17.03.10)  
The case contrasted starkly with that of a 37 year old woman living in the lower part 
of the barrio with her husband, five children and one grandchild. Also a home owner 
of ten years, she was still waiting to find out if they were to be included in the 
resettlement programme. In her sector, she said “no hay junta” [there is no junta], 
referring to the lack of interest by the neighbourhood committee in the exclusion of 
her block from the programme. With her husband out of work due to an accident and 
responsibility for a disabled son, which limited her capacity to take permanent work 
outside the zone, she supported a family of 8 working by day in a nearby barrio. 
Although she had visited the Caja de Vivienda’s local office once to enquire about 
their status, “There are no resources,” she said, “we just have to wait”. (Interview 
18.03.10)   
Political patronage brought the promise of connections and opportunities, but could 
also compromise individual agency and autonomy (what Woods refers to as the 
‘Faustian pact’ between security and agency, in van Dijk, 2011). The example used 
in Chapter 5 of the collection of former home owners now squatting in a cleared 
zone of the Altos de Estancia risk zone under the leadership of their former 
community leader illustrates this point. While their charismatic leader took petitions 
on their behalf to the housing ministry and presidency in order to claim the subsidies 
to which they felt entitled, the individuals themselves had no contact with state 
institutions. Through their personal connections with the leader they moved back to 
the zone, often under conditions of extreme economic hardship or family breakdown. 
They handed over the relevant papers for the political negotiation, and squatted 
where directed to, three families per plot, on plots that had never been settled or 
claimed (to avoid conflict in claiming land titles).   
The political context for agency 
The second point to note about how agency was exercised by community inhabitants 
was how these avenues for contestation had been shaped not only by the new 
architectures of risk management but by broader political settlements reached 
elsewhere. Political and constitutional change in the early 1990s (with the 
introduction of a new constitution in 1991 which established the Estado Social de 
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Derecho or commitment by the state to uphold a broad set of social and economic as 
well as political rights) led to the creation and strengthening of new civil defence 
bodies. The 1991 constitution, too, provided a key referent for those appealing for 
changes to their risk status or treatment at the hands of risk management agencies. 
The constitution enshrined the act of ‘Tutela’, or a petition based on the violation of 
constitutional rights.78 Examining transcripts from court cases brought by inhabitants 
of the three risk zones, it is notable (as touched on in the last chapter) how the cases 
are expressed in the broader language of social rights laid out in the national 
constitution and legislation, in contrast to the narrower ‘right to life’ invoked by risk 
management agencies. In Bogota, these national changes wrought decentralisation 
and the beginning of a radical political period in the city’s history. Institutions such 
as the Personería underwent significant strengthening in this time, although, critics 
noted, participation in policy processes – often the root cause of grievances within 
the risk management programme – remained a largely elite affair, with limited mass 
participation (Berney 2010).  
The political spaces opened up by broader state reforms did not necessarily result in 
outcomes favourable to the inhabitants of the three risk zones, however. Legal cases 
were sometimes overturned, sometimes upheld, or, as in one case in Brisas de 
Volador, although the court found that the inhabitants should be resettled, they did 
not award compensation, on the grounds that it was the inhabitants’ responsibility for 
settling in a high risk zone (Sentencia T-104 de Corte Constitucional, 22 Feb 
2011).79 Petitions to risk management agencies were reported to have little effect, 
although tutelas legally required a response. In Altos de Estancia the instigation of a 
tutela by a number of neighbourhood leaders led to a judicial order for an inter-
institutional committee to monitor resettlement projects and mitigation works. As 
Chapter 5 discussed, risk management agencies often responded by accommodating 
the demands of certain groups without transforming the structures of access (or these 
structures were much slower to change as they required changes to institutional 
rules). This type of accommodation echoed Holston’s characterisation of the urban 
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 Interestingly, the poorest socio-economic groups have made most use of tutelas in Bogota 
(Hernández 2010). 
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 Acción de tutela instaurada por Henry Poveda Rodríguez y otra, contra la Dirección de Protección y 
Atención de Emergencias (DPAE) y la Alcaldía Local de Ciudad Bolívar, Bogotá. 
http://www.corteconstitucional.gov.co/relatoria/2011/T-104-11.htm 
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struggles waged around services and legislation as ‘immanent material struggles’ 
that find resolution in the official apparatus but are not then sustained (Holston 
1999). Where new entitlements were granted – to particular housing subsidies or 
projects, for example – the community organisations then withdrew engagement, 
although in the Altos de Estancia zone community leaders retained a high profile and 
were still very active in pressurising the state.  
In addition, the occurrence of ‘emergencies’ – or landslide events that caused severe 
damage to property and even loss of lives – undercut the possibility for many to 
exercise their agency. Faced with the loss of their homes, or told that the state would 
no longer support them if they did not leave, people had little choice but to be 
evacuated. Referring to the lack of voluntarism by those evacuated after a massive 
landslide in the barrio of Cerros de Diamante in Altos de Estancia – in which over 
600 people were evacuated in 2002 – one former community leader noted “It’s not 
that they went, it’s that they were taken (no se fueron, los llevaron)” (interview 
01.03.2010).  
7.3 Responses to risk in the context of informal, urban livelihoods 
This second part of the chapter broadens out from the focus on the political domain 
to examine how people’s agency to transform risk (including but not confined to the 
political aspect) is shaped in the context of informal, urban livelihoods. In so doing, 
the section addresses questions of how informal, urban communities adapt, and who 
adapts. The first section examines how socio-economic status functions with the 
forms of political categorisation discussed in previous chapters to mitigate or 
reinforce the vulnerability of households to landslide risk. The subsequent sections 
show how access to critical resources to cope with and manage risks is shaped by 
particular social and institutional relationships, identifying the key factors that 
facilitate or constrain access for households in risk zones.    
7.3.i Socio-economic barriers to access 
The findings from the household survey and interviews across the three risk zones 
confirm existing research suggesting that the ability to access resources to protect 
against risk is unevenly distributed across households within communities (Pelling 
2003; Moser and Satterthwaite 2008). As the following examples show, even for 
groups eligible for resettlement, the monetary and time costs of participating in the 
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resettlement process were potentially high, delaying people’s relocation from the risk 
zones: 
In Brisas de Volador we interviewed one home-owning family who lived in a zinc 
and wood house with earth floors. They had spent five years in the process of being 
resettled, and had just received the keys to their new house. The process had 
required investing time and money, they said. They had been required to show 
documents proving their land title, identity, letters from the relevant institutions, 
certificates of visits from engineers, along with plans and studies of the house, land 
registry documents, certificates from the junta [JAC or local committee] verifying 
their residence, and an extra judicial statement attesting to their residence, marital 
status and the residence of their children. The land title documents to the new house 
alone cost around 500 thousand pesos80. Of the three family members, a woman, her 
husband and 19 year old son, only the woman was working, doing domestic work 
and other casual jobs on a daily basis, and they reported no other income. The 
husband suffered from dementia and had been hospitalised. All were enrolled in 
SISBEN health insurance. Both parents only had a primary education, although the 
son had a secondary education. They reported owning a radio and a food processor. 
(Interview 14.03.2010)  
One woman, aged 26, living in Caracoli described in an interview how she, her 
husband, sister and two children had been classified as ‘high risk’ in the May 2010 
landslide in the zone. Although they were told they were not a priority case, they had 
been affected by a landslide two years previously and wanted their status revised. In 
conversations with DPAE officials in the zone they were told to ask for a visit to 
determine the risk characteristics of the zone. By the start of August they were still 
waiting for a visit. Going to the DPAE offices to ask for the visit could only take 
place on a particular day during office hours. The woman said that none of the 
inhabitants of the house had the time or money for this. (Interview 01.08.10)  
Other households reported having to go into debt to pay for the relevant papers as 
well as clear their debts with service companies, a requisite of the resettlement 
programme at the time of the research (see also Chapter 5). The same socio-
economic barriers were also cited as impediments not only to individual petitioning 
                                                          
80
 Approximately equivalent to the monthly wage of a domestic help, working full time, as reported 
by women in the risk zones.  
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of state institutions but also to collective action. When asked why they did not form 
a voluntary association, a group of neighbours actively petitioning the state for 
inclusion to the resettlement programme simply said that they had put so much time 
into petitioning already (interview Brisas de Volador 05.01.10). In fact – to put into 
context the forms of political action discussed in the earlier section – in the Caracoli 
neighbourhood, out of twenty two surveyed, only three households reported directly 
contacting state risk management agencies. Alongside the instances of challenge and 
resistance and their politics, therefore, there lay a more mundane reality, expressed 
by many households in the phrase “toca esperar” (we must wait), which meant 
waiting for state subsidies, visits and even new surveys which might govern new 
inclusions to the resettlement programme. For some households, their vulnerability 
was then compounded by the fact that mitigating against risk – as expected of them 
by the state and as discussed in Chapter 5 – itself demanded time and resources.  
The question that arose during the research was the role that socio-economic barriers 
to institutional access played in excluding the poorest groups. While district officials 
suggested that the prioritisation process meant there was more likely to be a delay in 
entering the official programme for those with better constructed houses, as 
discussed, households who were formally eligible for the resettlement programme 
nevertheless struggled to meet its requirements. In fact, in Caracoli, the community 
leader reported that it was the original settlers who had the least who were the ones 
that were left in the high risk zone (Interview 22.03.10).  
In Caracoli, the third study site, a landslide event in May-June 2010 caused a re-
classification of part of the barrio, from medium to high risk. In August that year we 
surveyed 15 households in this area. The most striking thing to note was that all the 
houses bar one were brick and cement, as opposed to the zinc and earth constructions 
of the older high risk area (reflecting the typical process of house construction 
through upgrading, which by 2010 spanned over a decade of settlement). The 
majority of families received some government social assistance, and publicly-
subsidised health insurance, indicating high levels of relative poverty, with levels of 
education and employment status – as in the high risk zone – highly variable. 
However, as a tentative indication of higher levels of asset accumulation, in these 
households family reported owning goods we did not find in Caracoli’s high risk 
zone, such washing machines, fridges and, in one case, a computer. It is not clear 
154 
 
whether this reflects a difference in overall asset levels, however, or that the 
uncertainties of living in a high risk zone and restrictions on construction limited 
decisions about how to invest household assets, as interviews in other zones 
revealed. In addition, in the (previously) medium risk zone one household reported 
having taken formal loans (a finding confirmed in surveys of the non-high-risk Altos 
area), which suggests both the capacity to absorb the financial costs of such loans, as 
well as the related human and financial capacity and status to secure them. The final 
finding to note is that – with the exception of one block of households deliberately 
refraining from action in the hope of being included in the resettlement programme – 
a number of households who had experienced little or no direct impact from 
landslide events had nevertheless taken action to prevent water saturation and earth 
falling in behind their homes, by either digging ditches or channels. This suggests 
again the ability to assume the time and financial costs of doing so, costs which in 
other cases – even where the impacts of landslides were strongly felt – were simply 
prohibitive.  
The contrasts in the socio-economic status of households across the zones and the 
impact of this on families’ ability to access the resettlement programme, alongside 
other resources to manage risk, is illustrated through a set of case studies from 
households of different asset statuses. Within the high risk zones, the poorest groups 
were newer settlers who were automatically ineligible for housing subsidies 
(although, as Chapter 5 discussed, special conditions for inclusion were sometimes 
found). Manuel’s case illustrates how poverty and political marginalisation 
combined to perpetuate his presence in the high risk zone:  
Manuel is a 31 year old man who lives in the Altos de Estancia risk zone, squatting 
in a cleared area that has been declared at high risk. He lives there with his wife and 
five school age children. He moved in two years ago after arriving from a rural area 
to stay with his uncle because his family were threatened by armed groups and they 
had no work. Their house is a rudimentary shelter made from materials donated by 
people they knew through his uncle as they couldn’t afford to rent. Manuel, who said 
he knew a little bit about construction but had worked in the rural area as an 
agricultural labourer and was only educated until the first grade of secondary 
school, worked on construction sites for a few months, going wherever there was 
work, but sometimes there was no work and sometimes he didn’t get paid. He then 
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decided to mend rifles for people to make a living - a skill he picked up from 
watching people on the street - travelling into the centre of town every Friday to do 
it. His wife stays at home. As they have not been accepted onto the displaced 
persons’ programme they receive no state aid, they have no public health insurance 
and only the two youngest children have been accepted into school. The family tap 
both water and electricity illegally for free. He says the family just about manage to 
have enough to eat. His only direct contact with the state had been through his 
application to be part of the government’s programme for displaced people. 
Although he had been told to pursue their case through the Defensoria, he said that 
they hadn’t been, as some weeks there was money for the journey and some weeks 
not. (Interview 28.01.2010).  
Amongst older settlers, there were two broad groups of ‘medium asset’ households 
and ‘high asset’ households (in relative terms). The contrast between these two 
groups is illustrated by the following two case studies. ‘High asset’ households were 
uncommon across the risk zones – as the case shows, these households were able to 
pursue independent options to leave the zones. Medium asset households made up 
the majority of my informants. Unlike the high asset case, in the medium asset case 
the family was not able to contemplate taking a formal loan, and the head of the 
family had only sporadic employment. The family was also less politically well 
connected.  
Medium asset household 
Eva is a 51 year old woman living in the barrio of Brisas de Volador. She moved 
into the area ten years ago after the rents went up where she was living. She lives 
with one of her sons, aged sixteen, and her elderly mother, aged eighty-two, who 
suffers from hypertension. Her mother receives a state subsidy and all had state 
health insurance (targeted at the poorest groups). Her mother has no education, Eva 
has primary level education, and her son is at secondary school. Eva goes out to 
work when she receives the household bills (they are charged for electricity), but has 
spent two years without fixed employment, working either as a domestic help or in 
the rubbish collection agency office in the north of the city (where she has a friend 
who works). Her other son, aged 26, moved out to another barrio the previous year 
and is studying, although Eva visits him to help with the domestic work. The father of 
her children is an alcoholic but gives them some money. Eva keeps two chickens for 
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eggs. They own various domestic items such as a radio, food processor, television, 
fridge and electric oven. The house is on one floor with five rooms and is made from 
zinc and wood. To protect against landslides, Eva makes and clears out channels 
around the house. Eva collaborates with some of her neighbours to petition to be 
included in the resettlement plan, but says that in general people in the barrio don’t 
work together. (Repeat interviews March 2010)  
High asset household 
Julian is 53, and lives in a two storey brick house in the Altos de Estancia risk zone. 
He lives with his wife, two children who are nineteen and twelve and one grand-
daughter. Both he and his wife work, while his eldest daughter works when she is not 
studying at university, selling school uniforms in a clothes shop. His wife works as a 
domestic help around three days a week. Despite having had only primary 
education, Julian progressed from working in construction to working for a timber 
exportation firm, and then for a chemicals firm. However, he had had to leave after 
an industrial accident the previous year, and now worked as a contractor doing 
maintenance work. He had been paying into a social security fund, although 
payments to compensate for his accident had not yet materialised, while they pay 
into a social security fund for his wife. He had bought the lot in the mid-1990s – 
moving in from rental accommodation - and built his own house, paying off the 
quota in parts (with interest). When his barrio was legalised he was able to get 
formal title to the house. He and his wife were looking to get a loan from a savings 
fund against the land title in order to be able to move to a new house. They paid for 
electricity and water as well as a fixed telephone line. Julian was close to the 
leadership of the local Junta de Accion Communal (literally Community Action 
Board, or the locally-elected community organisation) and had been asked to stand 
for president, although he declined. Vocal in community meetings and with state 
officials, he refused inclusion in the resettlement programme and was lobbying the 
institutions to have the full value of his house recompensed before he would move. 
(Interview 01.03.10).  
This section has indicated how socio-economic status and political categorisation 
combined to influence the exposure and sensitivity of households to landslide risk 
across three risk zones. The section has presented findings from the research to show 
how poverty inhibited access to resettlement programmes, and compounded the 
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sensitivity of those still inhabiting the zones (although this was also underwritten by 
political decisions not to mitigate risk in these areas and to prohibit livelihoods 
activities which could also protect against risk, such as housing improvement). The 
research indicated that, where also politically excluded, the very poorest were most 
disadvantaged. The section then illustrated through a set of case studies from 
different asset groupings some of the processes through which poverty and political 
marginalisation are linked. The following section takes this forward, examining how 
these processes are embedded in social and institutional relationships which are 
highly contingent and, for the poorest, highly fragile.  
7.3.ii Transforming risk: informal urban livelihoods in social and institutional 
context 
This section analyses how the structures and relationships underpinning people’s 
livelihoods both enabled and constrained their ability to access opportunities to 
change the risks they face (on the basis of the meanings and identities discussed in 
the last chapter). The section shows how household capitals were not substitutable, 
equivalent and strategically managed to cope with risk, as assets approaches to 
livelihoods and vulnerability might imply, but shaped by the networks in which 
people were embedded, and the power relations within these. The section examines 
the three most important facets of livelihoods that emerged from the research as key 
to households’ abilities to reshape risk: the ability to leverage financial capital, to 
mobilise social networks and to negotiate the local institutional context.  
i. Leveraging financial capital   
Across all three asset classes interviewed, and as the previous section showed, a 
critical factor in re-shaping households’ ability to cope with landslide-related risks 
(whether ‘autonomously’ or through state channels and whether in accordance with 
or at odds with state-based risk assessments) was the accumulation of financial 
capital. Unlike other studies of ‘coping’ actions in urban environments (Jabeen, 
Johnson, and Allen 2010) there was little evidence in this study of households 
diversifying employment in order to leverage financial capital. Households and key 
informants reported major constraints to finding work: security concerns, lack of 
skills, the stigma of living in Ciudad Bolivar (still regarded as an insecure zone rife 
with delinquency by many in Bogota) and the need for social connections (discussed 
further below). In a high number of cases, security concerns meant one adult 
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member of a household stayed at home to watch the property and be with other 
family members, especially as high risk areas were perceived as fostering greater 
delinquency. The following case from Altos de Estancia illustrates how these factors 
combined to perpetuate poverty and vulnerability.  
The family, with six children, bought the plot and then moved to another part of 
Colombia. They moved back to the zone after they had heard about the official 
census for inclusion in the resettlement programme, but still missed the census. They 
now lived in overcrowded conditions in a house fabricated of plastic sheeting, 
petitioning risk management agencies on the basis of their title papers. The mother 
described how when it rained, water came up to their knees. They had no family 
nearby so nowhere else to stay. The husband worked in construction as it was where 
unskilled labour was needed, but he didn’t bring in enough money for the family. His 
wife didn’t want to go out to work as she was worried about the security of leaving 
the children alone. (Interview 08.01.2010).  
Where people were able to transform the risks they faced it was principally by taking 
informal loans and receiving state assistance and, in a handful of cases, saving. The 
following examples from the Brisas de Volador risk zone show how this enabled 
particular households (both original settlers of ‘medium’ asset status) to manage the 
fact of still living in a landslide risk zone, having been unable to enter the 
resettlement programme: 
Lucia lived at the bottom of the barrio, in a one-floor brick house, with her husband 
and two children. To do repairs to stabilise the house, at a cost of 800 thousand 
pesos, she took a loan from her employer which was then deducted from her salary. 
The loan came with interest. Lucia reported earning 25 thousand pesos a day and 
her husband, when he had work, earned around the same (Interview 09.01.10). 
 
Luz was one of the original settlers of the Brisas zone, having bought the house in 
2000, and had fully paid off the original loan for the plot. She and her family were 
one of only two families encountered in Brisas who had moved out into rental 
accommodation because the living conditions had become so bad. She worked three-
four days a week as a domestic help in family houses, but her husband wasn’t 
working. The cost of the rental house and service costs (they had never paid for 
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electricity in the risk zone) exceeded her salary, however. In addition, they received 
a state subsidy (Interview 12.03.10).  
As the first example shows, the nature of employment was critical to the ability to 
take loans, with more permanent employers a potential source of finance81. Social 
contacts played a vital role in securing loans as well as work (which was mainly 
procured through word of mouth). Repeat interviews with one family in Brisas de 
Volador were revealing of these dynamics. Early in 2010, the family – three sisters 
and one brother and their families – were going through the paperwork necessary to 
complete the requirements of the resettlement programme:    
By March, the family needed to get proof of payment from the public services 
companies, which was being held back by a credit F [the brother] had taken out with 
the electricity company Codensa to pay for a hi-fi and TV and which now needed to 
be paid off. He had negotiated with the company to pay it off in three parts. F’s 
sister T had asked her uncle for help, and was thinking of asking women who she 
worked with to help. She asked me about taking out a formal credit, but said that she 
had never got involved in this kind of thing, and was unsure what papers she would 
need. The oldest sister Y meanwhile had got another job in a different kitchen 
through a family contact, although the kitchen had said that they couldn’t take T on 
as well as they didn’t take sisters. F didn’t want to help T with her work as a street 
seller because the police were hounding her. T had called an organisation her other 
brother was involved in, in the dress-making business, but they said she would have 
to take a test before passing them her CV. Later in March, T said she thought that F 
would get the money from a friend. (Repeat Interviews March 2010)  
The importance of stable work and the social networks gained through such 
employment was underlined when, later in the year, a landslide affected the family’s 
house. Sister O, who had regular employment in an NGO, described how she was 
able to move out of the family home, but her younger sister T – a street seller – 
remained behind: 
                                                          
81
 The precarious nature of work – with many survey respondents in daily paid, casual employment – 
also restricted people’s ability to participate in state programmes and in community and 
neighbourhood organisations. The problem of getting ‘permisos’ was widely cited as a block to 
attending meetings, even for those on supposedly ‘permanent’ contracts. One interviewee now living 
in the Renacer project recalled how she was sacked from her job in a restaurant after asking for time 
off to go and get the papers she needed for the housing subsidy (Interview 01.03.10).  
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O described how she had a fear of paying rent, but how at 3am one night another 
pole fell in. “I heard a horrible thing….like a tremor, it almost had us buried; there 
was only the table between us and the kitchen. I grabbed the children and got them 
out as best as I could. I phoned a woman who I knew as her child goes to the 
Foundation [where O works] and asked if she could lend me money and that same 
day I came and looked for a house” It took O a week to find a house, which meant 
taking that time off work. Eventually, another woman at the Foundation told her 
there was a house free opposite the Foundation. O can’t pay the rent and the 
services, and is getting help from the Foundation. The owner of the house left her a 
microwave and a fridge which she is also paying off in small amounts. Despite being 
warned of the risk by DPAE officials, T stayed in the risk zone. Her work as a street 
seller was erratic due to police operations while she had failed to get work through 
her sisters. Although she had called a catering organisation her brother used to 
work for, they informed her she needed to go and take a test before she could be 
considered for work. (Interviews March 20 2010 and July 2010)  
ii. Mobilising social networks 
Social contacts were vital in many cases to people’s ability to move away from the 
risk zones, both through the resettlement project and of their own accord, and 
physically mitigate risks where necessary. The case of Mariana – a former inhabitant 
of the Cerros de Diamante community in the Altos de Estancia zone – epitomised the 
role that these networks could play in facilitating resettlement:    
Mariana had lived in her new house for four years. Before moving to the 
resettlement site she said she had a good job and was even working on Sundays. Her 
employer’s friends got her the new plot, it was the only one that met the Caja de 
Vivienda’s specifications for being resettled to used rather than new housing. She 
managed to bring some of the materials from her old house over to the new site, but 
they were stolen from her new plot. Another person evacuated from the zone helped 
her to make the floor and put the house up, while a friend lent her one million pesos 
(around two months full time wages in domestic employment) to build the house at 
5% interest. (Interview 19.03.10)   
For those who were unable to move away, managing landslide risk in the zones 
through cleaning gullies and putting in stairs and drainage channels was also 
dependent on networks between neighbours, particularly ties among older settlers. In 
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Caracoli, one family complained that changing the poles that held up their houses, 
and that became damp after rainfall, was difficult as it brought conflict with 
neighbours. Another household reported that putting in contention walls behind the 
house depended on agreement with the neighbours (Interviews 18.03.10 and 
01.08.10).   
However, as other studies of social capital have highlighted (Cleaver 2005), 
horizontal networks between those of the same status could also be fragile and easily 
exhausted. One family in Brisas de Volador reported staying with friends or relatives 
at night, when landslides often occurred, but that this was only possible until the 
friends or relatives got tired of it (Interview 20.07.10). Attempts to use social 
networks could also fail (as T’s attempts to find work through her siblings in the 
Brisas de Volador case above showed)82.  
iii. The local politics of access 
This final section shows how community-level ties shaped access to institutions, in 
particular the state resettlement programme from high risk areas. It shows how local 
politics and power relations mediated people’s ability to transform risk.  
As alluded to in some of the vignettes above, formally-elected community 
organisations – the Juntas de Accion Communal (JAC) – were pivotal to negotiating 
access to the resettlement programme. JACs were key institutions for risk 
management agencies, who disseminated information and organised community 
meetings through them, while, as the cases in the previous section showed, JACs 
could assist petitions for access. JACs provided letters verifying residency in the 
neighbourhood which were asked for as part of the official process. In all three risk 
zones, JACs were reported to charge for this (in Caracoli, informants said this cost 
around 5-10 thousand pesos). Where households had no access to a JAC, it was 
difficult to obtain such documents. In the Brisas de Volador risk area, for example, 
there was reportedly no JAC: the junta in the neighbourhood above did not consider 
the area under its remit, and residents reported that they were unable to ally 
themselves with the neighbourhood below as, although the JAC leader was 
supportive, they were not legalised and the other neighbourhood was. Families 
reported difficulties getting the necessary papers. The case also reflects the fact that 
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 Conversely, the collapse of social networks was also cited by newer migrants into the risk zones as 
a reason for their seeking shelter in such areas.  
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risk areas became – in all three neighbourhoods – stigmatised zones within the wider 
community. In the Altos de Estancia area, neighbouring community leaders said 
their communities believed that delinquency had increased with the establishment of 
the risk zone, and inhabitants of the risk zone complained people from neighbouring 
communities not in the risk zone threw rubbish and water into their area, and wanted 
them to leave. In addition, uncertainty about administrative boundaries and the 
incomplete ‘mapping’ of informal zones (discussed in Chapter 5) excluded certain 
groups: in Caracoli, a group of inhabitants at the top of the risk zones remained 
apparently undefined in terms of their inclusion in the Caracoli barrio or 
neighbouring Santa Viviana.  
The case of public service debts in Caracoli also illustrated how ineffective – even 
predatory – local institutions could undermine attempts to manage risk. Many 
households reported being in debt to the water company back-dated over several 
years, even though water and drainage had never been formally provided to most of 
the neighbourhood (legalisation of water for zones not at high risk was taking place 
at the time of the research). In a corruption scandal the previous leader of the junta 
had ‘sold’ the names of everyone in the barrio to be included on the list for 
installation. Although the individual was reportedly now in jail, the debts still stood. 
One woman – a 26 year old owner living at the top of the barrio who was unable to 
work herself because of an accident, although her husband had casual work in 
construction – had been told she had debts to the company of 430 thousand pesos83 
which she needed to clear before being able to access the resettlement programme 
(17.03.10).   
The operations of local security and paramilitary organisations also influenced the 
organisation of the juntas and independent attempts at community organising. In the 
Brisas de Volador zone, in the section known as Bella Flor, which was under threat 
of eviction, inhabitants reported that paramilitaries were active, charging for the 
provision of security. Threats against the junta meant that it ceased to operate, 
leaving people without a formal channel for representation. In Altos de Estancia, a 
former community leader reported how attempts in her neighbourhood to devise a 
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 This was roughly equivalent to two months full time salary for domestic employees, positions 
regarded as good jobs in the zones. Unskilled men typically took on construction work, which was 
lower paid.  
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community-led housing project as an alternative to state resettlement programmes 
foundered when local groups attempted to extort the money being saved for it 
(Interview 10.03.10).   
In many cases, therefore, the institutional channels which people relied on to 
leverage access were limited to individual petitioning and working in small bands of 
neighbours. In the Brisas de Volador medium risk zone two initiatives to petition the 
state for inclusion in the resettlement programme were underway by two groups of 
just a few neighbouring families; living only a few blocks from each other, they were 
unaware of each other’s activities. Only in Altos de Estancia, where whole 
communities were resettled, where there was a history of community organisation 
and leadership forged through the era of legalisation and a legal process had 
formalised dialogue between state risk management agencies and community 
leaders, did people work through the juntas. Even then, newer settlers in the high risk 
zones were isolated or had their own modes of organisation (such as displaced 
people’s groups) and some remaining groups of older inhabitants complained that 
they were unrepresented.   
These cases also highlight how state processes of resettlement re-shaped the local 
institutional context for people, with resettlement socially divisive within ‘at risk’ 
communities and between those in risk zones and those not. The community leader 
of Caracoli described how resettlement had brought disunity as new people had 
moved into cleared areas (interview 22.03.2010). In addition, independent attempts 
at community organising – such as initiatives for community-based resettlement 
projects – reported little support from state institutions. In the only successful case 
across the zones of such a project – the Renacer initiative – the leader of the group 
reported feeling stigmatised by state agencies for ‘politicising’ risk management and 
giving strength to other community leaders (Rojas Pulido 2004).  
7.4 Conclusion 
In answer to the first research question posed in Chapter 1, whether approaches to 
risk in informal, urban settlements needed re-thinking and how, this chapter has 
suggested two key extensions. First, in line with broader critiques of assets-based 
livelihoods approaches to vulnerability, the chapter has shown how social and 
institutional relationships for accessing critical resources are key to transforming 
164 
 
‘assets’, including opportunities in the social and political domain. The analysis in 
this chapter complements that of Chapter 5. Chapter 5 showed how state risk 
assessments, and the ‘categorical matrix’ embedded in risk assessment that 
engendered new forms of exclusion and inclusion, shaped the institutional 
possibilities to remake vulnerability through mitigation works and resettlement 
programmes. This chapter has added to this by demonstrating how institutional 
processes at different scales and across the broader state apparatus have also opened 
up or closed off possibilities for transformation (whether through resettlement, in 
situ mitigation or migration out of the zones). Further, it highlights how social and 
political connections at the household and community scale define the possibilities 
for households to reshape their livelihoods, and their vulnerability, in ways 
commensurate with the local meanings and identities discussed in Chapter 6. The 
chapter indicates that for the poorest groups these social and institutional ties were 
the most contingent and fragile, and depended on access to more powerful and well-
resourced actors. In this regard, employers and local political actors were central.  
The second key contribution of the chapter in answer to research question one is to 
show how a stronger emphasis on political agency and institutions is needed to make 
sense of the vulnerability of the inhabitants in Bogota’s risk zones. Again, this 
complements the analysis in Chapter 5 with a more in-depth examination of the 
political agency of vulnerable groups and the role of political institutions beyond risk 
management agencies. The chapter shows how the types of political action taken by 
households were varied and opportunistic, and depended on formal and informal 
channels (including, interestingly legal avenues for contestation). The lines between 
‘civil’ and ‘political’ society were indeed, as Corbridge notes, blurred (Corbridge et 
al. 2005). In the particular urban context of the study, the chapter further shows how 
insecurity and the difficult politics of community organising in Colombian culture 
and political life affected possibilities for collective action, although collective 
responses to risk did occur (whether in protests or community-based housing co-
operatives).   
The second research question posed in Chapter 1 was, how do states control for risk 
and vulnerability in informal, urban settlements? The chapter stresses that 
understanding the forms of political categorisation described in Chapter 5 is critical 
to understanding the dynamics of risk and vulnerability, and that the imperative is to 
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understand how political categorisation and socio-economic forces function together 
to influence outcomes for people. This chapter then adds to the analysis of risk 
assessment and societal responses to risk assessment presented so far in three ways. 
Firstly, it suggests – in line with Chapter 3 – that to understand how risk and 
vulnerability is, in effect, managed, it is necessary to understand not only the actions 
of risk management agencies but the influence of broader shifts in state institutions. 
Second, this chapter shows how state influence on risk and vulnerability – both 
negative and positive - is mediated by the sets of social and institutional relations in 
which people participate. Finally, it suggested the need to account for variation by 
social group and wealth ranking and for different forms of agency, from strategic 
resistance to co-operation and passive ambivalence.   
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Chapter 8 Conclusion: 
Rethinking Urban Risk and Adaptation 
 
8.1 Introduction 
This study has made two key, over-arching contributions to existing scholarship on 
urban risk and adaptation. First, it has provided a new empirical study of risk and 
vulnerability in informal, urban settlements, sites which have been under-studied in 
the disaster risk and adaptation literature to date. Second, it develops new conceptual 
thinking about the nature of risk and vulnerability in an informal, urban context. A 
critical argument of the thesis is that in order to make sense of the drivers, processes 
and outcomes of climate related risks in informal, urban settlements, it is critical to 
understand the politics of risk and vulnerability. In particular, the thesis calls for 
greater attention to the politics of risk assessment, or the ways in which risk as 
defined by powerful (in this case state) actors includes or excludes other visions of 
what risk is, who is at risk and who is responsible for risk. In turn, the ways in which 
urban inhabitants respond to risk reflects their responses to the visions implicit in 
risk assessment, the relationships this engenders and the access opened up or closed 
down by the new institutional arrangements it mobilises. This politics of risk 
assessment also plays out on political terrain, shaped by a broader state politics of 
democratisation and by the political agency of urban inhabitants. The analysis 
provokes us to revisit what different urban actors are adapting to, how they are doing 
so and who is able to transform the risks faced by low-income, informal urban 
communities. 
The conclusion reviews the research questions posed in Chapter 1, highlighting the 
main findings and further original contributions of the research. It then discusses the 
implications for policies to manage landslide risk in the informal settlements of 
Bogota and for urban disaster risk management and adaptation policies more 
generally. Finally, the chapter ends with suggestions for future research.  
8.2  Do approaches to risk need re-thinking in informal, urban settlements 
and, if so, how?     
The Introduction (Chapter 1) argued that informal, urban settlements manifest 
distinct forms of vulnerability to climate-related risk that have so far lacked due 
consideration in scholarship concerned with urban disasters and environmental 
change. While the nature of informality remains contested in the relevant literatures, 
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and varies across contexts, informal livelihoods are in part characterised by 
particular social practices and governance relations which potentially influence 
social vulnerabilities to risk. In accounting for these dimensions of vulnerability, 
new challenges arise, I argue, which suggest the need to re-think existing approaches 
to understanding climate-related risks, and the methods by which we do so.    
Chapter 2 then provided an in-depth review of contemporary approaches to urban 
risk. It argued that the bulk of urban scholarship on climate risk replicates a wider 
trend in the disasters and climate change literature – and in related policy approaches 
– to characterise risk as hazard, and thereby map the impact of physical events on 
particular social variables. This ‘impacts-based’ view of risk neglects questions 
about how social institutions and livelihoods mediate who is vulnerable to risk and 
how (Romero Lankao and Qin 2011). The chapter suggested that approaches to 
urban climate risk that do take these questions of social vulnerability as their starting 
point nevertheless neglect important dynamics of the social context and that these 
may be particularly pertinent to exploring the nature of risk in informal urban 
settlements. Drawing on wider debates about the nature of livelihoods, the chapter 
suggested Assets-Vulnerability approaches needed to better account for local 
experiences of risk (the ‘what’ of adaptation) and the role of meaning, identity and 
cultural practice in household decision-making. In addition, it advocated a move 
from a view of vulnerability as a condition of asset ownership, towards seeing it as 
the product of social and political relations, and the way these govern a lack of 
entitlements (van Dijk 2011). Where accounts of urban vulnerability to risk have 
addressed how particular institutional contexts shape vulnerability, they have 
concentrated on the formation of social and political assets in the context of different 
types of political regime (Pelling 2003). This work can be extended, first, by taking a 
broader view of livelihood practices, and, second, through a stronger focus on 
governance at the urban scale, and in the context of urban informality. In particular, 
the chapter argued for a more dedicated focus on the politics and practices of urban 
states in such areas, and the construction of state-based knowledge and expertise. It 
pointed to the need to connect analysis of access relations – as the basis for a more 
relational approach to livelihoods (Haan and Zoomers 2005) – with analysis of the 
ways in which state risk assessments mobilise new institutional channels and frames 
for managing risk. In these ways, the chapter argued that approaches to risk and 
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vulnerability needed to focus more on the political as well as the social production of 
vulnerability, and the political agency of those affected.     
Chapter 3 set out a new conceptual frame for thinking about risk in informal 
settlements as socially and politically embedded. It drew together scholarship from 
approaches to Science and Technology Studies concerned with the tacit framings and 
assumptions of scientific risk assessments, political science and urban studies. The 
chapter argued for stronger engagement with an approach to risk as a form of 
knowledge constructed and applied by particular actors in ways constitutive of the 
nature of risk itself. In particular, it argued that the idea of co-production, as 
developed in Science and Technology Studies, provided a useful conceptual avenue 
for understanding risk as both materially and socially produced (Jasanoff 2004). 
However, to understand co-production in the informal, urban context its 
understanding of expertise needed to be coupled with a stronger understanding of the 
workings of the urban state. Here, the chapter developed an analysis of state practice 
using work from urban studies, political science and theories of governmentality 
(Roy 2005; Zeiderman 2012; Gupta 2012). Finally, it examined how, through this 
lens, we might therefore understand societal responses to risk assessment. It 
concluded that theories in Science and Technology Studies opened up routes for 
understanding responses to risk in ways so far unconsidered in the literature on urban 
risk and vulnerability, namely as responses to the inclusions and exclusions inherent 
in risk assessments and the ways in which these impacted on livelihoods (Wynne 
1996). However, critical engagement with theorisations of agency in response to 
state power and in the specific conditions of urban informality were necessary to 
frame questions about the modes of and possibilities for societal responses to risk 
assessment.  
Chapter 4 discussed how new, more open and flexible methods were necessary to 
explore the approaches advocated in Chapters 2 and 3. Using such methods, the 
subsequent three chapters (5-7) then put the conceptual propositions of Chapters 2 
and 3 to work using a case study of the landslide risk management programme in 
Bogota, Colombia, and its operations in three informally-settled landslide risk zones.  
Chapter 5 concluded that the occurrence of landslides and the ongoing vulnerability 
of certain groups in formally-designated risk zones could not be fully understood 
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without accounting for political influences on risk assessment and management. 
These political influences were rooted in the particular history and culture of 
Bogota’s urban transformation, with particular contests over the formalisation of 
new settlements (which affected who was held responsible for mitigating risk) and 
conceptions of urban citizenship and rights (which influenced who was defined as ‘at 
risk’ and included or excluded from new state programmes). The chapter showed 
how risk was co-produced with this politics of informality, creating new inclusions 
and exclusions. The analysis probed how the state’s classification of households as 
‘at risk’ was embedded in a particular political-bureaucratic matrix with its own 
antecedents in the state politics of the time. This functioned to obscure and exclude 
the ways in which risks were produced, not only in the biophysical domain, but also 
in the social context of livelihoods. The chapter then highlighted how the 
vulnerability of certain groups could not be explained without also probing how state 
risk management agencies – the ‘social’ – functioned; how state agency was 
exercised through particular flexible, contingent and contradictory practices (such as 
‘unmapping’ (Roy 2005)) and how the networks of institutions at work in risk zones 
influenced the state exercise of power. As an approach to risk, therefore, the chapter 
showed how – far from being a physical condition or event alone – risk cannot be 
understood outside of the political relations that define it. As an approach to social 
vulnerability, the chapter showed how the continuous creation of vulnerability was 
enmeshed in the institutional context of the risk zones, and the state knowledge and 
politics that dominated this.   
Chapter 6 went on to show how urban residents responded to risk in the context of 
the values and meanings inherent in risk assessments, and in response to the 
institutional practices that accompany them. In the informal, urban context it 
illustrated how people’s response to landslide risk was framed by: their own 
concerns to secure appropriate housing and shelter; their understandings of their 
status and rights as urban citizens; their abilities to cope with and manage the 
impacts of landslides; and their judgements of state practices and expertise. 
Approaches to risk as hazard as well as existing approaches to understanding 
vulnerability in urban livelihoods overlook the ways in which these ‘filters’ of 
meaning affect decision-making in response to risk. Further, the chapter argued that 
the analysis called into question ‘what’ risks people in informal, urban areas were 
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adapting to. A narrow focus on responses to risk as biophysical risk alone misses the 
reality of responses to environmental change, and the way adaptation pathways are 
shaped by responses to environmental changes in the context of changes and risks to 
livelihoods (Forsyth and Evans 2013) and the politics of institutional relationships to 
expertise (Wynne 1996).    
Chapter 7 concluded that a re-think of approaches to urban vulnerability to climate-
related risks was necessary on three, inter-related grounds. The chapter showed how 
the inhabitants of risk zones used their agency to try and reshape the risks they faced, 
and the barriers to doing so. It therefore argued, first, for an approach to risk that 
emphasises access to institutions as an important determinant of vulnerability. 
However, it argued that access should be viewed not simply as a function of what 
people have, or the social group to which they belong, but also in terms of the 
relationships of power in which they are situated. Second, it highlighted how 
people’s agency in response to risk was often contingent on, and forged through, 
personal relationships and networks. Finally, it stressed the importance of the 
political domain to people’s agency, but showed how this was shaped by high-level 
political change as well as local institutional structures.  
In sum, where existing approaches to risk – across the impacts-based and 
vulnerability traditions – treat the ‘what’ of risk as a given, the thesis has pointed to 
the importance of understanding the mutual construction of the natural and social in 
the urban context. This means placing the ways in which risk is defined and 
operationalised within their historical and political context and understanding how 
risks are shaped by social and political relationships of power. This leads us to 
understand how risk assessments mobilise particular visions of risk and exclude 
others, thereby defining who is at risk, or how risk is to be addressed in certain ways.  
A re-politicisation of our approaches to disaster and climate change risk in urban 
areas entails understanding the socio-political context in which vulnerability 
emerges, the particular forms of urban governance and expertise operating in 
informal areas and the agency that poor urban communities can wield in response. 
This raises new questions for theories of urban adaptation about what we are 
adapting to, but also who is adapting and how. In the case examined for this thesis, 
different forms of adaptation are occurring both at the state and community level and 
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different adaptive responses are manifest within communities. The thesis suggests 
both a stronger emphasis on ‘politics as adaptation’ and moving away from in situ 
models of asset holding to a better understanding of the social and institutional 
relations of access which shape adaptive capacities.   
8.3 How do states control for risk and vulnerability in informal, urban 
settlements? 
As Chapter 1 posited, the impact of the state goes beyond planned risk management 
interventions, and the actions of state actors have intended and unintended effects. In 
addition, the question of how states control for risk and vulnerability allows for both 
positive and negative effects to be explored. Citing both vulnerability analysts and 
urban scholars, Chapter 1 underlined the importance of understanding the 
governance relationships that influence the status and development of informal urban 
settlements to assessing risks and vulnerabilities in these areas. Contemporary urban 
studies scholarship concerned with urban informality has stressed how states are not 
‘outside’ the construction of informality, but deeply implicated in it (Roy 2005; 
Varley 2013). Impetus for the research question also comes from the fields of 
disaster risk and adaptation, where questions are increasingly being asked about the 
role of risk governance itself in shaping vulnerability but, as yet, there is little 
analysis of this at the scale of local government (DKKV 2012). Chapter 2 then 
showed how existing approaches to risk and vulnerability had so far little 
emphasised the role of the state, the nature of state practice and the ways in which 
the knowledge and expertise mobilised by states, such as risk assessments, are 
arrived at and used. 
As set out in the previous section, Chapter 3 suggested that the question could not be 
answered without understanding the nature of and inter-linkages between risk 
assessment and the state and its politics. The chapter used debates in Science and 
Technology studies (STS) to shed light on how knowledge about risk might be 
influenced by the social context in which it is produced (Jasanoff and Wynne 1998; 
Lane, Landström, and Whatmore 2011), turning to the idea of co-production as a 
framework which stresses the importance of analysing the emergence of the social 
alongside the scientific, and the role of power and culture (Jasanoff 2004). To then 
unpack the nature of urban state governance in informal settings, I examined debates 
about state practice in urban studies and amongst governmentality theorists, 
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concluding that while these provided new accounts of state action they could not 
account for the political construction of expertise (ibid.). Finally, the chapter 
concluded that in order to understand the state politics of risk, it was necessary to 
extend existing scholarship about the nature of societal agency in response to risk 
assessment, which shapes how we understand the limits to state power.    
The case study analysis of Chapters 5 to 7 then exemplified how this theoretical 
framing explained how state risk management measures wittingly and unwittingly 
influenced the occurrence of risk and vulnerability in informal urban settlements, in 
the sense of both mitigating and exacerbating effects. In showing how landslide risk 
assessments were effectively co-produced with the values, culture, norms and 
practices of the state in Bogota, Chapter 5 demonstrated how the technical culture of 
risk management that arose in Bogota’s political history excluded local perspectives 
on risk and analysis of the social drivers of risk. Further, it concluded that 
assumptions about the social and political context made during risk assessments – 
despite their purported technical nature – could be linked to ongoing landslide 
events. In addition, ongoing processes of inclusion and exclusion from the risk 
management programme – which affected which households and groups were 
exposed and sensitive to landslides – were influenced by the coupling of risk 
assessment with a particular mode of classification of population groups, informed 
by state imperatives that lay beyond the purposes of risk management alone. The 
second part of the chapter showed the effects of state efforts to manage risk could 
not be understood without understanding how state operations were, in practice, 
flexible, contingent and often contradictory and how the operations of risk 
management agencies converged or diverged with the actions of other state and local 
actors.  
Chapters 6 and 7 showed how state control of risks and vulnerability was mediated 
by the response of societal actors to the values, meanings and practices embedded in 
risk assessments. The politics of this relationship generated deep ambivalence among 
communities about the nature of the state project. Nevertheless, Chapter 7 concluded 
that the agency of households and individuals to remake their livelihoods was highly 
constrained. However, opportunities for agency were not uniform and avenues for 
contestation were in part opened by the trajectories of political reform that have 
accompanied the project of risk management.        
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The thesis therefore makes a new theoretical contribution in linking debates about 
risk and vulnerability to those about state practice and expertise in the context of 
urban informality. It takes forward existing work applying post-structural 
scholarship to the practice of disaster and climate risk management in two ways. 
First, in applying insights from STS to understand the way in which expert 
knowledge is brought together and applied at the interface of the natural and social 
worlds, revealing how risk assessments thereby mobilise new forms of inclusion and 
exclusion. Second, in broadening our understanding of the ‘subjects’ of risk, their 
meanings, values and possibilities for agency and the ways in which this agency is 
shaped by the visions of risk inherent in risk assessments. The thesis emphasises 
how these processes are informed by a particular politics of informality, and contests 
over citizenship, rights and livelihoods in informal urban settlements. Further, it 
connects livelihoods debates in development studies with new scholarship in STS, 
showing how access relations are shaped by the politics of defining risk itself, and 
the new inclusions and exclusions this creates.  
8.4 Policy implications 
In Bogota, recent attempts to improve climate change preparedness in the city have 
led to an intensification of the disaster risk management model examined in this 
thesis. However, the findings of the thesis offer synergies with other analyses of the 
disaster management system that stress that without understanding and acting on the 
drivers of social vulnerability in the city, disaster managers will face the ongoing 
exposure and sensitivity of populations in risk zones (Lampis and Rubiano 2012). In 
part this necessitates grappling with how to protect people against risk whilst also 
protecting their livelihoods (including the value and meaning these have for people), 
whether through more sensitive resettlement policies or the introduction of insurance 
policies (as has been done in the Colombian city of Manizales), but also in involving 
local populations in decisions about mitigation measures. Small experiments to this 
effect exist, but have not been scaled-up (for more on this, see 
http://www.bartlett.ucl.ac.uk/dpu/mapping -environmental-change/dialogues-on-the-
move/bogota). A further implication is that state actors begin to recognise the role of 
state practice itself in mitigating and exacerbating risk, although improved practice 
and the convergence of state agencies around the same, existing paradigm without 
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acknowledgement of the implications for livelihoods and vulnerability would 
undermine the purpose of risk management.    
In informal, urban contexts, the thesis adds weight to calls by numerous authors to 
strive for ‘transformative’ climate adaptation policies and practices that tackle 
underlying power structures and injustices and respect the livelihoods needs and 
practices of the most marginalised groups (Pelling 2011; Allen, Castan-Broto, and 
Johnson 2011). A first step to doing this, as Ribot argues, is to ensure that 
vulnerability assessment, in its fullest sense of analysing the causal structures of 
vulnerability, is an integral part of adaptation practice (Ribot 2011). 
At the level of global policy debates, the findings of the thesis add weight to calls for 
multi-stakeholder governance in the risk sector (see IPCC 2012) but suggest in 
addition that there is a need to examine how risk is framed and communicated in 
such fora by different actors (given the different approaches to risk outlined here as 
well as the relationships of power which are carried into such interactions). 
Improved deliberation may also be insufficient without acknowledging the broader 
structural and developmental factors that shape people’s ability to cope with and 
prepare for risk – a point that vulnerability theorists have long stressed (Blaikie et al. 
1994). 
This study also touches on the use of particular policy measures that are being 
advocated as urban ‘adaptation measures’ such as resettlement, land use zoning and 
building control. Again, the importance of this study is to suggest that we understand 
how risks are defined as the basis for these measures and by whom, and how this 
legitimises action by particular actors in particular ways. In the case of resettlement 
policies in the face of environmental risks, like those examined in this thesis, the 
literature stresses the (valid) need to accommodate people’s livelihoods and ensure 
proper consent (World Bank 2011). However, a further important question is who is 
defined as ‘at risk’ and included in resettlement programmes, how they are defined 
and by whom, and how this affects efforts to manage risk and vulnerability.  
8.5 Suggestions for future research 
Based on the research, I suggest five avenues for further study. First, the theoretical 
approach can be used to examine a broader set of case studies with an explicit focus 
on urban climate change adaptation policies. Since the thesis research was 
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conceived, a ‘wave’ of adaptation policy-making has taken place in cities of the 
developing world. However, little attention has been paid to how and why the form 
of adaptation policies, and the risk assessments that underlie them, might differ 
across contexts. Here, co-production might again provide a useful frame to 
interrogate the intertwined social and natural production of risk, alongside further 
analysis of the state practices that are shaping adaptation policies and planning. A 
more dedicated focus on climate change adaptation would raise additional questions 
about the use of often highly uncertain climate models and the process of ‘fixing’ 
them for planning purposes than it has been possible to explore in this thesis.   
Second, the analysis of institutions presented here touches on the role of legal 
institutions and state bureaucracies in mediating vulnerability. While the workings 
and influence of these institutions are receiving attention in other fields (see Gupta 
on bureaucratic practice and poverty and Biehl on the role of the judiciary and health 
risks in Brazil: Gupta 2012; Biehl et al. 2012) there has been little in-depth 
exploration of their role in relation to environmental risk. 
Third, there is a need to explore how other dimensions of informal, urban livelihoods 
shape responses to risk and vulnerability. The fieldwork undertaken for this thesis 
pointed to the importance of mobility and social networks inside and outside risk 
zones to the management of risk. These aspects are not easily captured in 
quantitative frameworks for assessing vulnerability and merit further, dedicated 
qualitative investigation, even if quantitative proxies are then developed to allow for 
their measurement. 
Fourth, although a policy implication of the thesis is to favour multi-stakeholder 
governance models for risk management, there has been little comparative 
investigation of the nature of deliberation in these forms of institutional 
arrangements, and how competing values at different scales are addressed through 
multi-stakeholder participation. Applied to urban climate change adaptation in 
particular, this raises pertinent questions about lay engagement with climate models, 
and the need to bridge the gap in public perception between foreseeable and 
unforeseeable, past and future climate events.   
Fifth, and finally, there is a need to understand the resonances of this thesis for other 
theoretical frameworks for understanding risk and adaptation. For reasons briefly 
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outlined in Chapter 2, resilience theory (and recent work in urban political ecology, 
although this has had less purchase in debates about climate risk) was not used as the 
lens for this project. However, additional work should explore the implications of its 
findings for current debates in these traditions, extending existing efforts to unpack 
relationships between resilience and vulnerability perspectives (Miller et al. 2010; 
Scoones 2009) and complementing new work on the use of resilience perspectives in 
urban contexts (Béné et al. 2014; Ensor et al. 2013). 
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Annex 1: List of government interviewees  
 
Interview 
code 
 
Position 
Date of 
interview  
DO001 Resettlement officer for San Cristobel and Corinto district, 
Caja de Vivienda 
June 21 2010 
DO002 Legal advisor, Caja de Vivienda June 21 2010 
DO003 Former Director of Resettlement, Caja de Vivienda, (2004-
2007) and DPAE employee (1997-2003), Anthropologist 
June 23 2010 
DO004 Local management team, DPAE June 23 2010 
DO005 Social workers, Social Management Team, DPAE June 24 2010 
DO006 Consultant. Former employee of Secretaria Habitat with 
responsibility for resettlement policy (2000-2007), World 
Bank consultant for Latin America resettlement 
documentation project (2008 -) 
June 25 2010 
DO007 Customer Manager GeoIngenieria –  
1995-2006 Coordinator of Ladera programme in Territorial 
Management team, DPAE 
June 25 2010 
DO008 Officer, Caja de Vivienda June 26 2010 
DO009 Social Worker, Former Director Social Management Team, 
DPAE 1999 – 2008 
June 29 2010 
DO010 Caja de Vivienda, Ciudad Bolivar team, local office (Salon 
Communal Arborizador Alta) 
Field visit June 
30 2010 
DO011 Social workers responsible for resettlement, Altos de 
Estancia team, DPAE 
During field visit 
June 30 2010 
DO012 Head  – Social Management Team, Altos de Estancia, DPAE July 2 2010 
DO013 Technical Assistance Team, DPAE July 2 2010 
DO014 2002-2008 Head social team charged with evacuating 800 
families in Altos de Estancia, DPAE; then Caja de Vivienda 
official 
July 2 2010 
DO015 Advisor, Ministry Environment Jan 3 2010 
DO016 Head, Gestion Territorial, DPAE Jan 3 and 13 
2010 
DO017 Consultant, Secretaria Distrital de Ambiente (Environment 
Ministry)  
Jan 7 2010 
DO018 Social Worker, Altos de Estancia Management Team, DPAE Jan 13 2010 
DO019 Ministry of Environment representative on Altos de Estancia 
team 
Jan 13 2010 
DO020 Mapping team, DPAE Jan 13 2010 
DO021 Officer, Caja de Vivienda  Jan 14 2010 
DO022 Profesor, Universidad de los Andes, formerly part of district 
planning team 
Jan 14 2010 
DO023 Former Ciudad Bolivar Coordinator, DPAE 23 March 2010  
DO024 Officer, Secretaria de Desarrollo Comunitario 15 December 
2009 
DO025 Officer, Secretaria de Habitat 16 December 
2009 and Jan 18 
2010 
DO026 Disaster Management Specialist World Bank, formerly DPAE 
Director 2003 – Nov 2006 
10 April 2010 
178 
 
DO027 Disaster Risk Consultant Jan 12 2010 
DO028 Former Director DPAE 1998-2002 Jan 18 2010 
DO029 Director Legalisation and Barrio Improvement, District 
Planning Department 
Jan 18 2010 
DO030 Officer Responsible for Vigia Programme, DPAE Jan 18 2010 
DO031 Regional Disaster Risk Management Consultant Jan 18 2010 
DO032 Risk and disaster management specialist, Ministry 
Environment 
Nov 28 2009 
DO033 Former DPAE Technician 2009-2010 
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Annex 2: Semi-structured household survey 
 
NOMBRE DE ENTREVISTADOR 
 
FECHA Y HORA 
 
LOCALIDAD, UPZ, BARRIO, MANZANA, UBICACION 
A. DATOS DEL HOGAR 
1. Nombre y Apellido (opcional) 
2. Edad (años)     
3. Sexo     M     F 
4. ¿Cuál es su lugar de nacimiento? 
5. ¿Donde vivia antes de vivir aca? 
6. Que rol tiene en el hogar  
  1. Padre    2. Padre cabeza de familia   3. Madre   
  4. Madre cabeza de familia    5. Otro______________________ 
7. ¿Hace cuanto vive en esta casa? 
8. Su vivienda es:  
1.   Propía, totalmente pagada   
2.   Propía, la estan pagando   
3.   En arriendo   
4.   En subarriendo  
5.   De otra persona, sin pagar arriendo   
6.   Ocupante de hecho  
 
9. Tiene: 
1.   Escritura   
2.   Promesa de venta   
3.   Ningun papel de compra 
4.   No sabe   
5.   Otro…………………………………………………………………………… 
 
10. ¿Quienes comen y duermen habitualmente en el hogar? 
 1. Parentesco (identificar jefe de hogar) 
e.g. Esposo (a) / Compañera (o); hijo       
 
2. Sexo 
(M/F) 
3. Edad  
1.    
2.    
3.    
4.    
5.    
6.    
7.    
8.    
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11. ¿Cual es el material predominante de las paredes exteriores? 
1.   Bloque, ladrillo, piedra, madera pulida 
2.   Tapia pisada, adobe 
3.   Bahareque revocado 
4.   Bahareque sin revocar 
5.   Madera burda, tabla, tablón 
6.   Material prefabricado 
7.   Guadua, caña, esterilla, otro vegetal 
8.   Zinc, tela, lona, cartón, latas, desechos, plástico 
9.   Sin paredes 
 
12. ¿Cual es el material predominante de los pisos? 
1.  Mármol, parqué, madera pulida y lacada 
2.  Alfombra o tapete de pared a pared 
3.  Baldosa, vinilo, tableta, ladrillo, madera pulida 
4.  Madera burda, tabla, tablón, otro vegetal 
5.  Cemento, gravilla 
6.  Tierra, arena 
 
13. ¿Cuantos pisos tiene la casa? 
14. ¿Cuantos cuartos tiene la casa (inluyendo banos y cocina)? 
 
15.  ¿Cómo es la via que llega a la casa? 
1.  Pavimentada  
2.  De barro, viable para transporte 
3.  De barro, no viable para transporte 
4. Otro………………………………………………………………… 
 
 
B. DATOS SOCIO-ECONOMICOS 
16. Para las personas que han generado ingresos para el hogar en el ultimo año:  
Actividad de la persona  a. Las 
actividades se 
realiza: 
1. En casa     
2. En el barrio  
3. En el sector 
4. En otro sector 
de Bogota  
5. Fuera de 
Bogota 
b. Las 
actividades 
son: 
1. Permanente 
2. Por dias 
3. Casual (Por 
vacaciones, por       
temporadas) 
c. Cuánto 
gana en este 
empleo  
Por dia 
O por mes 
O por año 
(Nota el valor 
para lo que 
mas aplica) 
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17. En el ultimo año recibieron algun ingreso de: 
 Si / No Valor 
1. Arriendo de casa   
2. Arriendo de vehículos, maquinaria, 
equipo 
  
3. Fondo de pensión    
4. Otros ayudas o subsidios de 
instituciones públicas  
  
5. Algún ayuda proveniente de otros 
hogares o personas residentes en el país 
  
6. Otro   
 
18. ¿Ha recibido algun prestamo en el ultimo año? 
 No    Pase a 14. 
 Si     a. De que valor?  ……………………………………………. 
      b. De que persona o entidad? …………………………….. 
 
19. ¿Cuáles de los siguientes bienes posee este hogar? 
 1. Máquina lavadora de ropa  2. Nevera o enfriador  
 3. Equipo de sonido   4. Estufa eléctrica o a gas 
 5. Horno eléctrico o a gas   6. Liquadora   
 7. Máquina de coser   8. Televisor 
 9. VHS      10. DVD    
 11. Radio     12. Computador para uso del hogar 
 13. Motocicleta    14. Carro particular   
 15. Bicicleta   16. 
Otro………………………………………….. 
 
20. ¿Que niveles de educación tienen las personas en el hogar? 
1. Preescolar     
2. Básica primaria (1 a 
5) 
    
3. Básica secundaria y 
media (6 a 13) 
    
4. Técnico o 
tecnológico 
    
5. Universitaria sin 
título 
    
6. Universitaria con 
título 
    
7. Ninguno     
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21. Cuantos personas en el hogar: 
1. Sufren alguna 
enfermedad crónica 
(hipertensión arterial, 
diabetes, etc.) 
    
2. En el ULTIMO ANO 
tuvieron alguna 
enfermedad, accidente, 
problema odontológico 
o algún otro problema 
de salud que no haya 
implicado 
hospitalización 
    
3. Durante el ULTIMO 
ANO tuvieron que ser 
hospitalizado 
    
 
 
22. ¿Cuantos personas en el hogar estan vinculados al SISBEN?  
23. ¿Si no, porque? 
24. ¿De donde consiguen servicios que tiene la vivienda? 
 Públicos, comunales, privadas
   
Pagada   
Si / No 
1. Energía eléctrica   
2. Gas natural    
3. Acueducto   
4. Alcantarillado   
5. Recolección de 
basuras 
  
6. Teléfono fijo   
7. Ninguno de los 
anteriores 
  
 
25. Cuantos personas en el hogar hacen parte de alguna organización social o 
iniciativa de participación ciudadana: 
1. 
Ningun 
2. 
Comités 
locales 
3. 
Junta 
4. 
Reuniones 
comunales 
5. 
Acciones 
comunales 
regulares 
6. Acciones 
compartidas 
con los 
vecinos 
regulares 
6. Otro (por 
ejemplo, 
defensa civil, 
vigia 
ambiental, 
policia 
comunitaria) 
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C. RIESGO 
26. La vivienda esta clasificada como: 
1. En alto riesgo no-mitigable 2. En alto riesgo mitigable   
3. En riesgo medio   4. No sabe 
 
27. ¿Cuándo fue clasificada asi?    
28. ¿Cuándo se transladaron por aca sabian que podia presentar derrumbes / 
movemientos de la tierra aca? 
 No   
 Si   
        
29. ¿Han sentido los efectos de un derrumbe / de un movimiento de la tierra? 
       No    Pase a 32. 
       Si    Pase a 30. 
 
30. ¿Nos puede describir que paso y con que frecuencia?  
¿Como afectaron estos eventos al hogar en terminos de la vivienda, la salud de las 
personas, sus bienes, su ingreso, su educación, y otros efectos relevantes? 
 
31. ¿Que acciones tomaron para enfrentar estos eventos y prevenir danos futuros? 
(Por ejemplo: llamar a los bomberos, reubicarse temporalmente, reparaciones a 
casa, hacer canales al lado de la casa, buscar prestamo, buscar el apoyo de la 
junta, hacer obras comunitarias.) 
 
SI NO HAN SENTIDO NUNGIN EFECTO 
32. ¿Perciben que viven en una zona en que podian presentar este tipo de 
fenomeno? 
 No   
 Si   
Si si: ¿Por qué? ¿Que acciones han tomado para prevenir danos futuros? 
(Por ejemplo: nada, llamar a los bomberos, reparaciones a casa, hacer canales al 
lado de la casa, buscar prestamo, buscar el apoyo de la junta, hacer obras 
comunitarias.) 
 
33. ¿Ustedes fueron incluidos en unas de los siguientes medidas? 
1. Desalojo inmediato de la vivienda  
2. Restriccion parcial de uso 
3. Programa de reasentimiento  
4. Uso condicionado de la vivienda (mientras se hacen obras de mitigacion o 
estudios) 
5. Programa de mejoramiento integral de vivienda 
         Pase a 34 y 35.  
 
6. Ningun tipo de programa municipal  Pase a 36. 
 
34.  ¿Cómo sabian de las medidas que iban a tomar en la zona? 
Nunca sabia 
La DPAE hizo una visita a casa 
La DPAE ha hecho multiples visitas a mi casa 
En una reunion con la DPAE 
En un taller con la DPAE 
En una reunion comunitaria 
Por mis vecinos 
Otro – cual?.............................................................................................................. 
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35. ¿Nos puede describir que ha sido el proceso?  
¿Que tenian que hacer para ser incluidos (Por ejemplo: nada, mostrar prueba de 
venta, comprar prueba de tenencia, formar parte de una accion comunal, participar 
en un nuevo census)?  
¿Qué han implicado estas medidas por ustedes?  
¿Si no querian acceder al programa, porque?  
 
36. ¿Por qué no fue incluido? ¿Que acciones han tomado o estan tomando para 
ser incluidos? 
 
 
 
 
GRACIAS POR SU COLABORACION. 
 
OBSERVACIONES ADICIONALES DEL ENTREVISTADOR. 
(BUENA PERSONA PARA HACER UNA HISTORIA DE VIDA MAS AMPLIA? – 
PARECE CONFIABLE, ABIERTA, DISPUESTA) 
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